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ABSTRACT 
 From 1933 to 1945, the respective general staffs of Germany and Switzerland 
took two different paths in civil-military relations in German-speaking Europe. Whereas 
the German general staff did not prevent or substantially impede the rise of Hitler and his 
repressive policies, the Swiss counterpart constituted a fundamental pillar of liberal, 
democratic constitutional and institutional civilian control of armed forces. The study of 
these two siblings provides historical insights into the effects of liberal democratic values 
on military bodies in comparison to authoritarian views. The primary research question 
addressed is: How do liberal values and democratic civilian control affect the general 
staff’s role in a democracy in a time of domestic and international crisis? The author 
defines the liberal values of the general staff officers (endogenous factor) and the civilian 
control of democracy over its armed forces (exogenous factor) as independent variables, 
and the role of a general staff within a democracy as the dependent variable. The 
comparison of the two states’ general staffs from 1933 to 1945 emphasizes that liberal 
principles and the conviction of a democratic civilian authority as having moral primacy 
prevents a powerful military entity from becoming a mortician of democracy. This 
concept of moral primacy must be implanted within the hearts and minds of future 
general staff officers far earlier than at the start of military education. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
From 1933 to 1945 amid the epoch of total war, the German and the Swiss gen-
eral staffs (GS) took two different paths of civil–military relations in German-speaking 
Europe. Whereas the German GS neither prevented nor substantially impeded the rise of 
Hitler, his repressive policies, or his path of violence into World War II, the Swiss coun-
terpart constituted a fundamental pillar of liberal, democratic constitutional and institu-
tional civilian control of armed forces.1 The causes and course of this bifurcated devel-
opment is deeply rooted in the history of the German and Swiss GS within the 19th and 
early 20th century, to say nothing of the fate of democracy in mass politics in the two 
countries.2 A comparison of these two siblings provides historical insights into the effects 
of liberal democratic versus authoritarian worldviews on military bodies and, in the worst 
case, how badly military professionals in the brains of armies can harm an entire nation’s 
well-being. 
With this theme at its core, this thesis evaluates the decisive aspects, the causes 
and effects, and the implications of liberal values and democratic civilian control and 
their opposite for the GS of both Germany and Switzerland. It also analyzes these inter-
dependencies within the respective militaries and societies. The following is the primary 
                                                 
1 Hans Rapold, Zeit Der Bewährung? Die Epoche Um Den Ersten Weltkrieg 1907-1924 [the Swiss 
General Staff, Challenging Times? The Era Around World War I 1907-1924], Der Schweizerische 
Generalstab (Engl. The Swiss General Staff) 5 (Basel, Switzerland; Frankfurt at Main, Germany: Helbing 
& Lichtenhahn, 1988), 431; Gordon Alexander Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 
(London, U.K.; Oxford, U.K.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 469–70; Geoffrey P. Megargee, 
Inside Hitler’s High Command (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 16–17; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, 
Das Heer Und Hitler: Armee Und Nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933-1940 [the Army and Hitler: Armed 
Forces and the National-Socialist Regime 1933-1940], vol. 10 (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1969), 35–36; Walter Görlitz, History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945 (New York: 
Praeger, 1957), 276; Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann, Die Wehrmacht: Mythos Und Realität. 
Sonderausgabe [the Wehrmacht: Myth and Reality. Special Edition] (Munich, Germany: R. Oldenbourg, 
2012), 46. 
2 Viktor Hofer, Entstehung Und Entwicklung Einer Interdisziplinären Institution 1848-1874 [the 
Formation and Development of an Interdisciplinary Institution 1848-1874], vol. 2, Der Schweizerische 
Generalstab (the Swiss General Staff) (Basel, Switzerland; Frankfurt at Main, Germany: Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 1983), 7; Georges Rapp, Von Den Anfängen Bis Zum Sonderbundskrieg [from the Beginning 
Until the War Against the Sonderbund], Der Schweizerische Generalstab (the Swiss General Staff) 3 
(Basel, Switzerland; Frankfurt at Main, Germany: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1983), 5–6. 
2 
research question: How do liberal values and democratic civilian control affect the GS’s 
role in a democracy in a time of domestic and international crisis? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
After the German defeat in World War I, though formally abolished by the Ver-
sailles treaty, the German GS nonetheless preserved its institutions and above all its elite 
esprit de corps, nourished by a desire for revenge to undo defeat. The veterans of the 
Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) (Supreme Army Command of the Imperial German Armed 
Forces) in the epoch 1916–1918 in the new Truppenamt (troops office, the cover term for 
the hidden GS) exerted control of domestic and foreign politics, although it lost some of 
its political influence due to its de jure dissolution in the peace treaty. All the same, its 
leadership embarked on clandestine restoration of its role within the armed forces—the 
Reichswehr—of the German Reich’s successor state, the Weimar Republic.3 The GS still 
recognized war as the tool to shift the strategic balance in Europe and to undo the 1918 
defeat in a time to come.4 The GS favored and waited for a congenial political leadership 
willing to provide the political support to preserve German military power in Europe; to 
regain the requirements for a revisionist war; and to reestablish the former elite status of 
the military within the state and society.5 In terms of size, the reduced German officer 
corpsin particular, the GSnever fully adopted democratic values and the understand-
ing as well as the respect for civilian control of the armed forces.6 Nor did civilians in 
parliament and the cabinet impose constitutional limits on the political prerogatives of 
those in command of the army, with the net effect that after 1930, the politicized GS 
helped to destroy the republic leading up to the climax in 1932.7 
With the founding of the Swiss federal state in 1848 at the time of the widespread 
European revolutions against the Holy Alliance and the system of Metternich, liberal val-
                                                 
3 Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, 6. 
4 Megargee, 12. 
5 Megargee, 16. 
6 Megargee, 3. 
7 Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, 384, 467. 
3 
ues became the national idea and heavily influenced society, politics, and the military.8 
Since the Swiss Armed Forces (SAF) have long been based on conscription, the relation-
ship between the economic, political, societal, and military leadership has remained clos-
er and more intertwined than in other European states, especially as the Reichswehr could 
not employ conscription because of the Versailles treaty.9 Nonetheless, after 1880, the 
Prussian, and later the German GS became a role model for the structure, doctrine, and 
training of the Swiss high command as was the case in many nations throughout the 
world.10 Despite some relatively violent conflicts in Switzerland after 1919, no political 
radicalism succeeded in gaining enough public support to overthrow the democratic con-
stitution.11 The armed forcesin particular, the GSembodied no power factor within 
this struggle and proved their loyalty towards the democratic constitution and the civilian 
leadership.12 
But, why is the era before 1945 relevant for this study? Switzerland has supported 
numerous civilian and military security sector reform projects: in the Balkans and now in 
2019, particularly in Africa.13 The outlook for these projects of state building is not al-
ways bright. The overemphasis among Switzerland’s partners on such issues as pure 
technical and tactical military training in the face of tactical requirements always bears 
the risk of crafting and preparing a force with no understanding of liberal values or the 
essentials of nation-building and rule of law in the best sense. Tactics and force genera-
                                                 
8 Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies, 3rd ed 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 12. 
9 Rapold, Zeit Der Bewährung? Die Epoche Um Den Ersten Weltkrieg 1907-1924 [the Swiss General 
Staff, Challenging Times? The Era Around World War I 1907-1924], 9. 
10 Rudolf Jaun, Das Schweizerische Generalstabskorps 1875-1945 [the Corps of the Swiss General 
Staff Officers 1875-1945], vol. 8, Der Schweizerische Generalstab (the Swiss General Staff) (Basel, 
Switzerland; Frankfurt at Main, Germany: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1991), 436–37. 
11 Rapold, Zeit Der Bewährung? Die Epoche Um Den Ersten Weltkrieg 1907-1924 [the Swiss General 
Staff, Challenging Times? The Era around World War I 1907-1924], 336. 
12 Rapold, 431. 
13 Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, “Swiss Regional Police Cooperation Programme in 
the Western Balkans 2012-2016 | DCAF a Center for Security, Development and the Rule of Law,” ac-
cessed February 18, 2019, https://www.dcaf.ch/swiss-regional-police-cooperation-programme-western-
balkans-2012-2016; Chris Smith, “Security-Sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or Institutional 
Engineering?,” Conflict, Security & Development 1, no. 01 (April 2001): 6, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800100590595. 
4 
tion as the point of departure quite often entails a lack of respect for a liberal, democratic 
constitution—ready for all too many figures who undergo such training to then overthrow 
the government and democratic institutions.14 Based on the historical comparison 
between the German and the Swiss GS, and inspired by the concept “Innere Führung” of 
the original Federal German Bundeswehr, this thesis contains recommendations for the 
education, training, and mentoring of higher military leadership in democracies.15 Liberal 
values should guide this leadership rather than promote a cult of armed power devoid of 
restraints and prone to be a pillar in a totalitarian state, all military efficiency and 
battlefield success aside. Furthermore, the military leadership should be inherently 
encouraged to protect, rather than to threaten, a democratic constitution. Reflection about 
this contrast is a useful procedure for those in the higher realms of policy and strategy 
amid the crises of the present. One does not want to say that the 1930s are repeating 
themselves, but an encounter with the clash of military professionalism, force and 
statecraft in comparative perspective can spark more intense reflection about past and 
contemporary challenges to constitutions and soldiers. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research can be broadly classified into three distinct groups of literature 
across the two nations. The first group of sources covers the long and wide bibliography 
on the Prussian and later German GS. The second group of sources explains the Swiss 
equivalent—mainly within the series The Swiss General Staff. In contrast to the literature 
about the German GS, the Swiss literature very often refers to the German role model, as 
mentioned later. Both groups of literature cover the aspects of civilian control from their 
national perspectives. The third group approaches the generalized aspects of liberal val-
ues, civil–military relations, civilian control of armed forces, and security sector reform 
                                                 
14 Smith, “Security-Sector Reform,” 17. 
15 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 290. 
5 
(SSR). The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) adds a wide 
spectrum of documentation to the latter two domains.16 
1. Germany 
Faced with the need to repel Napoleon and his revolutionary army, between 1803 
and 1822, the paradigm of a GS or of GS officers was created in Prussia based on an 
initial memorandum of Lt. Gen. Gerhard von Scharnhorst.17 Throughout the 19th 
century, the military victories of Prussia over the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the kingdom 
of Denmark, and France led to the German unification in 1871, and Prussian political and 
military supremacy within continental Europe. This success was largely the result of the 
enhanced military effectiveness within the bureaucratic managerial elite, enabled by the 
Prussian GS under the lead of field marshal Helmuth von Moltke.18 In fact, the success 
was the result of a comprehensive approach by the military, but also of political and 
diplomatic measures by the civilian administration and the diplomatic corps.19 In a 
process that began in the 1850s and reached its climax in the midst of the 1914–1918 
war, the Prussian GS was convinced of its strategic supremacy over civilian authorities, 
in particular, in military, but also in political matters.20 The organizational size of the 
German GS consistently grew over the decades from victory in the wars of 1864–1871 
until 1914. Consisting of 21 branches, 300 officers, and standardized working 
procedures, it was recognized as a “world-renowned military elite,”21 reached its peak in 
wartime, with almost full authority over operations, strategy, and administration.22 
                                                 
16 Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, “About SSG/R | DCAF a Center for Security, De-
velopment and the Rule of Law,” accessed February 18, 2019, https://www.dcaf.ch/about-ssgr. 
17 Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, 31–32. 
18 Hofer, Entstehung Und Entwicklung Einer Interdisziplinären Institution 1848-1874 [the Formation 
and Development of an Interdisciplinary Institution 1848-1874], 2:5–6. 
19 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941 (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1971), 10. 
20 Alexander B Bitter, “Kurt Von Schleicher the Soldier and Politics in the Run-up to National Social-
ism: A Case Study of Civil-Military Relations” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 3. 
21 Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, 2. 
22 Megargee, 3. 
6 
After the defeat in World War I and the Versailles peace treaty in 1919, the allies 
forced the Weimar Republic to dissolve the GS, at least on paper and in the view of the 
public. In reality, the entity went under wraps where it developed a particular 
aggressiveness in multiple directions of effort: diplomatic, technological, and ideological 
in nature. The defeated unveiled a kind of hybrid war against the Versailles treaty and the 
dictates of disarmament by the remaining GS officers, with Wilhelm Groener and Hans 
von Seeckt in the lead. This dissolution, however, did not happen because the essential 
structures—planning, organization, and intelligence cells as well as the military history 
branch—were hidden and survived in multiple elements and organizations within the 
camouflaged high command of the Reichswehr until Hitler came into power.23 This 
contained autonomy of the Reichswehr, almost completely out of control of civilian 
authorities or parliamentary checks and balances, was only possible due to constitutional 
insufficiencies.24 The fact that, unlike in the epoch 1935–1944 in the Third Reich and 
also in the era 1949–1965 in the Federal Republic of Germany, Gen. Hans von Seeckt, 
the chief of the Truppenamt from 1920 until 1926, preserved the essential aspects of 
Moltke’s GS within the Reichswehr and re-invented the old term of the unpolitical armed 
forces.25 In short, the Weimar Republic failed to integrate its armed forces as a 
legitimated and regulated element of state power within the democratic, constitutional 
framework.26 
                                                 
23 Rapold, Zeit Der Bewährung? Die Epoche Um Den Ersten Weltkrieg 1907-1924 [the Swiss General 
Staff, Challenging Times? The Era Around World War I 1907-1924], 32; Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High 
Command, 3. 
24 Bitter, “Kurt Von Schleicher the Soldier and Politics in the Run-up to National Socialism: A Case 
Study of Civil-Military Relations,” 49. 
25 Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, 382; Bitter, “Kurt Von Schleicher the Soldier 
and Politics in the Run-up to National Socialism: A Case Study of Civil-Military Relations,” 56; Gordon 
Alexander Craig, “Army and National Socialism 1933–1945: The Responsibility of the Generals,” World 
Politics 2, no. 03 (April 1950): 432, https://doi.org/10.2307/2008913; Hans Senn, Erhaltung Und 
Verstärkung Der Verteidigungsbereitschaft Zwischen Den Beiden Weltkriegen [the Maintaining and 
Strengthening of the Readiness for Defense Between the World Wars], vol. 6, Der Schweizerische General-
stab (the Swiss General Staff) (Basel, Switzerland; Frankfurt at Main, Germany: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 
1991), 38. 
26 Bitter, “Kurt Von Schleicher the Soldier and Politics in the Run-up to National Socialism: A Case 
Study of Civil-Military Relations,” 85. 
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The unique selection, education, and training of the Prussian German GS officer 
had been initiated by Scharnhorst in the Napoleonic period, and forced by the chiefs of 
GS, Gen. Karl von Reyher and his successor von Moltke in the mid-19th century. This 
approach was a leading reason for the military proficiency of the Prussian and German 
GS amid the rise of managerial practice in the industrial age and the reinvention of elites 
in the face of revolutionary and national movements.27 One important aspect of the staff 
and line was the recurrent exchange between postings within a field command, and post-
ings in a staff that accumulated knowledge as well as staff work and field experience; this 
was combined with an excellence in education and training that set standards for all lead-
ing armies of the world.28 Another key determinant was the leadership principle “com-
mand by directive,”29 which arose from Clausewitz and was then perfected by Moltke 
and his successors. In contrast, the French staff officers remained merely the executors of 
orders from above (i.e., for the general officers) until the founding of the École Supéri-
eure de Guerre (Higher War College) in 1880; that is, in the wake of defeat by Prussia 
and the general trend in the late 19th century to imitate German practice.30 However, von 
Moltke abolished Scharnhorst’s ideal of a comprehensive general education, substantially 
determined by the more liberal and universalist paradigms of “decency, joy in responsi-
bility, and mental force”31 in favor of an education “narrowly”32 based on military skills, 
with a heavy emphasis on tactics and operations.33 The outcome of this purely military-
tactical training at the War Academy in Berlin led to a uniform mindset and worldview 
that emphasized a strategy of anniliation, maneuver, and fire in battleusually conceived 
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in abstraction from its strategic and political context as these phenomena evolved after 
about 1900. This military training was determined by a rigorous system of selection at an 
early age and an integrated curriculum taught by a highly proficient, but solely military 
faculty, and this training carried social prestige equal to or greater than that of a civilian 
university.34 It is worth noting, however, the duration of training at the War Academy 
was shortened from three to two years shortly after Hitler came into power.35 Especially 
in the Reichswehr, the German officer corps, particularly the GS, systematically disad-
vantaged officers with a liberal, democratic worldview who then tended to leave the 
armed forces.36 For the Reichswehr as constituted from 1921 onward, any political ac-
tivity was prohibited, which made many officers politically ill prepared for the radicaliza-
tion of the republic and disenabled them to embrace democratic control of the military to 
the extent such was possible in the years 1921–1930.37 The result of this insularity that 
aspired to be apolitical combined with the narrow scope of an exclusive military train-
ing—although very profound—almost perfectly merged with the anti-intellectual attitude 
of the National Socialists. It made it practically impossible for the German officer corps 
to resist Hitler’s promise in February 1933 of the armed forces' role as the second pillar 
of the regime along with the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP).38 
In the Prussian state, the estates became the core of the dynasty and the army. In 
Prussia, contrary to Switzerland, and despite Field Marshal Count August Neidhardt von 
Gneisenau’s early claims for a liberal constitution in 1808, the liberal revolution of 1848–
1849 had been suppressed with military power also provided by the tsar and also operat-
ing in the same fashion in Habsburg.39 After 1866, a rapidly rising middle class forced 
the Prussian king to agree to concessions about power in the state and a unified Germa-
                                                 
34 Van Creveld, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, 100–101. 
35 Peter Hoffman, Stauffenberg - a Family History, 1905-1944 (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2003), 80. 
36 Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, 232. 
37 Craig, 385. 
38 Van Creveld, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, 32–33. 
39 Hoffman, Stauffenberg - a Family History, 1905-1944, 100. 
9 
ny.40 By the middle of the 19th century, the nobles and the middle class shared two simi-
larities: a strong sense of nationalism, and the admiration for a powerful military.41 In the 
final decades of the 19th century, and in particular after the dismissal of Chancellor Bis-
marck in 1890, the GS—strengthened by its military successes—became a power onto 
itself as the strategic situation of the Reich became more problematic. The GS as func-
tional elite gradually and essentially undercut and deflected civilian and royal control 
mechanisms.42 The king, later the emperor, became more and more the role of a figure-
head without effective command and control within the German Reich. The monarch suf-
fered, despite all appearance of centralization and efficiency to the contrary, a disaggre-
gated and dysfunctional unity of government within the leading entities in the armed 
forces. Although the reformers in the Napoleonic era, led by Scharnhorst, opened the of-
ficer corps to the middle class at the beginning of the 19th century, the extremely con-
servative mindset and the caste system determined the German officer corps especially 
through 1933 and then opened itself to National Socialism when the regime change oc-
curred at that time.43 This conservative mindset was almost unconditionally linked to the 
centuries-long Prussian tradition of absolute loyalty to the dynastic state based on the 
estates of nobility and the officer corps, because “the army serves the state, only the state; 
for it is the state.” 44 
Although the republican government of the Weimar Republic depended upon the 
Reichswehr to maintain order mostly against the communists, the army was never fully 
integrated in the executive and reconciled with the legislative, as was the case in mature 
democracies. Almost the entire officer corps of the Reichswehr nurtured a political stance 
enshrined in Seeckt’s writings about the army being the state itself and, as such, alien to 
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civil rights and the political business of a normal democracy. The rule of law was deflect-
ed by remnants of military privilege, and the spirit of a democratic constitution failed to 
permeate the military as required by the revolution in 1919.45 In contrast, the state of cri-
sis brought forth a clique of politicized soldiers like the last chancellor of the Weimar 
Republic, Kurt von Schleicher, who successfully deepened this anti-democratic atti-
tude.46 The German officer corps, and particularly the GS, had successfully preserved its 
Praetorian-guard character.47 After 1933, Hitler provided the political support that the 
military leadership had desired for a long time.48 Critical officers, like Gen. Ludwig 
Beck, the chief of the German GS until 1938 and later a prominent member of the mili-
tary resistance against Hitler, represented the minority and Hitler subsequently replaced 
almost all politically non-conforming officers within the GS. 49 Yet, many in the military 
leadership always looked down on the “Bohemian corporal,” being sure to abandon him 
if he would oppose the legitimacy of the officer corps; they did not realize that he already 
successfully undermined the historical traditions, the political and military judgment, and 
the honor code of the officer corps.50 In fact, the constant influx of young, already politi-
cally conforming officers continuously undermined the position of opponents like Beck 
or conservative neutralists.51 
The unconditional loyalty to the state (Hitler was the state after the infamous oath 
pledge in 1934), the uniform mindset, and the narrow intellectual worldview, combined 
with a conservative, anti-democratic attitude within a closed network of like-minded of-
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ficers—a state within the state—created a perfectly levelled ground for the National So-
cialist ideology.52 Hitler successfully linked personal loyalty to him with unconditional 
loyalty to the state. He further linked the GS’s elitism with the egalitarianism of the Na-
tional Socialist ideology, and the GS’s military proficiency with the pledge of military 
supremacy within Europe.53 
2. Switzerland 
In contrast to Germany, the term “general staff” was not properly defined in Swit-
zerland until 1874, due to the reformation of the Swiss Confederation after its defeat by 
Napoleon in 1798–99, the founding of the modern federal republic, and the merger of the 
cantonal armies into national armed forces after 1848.54 A clear distinction between of-
ficers who served in higher staffs, aide-de-camps for general officers, or a structure of a 
joint staff, as it existed in Prussia, did not exist.55 The idea of a GS officer, a leader who 
thinks more broadly, jointly, and more profoundly than the rest of the officer corps 
emerged after the first joint operations within the Napoleonic era in Prussia. In 1822, the 
term “general staff officer” was mentioned for the first time in Switzerland to describe 
those officers who were the primary advisors for the general officers. Nonetheless, de-
fined role profiles, a tailor-made education, and a special selection of personnel were in-
troduced much later, during active duty in World War I.56 
The term “general staff” determined three designations: first, the corps of the GS 
officers, which in fact was (and still is) the pool of personnel; second, the GS within the 
department of defense; and third, the “Great General Staff,” the armed forces staff.57 The 
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latter two formed the commanding structure for the commander in chief, the General who 
will be elected by the parliament only in wartime.58 Despite the German defeat in World 
War I, from 1822 until 1945, the Prussian GS, later the German GS, provided the 
blueprint for its Swiss counterpart.59 
Although not a surprise, the Swiss definition for the organization “general staff” 
is not substantially different from its German role model. The GS is a hierarchically 
structured, leading military entity within organized armed forces to support the supreme 
military leaders. The GS consists of highly qualified, highly educated, and profoundly 
trained officers. The GS is a centralized authority under the lead of a chief of GS. The GS 
has several specific missions: first, in peacetime, to increase the effectiveness of the 
armed forces by providing an appropriate structure, modern armament, equipment, and 
military training of highest standards; second, to obtain accurate knowledge of the 
strength, effectiveness, and war preparations of all potentially adverse and allied armed 
forces, as well as to plan, organize, and prepare the national defense based on this 
information; and third, in wartime, to act as the sole command structure for the 
commander in chief.60 The similarities between the German and the Swiss GS were 
exemplarily shown by the descriptions for the GS functions, and the internal structure of 
the armed forces staff.61 Despite this, due to the federal structure and the militia princi-
ple, explained later, it took until 1935 to implement all except one feature of the German 
GS concept.62 The only feature that has not been implemented is the complete profes-
sionalization of the military leadership. Not only the enlisted personnel but also the offic-
ers, including the GS officers, have been selected based on conscription, which was sus-
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pended in Germany during the period 1919–1935.63 Yet, this missing feature did not sub-
stantially hamper the operational planning capabilities of the Swiss GS since it proved to 
be able to prepare and execute the defense plan “Reduit” within a short period.64 This 
defense plan, carefully coordinated with civilian measures, remained the determining fac-
tor for the Swiss strategic approach throughout World War II.65 
Nevertheless, due to conscription being based on the militia principle—modern 
Switzerland never had a substantial military career force—Switzerland’s officer corps 
always lacked the comprehensive military training and experience, and this characteristic 
substantially distinguished it from its German role model.66 In 1847, Gen. Guillaume 
Henri Dufour, the commander in chief during the last war on Swiss soil, the “war against 
the Sonderbund,” denounced the inadequate education and training of the higher officer 
corps as well as the structure of the educational institutions. In 1854, the veteran organi-
zations launched an initiative to create a professorship at the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology, today ETH Zurich, which was the historical origin of the today’s Swiss Mil-
itary Academy.67 The chief of staff of the GS during World War I admonished that a GS 
officer may possess comprehensive military knowledge and complete operational under-
standing.68 These statements constitute a typical dilemma of the education and training of 
military forces in democracies. Armed forces that provide high military efficiency 
through professionalization can pose a threat in a weak democracy and in a time of crisis 
(i.e., Germany in 1929–1932), by transforming the military into a Praetorian guard. By 
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contrast, a conscript military force, formed of citizen-soldiers, often lacks military profi-
ciency but represents the nation’s pluralism.69 
According to a federal councilor, the corps of the GS officers constitutes a part of 
the military and societal elite of Switzerland. This elite is not a caste; in fact, based on its 
societal or economic position of relative power and influence over the controlled used of 
force, it represents an essential link between politics, society, the economy, and even cul-
ture. This elite may prove its unconditional will to serve the nation far above the devotion 
demanded of the ordinary citizen, both in the armed forces as well in the everyday life in 
civil society.70 The Swiss federal state, constituted in 1848 and substantially reformed in 
1874, is devoted to the principle of neutrality71 relative to the European security system 
and its global adjuncts.72 Switzerland eventually adapted its policy of neutrality, howev-
er, in accordance with the international situation, and with respective effects on the mili-
tary strategy especially as the great power system lurched into the epoch of total war.73 
The Swiss society, politics, and armed forces have been heavily inclined to the principles 
of liberalism and direct democracy as fundamental state paradigms of the Swiss nation-
state, determined by a classical pattern of service at arms to the federation and communi-
ty without compensation—the militia principle.74 The militia principle (from a military 
perception) had its European origins in antiquity in both Greece and Rome, and then in 
the medieval period, particularly, in various European states of the pre-modern era. The 
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militia concept used in Switzerland is then comparable to the recruitment principle of the 
U.S. National Guard, or the idea of the “Minute Men” who defended themselves and the 
United States with only the smallest cadre of regular soldiers in the equivalent to a Euro-
pean standing army.75 Within Swiss society, two civil–military factors determine social 
status: the civilian profession, and the civilian education. While the second determinant 
can be recognized as a precondition for the first one, together these determinants were 
inevitable to reach higher positions, within the political sphere as well as the armed forc-
es.76 Both careers were often interlinked and reinforced each other.77 This link can also 
be recognized in the close cooperation between GS, intelligence services, department of 
state, and other civilian authorities.78 In short, a high social status in the civil and the mil-
itary role was only achievable with a worldview determined by liberal values (in the un-
derstanding of the 19th century), a higher civilian education but completed with a particu-
lar sequence of military training, and a successful position in the economy, which is not 
necessarily the case in nation-states with a dynastic and anti-capitalist tradition. 
3. Liberal Values and Civilian Control of Armed Forces 
While a simple definition of liberalism as it applies to this topic might be found in 
the concept of civil rights and human rights merged with an idea of checks and balances 
as well as free enterprise, it is very difficult to distinguish between the strands of constitu-
tional liberalism, economic liberalism, and social liberalism. In fact, liberal values com-
prise all three elements, which in the mind of many professional soldiers, are thought to 
be either anathema to military order or, at the very least, should be subordinate to the 
eternal values of the soldier and unyielding dictates of combat.79 In a contemporary 
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approach, liberal values can be defined as the following determinants: equal dignity of 
each individual with inalienable human rights, freedom of the individual and the 
community in coexistence with others, and personal responsibility for own actions or 
omissions.80 
Furthermore, democratic civilian control of armed forces can be generally defined 
as follows: first, military affairs follow some coherent political purpose determined by 
the sovereign, which, in this case, is a democratically elected government with the 
constitutional features of checks and balances. These restraints apply to the supreme 
command of the forces, as well as to power of the purse, and also to the disposition of the 
armed forces in domestic disturbances, as well as the application of human rights in the 
inner structure or inner life of the army. Central to this requirement is fair and lasting 
peace based on a link of the individual and collective action on the national and 
international legal system, including the national and international monopoly of force, 
and as sketched previously, separation of powers through a system of mutual control of 
power and procedural democratic decision making.81 Switzerland’s neighbors over time 
have faced an ongoing challenge to achieve these goals of policy. 
4. Civil–Military Relations and Security Sector Reform 
The three main aspects that determine the civil–military relations in a democracy 
are the liberal-democratic constitution and its institutional approach of democratic civil-
ian control, or oversight, of armed forces; the power(s) of the nation-state and how these 
powers will be executed; and finally, the role of the soldier within this democracy.82 In 
the wake of defeat in 1945, as a contrast to the case of 1918, the Federal Republic of 
Germany institutionalized the democratic civilian control of the Bundeswehr within the 
amendments to the 1949 Basic Law enacted in the period after 1955. The first semi-
official expression of this goal of policy was in the Himmerod memorandum, a planning 
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document drafted in the fall of 1950, sketching out in broad lines a future West German 
contribution to transatlantic defense. This document emerged from a secret meeting in the 
Eiffel Mountains in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War, which compelled the 
Bonn government to perform the unthinkable of founding a new army even as war crimi-
nals were still being executed by the victors. By 1953, this vague wish became known 
among a group of ex-soldiers in the Bonn government under the title of Innere Führung, 
which cannot be precisely translated. It nonetheless means a concept of fundamental 
principles of service that reconcile civil rights with the imperatives of military discipline 
as is common among established democracies.83 This concept has been adopted as role 
model by other democratic armed forces and the Geneva Center for Security Sector Gov-
ernance (DCAF).84 The links between the soldier, his or her education, excellence (or 
not) of citizenship for a role within the democracy, and his or her own relation to the 
democratic institutions comprise civil–military relations. At the same time, these issues 
are complex and prone to much misunderstanding about the limits of service and disci-
pline, especially in societies in crisis.85 
The term security sector reform is an invention of the 1990s, and arose because of 
the insufficiency of the conventional term of civil–military relations that was revived as 
the Warsaw Pact collapsed by 1991 and the Central and Eastern Europeans freed of the 
Russian yoke looked for an alternative to the Soviet model army and party army that had 
held sway since 1946. Security sector reform must be understood in its strategic and 
transforming dimension, which affects the stability of a nation-state.86 If security sector 
reform only concentrates on the institutional management of the greater efficiency of 
structures, the streamlining of equipment procurement, and the routine training of tech-
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nical military skills; the results of this effort—disconnected from the imperatives of con-
stitutions and some coherent political purpose grounded in democratic statecraft—can be 
dangerous for a pluralist constitution.87 Decisive for a successful security sector reform is 
the formation of a strong, durable democracy in a resilient and strong state joined with 
advanced education for the leadership (which has to include the education of liberal val-
ues), based on democratic integration of the armed forces within the practice of state and 
society that is anything other than the dynastic, authoritarian, or totalitarian state poi-
soned by the leadership principle and also damaged by the misuse of the armed forces for 
ends that are alien to their inherent character.88 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
The author defines two independent variables in this research: the liberal values of 
the GS officers (endogenous factor), and the civilian control of a democracy over its 
armed forces (exogenous factor). 
Furthermore, the author operationalizes liberal values through eight aspects. The 
first aspect is the attitude of the GS officers toward the polity and to what extent the GS 
recognizes the concept of the state matters. The second aspect is the experience of and 
respect for democratic-procedural norms of political pluralism. It is crucial for the mind-
set of a democratic GS officer that he or she gain not only theoretical knowledge, but also 
practical experience of political pluralism in order to accept democracy. This aspect is of 
particular importance since democratic policy-making procedures are fundamentally dif-
ferent from military decision-making processes. The third aspect is the extent of ac-
ceptance of a civilian authority over military affairs. It is decisive that the military leader-
ship unconditionally accepts decisions of civilian authorities, even in the case that the de-
cisions are against the military. The fourth aspect is the extent and the proficiency of ci-
vilian education. A profound education provides the crucial understanding of the ad-
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vantages of pluralism. The fifth aspect is the mindset and worldview of the GS officer. 
The absorption of liberal or authoritarian perceptions is a base determinant for the GS’s 
patterns of action. The sixth aspect is the extent of acceptance of heterogeneity within 
one’s own social group. The exclusion of contradictory opinions, mindsets, and 
worldviews, among others, can lead to a narrow set of courses of actions, respectively, or 
courses of omissions. The seventh aspect is the self-understanding of the role of a soldier 
in the state. The self-understanding of the GS’s role can be perceived from two distinct 
positions, the position as a servant of the state (democratic) or the position as a ruler of 
the state (authoritarian), which is decisive for the GS’s behavior as an entity. The eighth 
aspect is the interpretation of elitism within the framework of the state. Inflated elitism, 
especially if understood in a narrow military context, can lead to a susceptibility for au-
thoritarian leaders (messiah effect), which is critical for the responsible or irresponsible 
actions of a GS. 
The author operationalizes civilian control of armed forces through five aspects. 
The first aspect is the state structure and the determining social paradigms. The precondi-
tion for civilian control of armed forces is the existence of a state structure that can pro-
vide procedural instruments for the control of armed forces. Also, the state determining 
social paradigms have to allow those instruments to work effectively. The constitutional 
checks and balances are the second aspect. Without procedural norms, which are con-
stantly limiting and restricting the military’s autonomy, effective control of armed forces 
is unlikely. The third aspect is the degree of autonomy within institutional limits. Re-
sponsible and successful military actions are not possible without a certain degree of au-
tonomy. Nonetheless, the control-autonomy ratio between civilian control and military 
autonomy is decisive for the role of a GS. The fourth aspect is the integration of the 
armed forces within the institutional framework. Armed forces that are a foreign body in 
a democratic state are very likely to develop a Praetorian-guard character. The fifth 
aspect is the degree of professionalization of the GS. A highly professionalized and pure-
ly military-skilled GS is likely to develop itself into a state within the state. 
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The dependent variable, as depicted in Figure 1, is the role of a GS within a de-
mocracy. The author operationalizes the role through two factors: the actions and the 
omissions of a GS as an entity. 
The author determines the causal mechanism as follows: first, the GS acts as a 
protector of democracy if the GS officers’ liberal values and the civilian control of armed 
forces is positively related to the role of the GS within a democracy; second, the GS acts 
as a mortician of democracy if the GS officers’ liberal values and the civilian control of 
armed forces is negatively related to the role of the GS within a democracy. 
 
 Hypothesis. 
Since the substantial military parameters are not significantly different, the author 
argues that the civilian education, influenced by pluralistic and liberal paradigms in the 
second half of the 19th century in Switzerland, first created a unique form of societal 
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elitism that connected politics, society, military, and culture; and second, crafted 
fundamentally democratic, social, and institutional norms to control the armed forces by 
civilian authorities. In constrast to the German GS, the principally different 
understanding of an elite and the fundamentally democratic norms within the Swiss civil 
society shaped the Swiss GS as protector of democracy. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a qualitative, comparative analysis and focuses primarily on histori-
cal analyses. Since liberal values and the degree of civilian control of armed forces are 
difficult to operationalize in a quantitative approach, a qualitative analysis is most appro-
priate. The study uses a multitude of secondary, as well as several primary sources, to 
evaluate and assess the hypothesis. Published books, official transcripts, and academic 
articles account for the secondary literature, while personal records as primary sources 
account for the case study of Lt. Gen. Herbert Constam. The case study illustrates the as-
pect of “acceptance of heterogeneity within one’s own social group.” The results of the 
case study refer to the primary sources within the appendices. 
This thesis aims to examine and analyze historical cases systematically. The thesis 
summarizes both cases, Germany and Switzerland, and highlights similarities and dis-
crepancies related to the influences of the factors “liberal values” and “civilian control” 
on each GS’s actions. The results of the thesis intend to examine and weigh the causes 
and effects of liberal values and civilian control of armed forces. The analysis of the in-
terdependencies between the evaluated causes and effects bolsters the conclusion, which 
includes recommendations for security sector reform projects to avoid similar effects (as 
in the Weimar Republic) within young and potentially unstable democracies engaged in 
ongoing security sector reform. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is structured into six chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter II 
explores the role of the German GS within the Weimar Republic and during the Third 
Reich. Since the Prussian GS, which later became the German GS, constitutes the role 
model for the Swiss counterpart, it is crucial to examine the German case first in order to 
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interpret the German influence on the Swiss GS correctly. Chapter III explores the role of 
the Swiss GS within the modern federal state of Switzerland during the same period. 
Chapter IV is dedicated to the case study, which emphasizes heterogeneity as a strength 
and not a weakness of an elite entity. Chapter V draws comparisons and discusses simi-
larities and discrepancies between the Swiss and the German GS. Chapter VI ties the re-
search together and draws an overall conclusion in order to sharpen the recommendations 
for security sector reform projects in young democracies. 
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II. THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN GERMANY 
This chapter characterizes the role of the German GS within the setting of the re-
search question and the specified period, which includes the different structures and or-
ganizations in relation to the term GS. The chapter intentionally describes aspects that are 
beyond the examined era (1933 until 1945) because the designated aspects had impacts 
within the specified period or are of vital interest for the context’s understanding. The 
author limits his analysis primarily to the GS of the army, in contrast to the navy and the 
air force of the Wehrmacht. Before 1871, the author limits his analysis solely to the Prus-
sian GS. Chapter II does not draw comparative conclusions or statements in relation to 
the Swiss GS, as those are exclusively described in Chapters V and VI. 
A. LIBERAL VALUES WITHIN THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF CORPS 
In this section, the author describes and measures the extent of liberal values with-
in the German GS corps (army). The section intends to outline and conceptualize the ab-
stract construct ‘liberal values’ within this specified social group. The author does not 
intend to compare the German GS with its Swiss counterpart, except in cases that are in-
evitable for the understanding of the context. 
1. The Attitude of the General Staff Officers toward the Polity 
Most scholars would agree with the scholar Harold Gordon that the primary fac-
tors influencing the attitude of the German officer corps prior until 1945 are nationalism, 
monarchism, and the belief in the military’s superiority beyond the Prussian and later 
German society. Extensive patriotism, which most external observers would assess as 
chauvinism, in connection to the disappearance of the imperial pole star after the German 
defeat in World War I led to an ambiguous self-understanding of the officer corps within 
24 
the subsequent periods of absolutism, militarism, totalitarianism, and democracy.89 In 
Prussia, today part of Poland, Russia (Kaliningrad), and Lithuania, the origins of the 
Prussian soldier elite were determined by the traditional rural nobility, the Junkers, which 
influenced the German officer corps until the end of WWII. In order to describe the men-
tality of the Prussian and subsequent German officer corps, it is important to consider the 
feudal-bourgeois, military-civilian, intellect-instinct, conservative-liberal, mind-
character, and rural-urban contradistinctions.90 
Imperial Germany, or the second Reich, was an astonishing amalgamation of ab-
solutist, liberal, Enlighted politics and society, which affected the first German republic 
in 1919. Among the determining paradigms for the foundation of the second Reich in 
1871 were the defeat of absolutist Prussia by Napoleon in 1806; the only short-lived ef-
fects of the reformers among Stein, Boyen, and Scharnhorst; the restoration phase after 
the congress of Vienna in 1815 until 1848; and the suppressed Prussian liberal revolution 
in 1848. The Emperor made limited concessions to constitutionalism, most arguably to 
maintain and consolidate this power within the state. One of these concessions was the 
general conscription. In times of Germany’s rise as a nation state but under increasing 
tensions between the classes, conscription must have been seen as a principle of equality 
and nation-building. Service created an individual relationship between society and the 
state in the soldier as a German. The army was a stabilizing factor among the society, the 
state, and the elites. The army provided the nation-state the power to play a role in Eu-
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rope, but it also became a structural element of an authoritarian and militarized state or-
der.91 
The officer corps was bound by a personal oath to the state symbol—the crown—
which saw itself as functional bearer and executor of state power. The crown tried to re-
sist societal or economic changes of the mid and late 19th century, such as urbanization 
and industrialization, until WWI. The officer corps not only constituted a new first estate 
within the Prussian kingdom, and later the German empire, it also established itself as the 
leading entity of state power within the monarchy. The tandem officer corps-crown, with 
its pre-industrial attitude and mentality, outlived every structural change of the polity un-
til WWI in almost intact condition.92 The collapse of the German empire in 1918, how-
ever, also represented the downfall of the officer corps’ universe, since the officer corps 
had been linked through the crown to the state.93 
With respect to the situation after the German defeat in WWI, most scholars 
would define the German officer corps’ political attitude as mostly homogeneous. The 
overwhelming majority of officers were and remained minimally distant, maximally hos-
tile towards the new Weimar Republic, its democracy, parliamentary rule, and political 
parties. The world of party politics and pluralism were alien to most officers. Some fac-
tions of the corps accepted the inevitable historical changes and tried to live with them. 
For almost all of them, though, the system of Weimar and Versailles represented the 
forces that destroyed the Perpetuum mobile of the officer corps’ heart and mind.94 Be-
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sides, the officers understood the downfall in WWI more as political and economic, ra-
ther than as a military defeat in which the officer corps retained excellence of skill.95 
The person who most affected the anti-democratic and anti-republican attitude of 
the German officer corps and the GS, in its camouflaged form, was Gen. Hans von 
Seeckt, who became chief of staff in 1921. According to both Gordon and Francis Car-
sten, Seeckt was a convinced monarchist during his entire life. Nevertheless, he was a 
realist and knew that a royal restoration would be rather unlikely; also, he was well aware 
of William II’s individual deficiencies. Seeckt served the German state for its sake, but he 
remained aloof from the constitution and nurtured the ideal of a new Reich.96 From his 
aristocratic perspective, he conceived democrats—also the new president of the republic, 
Friedrich Ebert; and the Reichswehrminister (SECDEF), Gustav Noske (both were So-
cial–Democrats)—as anti-royal parvenus.97 The definition that best describes this sort of 
German officer would be Vernunftrepublikaner (rational republican).98 
The active German officers in 1919–1921 had been raised along with the princi-
ples of strict royalism that endured despite state and society as it existed in the years 
1919–1930. According to Gerhard Ritter and Karl Demeter, although not the majority, a 
substantial share of the officer corps derived from the Prussian military nobility, the Jun-
kers. The majority of the officers, derived from the bourgeoisie, had been assimilated into 
the esprit de corps of the Prussian and German officer corps, facilitated by the national-
istic mainstream of the late 19th century. The entire inheritance of a profession by virtue 
of generations of officers created the expectation of a pivotal role within the state. This 
role must be linked to a special status within the state and exclusive rights and privileges. 
This linkage had its roots in the pastoral-feudal form of the Frederician Prussian society 
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and dated back in part to the early modern period. This view was entirely antagonistic to 
the reality of the urban-bourgeois world in the early 20th century. The perception and 
feeling of being completely uprooted is a crucial determinant for the German officer 
corps after 1919. The successor of the old armies, the Reichswehr, was in general apoliti-
cal, as directed by Seeckt, to nullify the free-booter spirit of the epoch 1919–1923. Yet, 
the military leadership had sympathies with the rightwing parties—similar to France—
simply because those parties spoke for the political agenda of officers.99 
2. Experience of and Respect for Democratic-Procedural Norms of Polit-
ical Pluralism 
The officer corps, including the elite cadre of the GS which now operated in se-
cret, had in former times superficially adhered to an apolitical ideal. Moreover, one can 
say that sophisticated experience of parliament and political parties among the German 
officers was almost non-existent. Francis Ludwig Carsten has explained that the German 
officer corps enjoyed prestige and influence via bypassing the domestic political realities 
that were unparalleled in democratic but also monarchical countries of that time. The po-
litical sphere played no part in military education and training and was of marginal im-
portance within internal discussions.100 
After the violent turmoil in the years 1919–1923 following the collapse of the old 
Empire, the Spartacist (Communist) as well as the Kapp-Luettwitz (radical right wing) 
coup attempts (mutiny of military formations), Seeckt banned all party politics in the 
ranks and proclaimed the policy of the unpolitical Reichswehr in order to expel all politi-
cal influences—from the left but also the right political spectrum—which could possibly 
disrupt the army’s coherence. This policy was supported not only by the first 
Reichswehrminister Noske, the Social–Democrat, but also by Seeckt’s more pragmatic 
predecessor, Gen. Walther Reinhardt.101 Seeckt’s quotes from this time are well known: 
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“There must be no party politics in the Reichswehr,” and “Two things are of basic im-
portance for the relationship [of the Reichswehr] to the people: absolute neutrality to-
wards all political movements, so long as they do not attempt armed revolution, and read-
iness to help everyone.”102 Indeed, Seeckt’s conviction must not be misunderstood as an 
attack against the German state, but as a warning to all political parties that the 
Reichswehr would not tolerate political instrumentalization by any party or particular in-
terest, according to Gordon.103 
Although Seeckt idealized the state within the state ideal and maintained his dis-
tance from the Weimar coalition parties (SPD, Center, and the Liberals), the officer corps 
and the Reichswehr as a whole were profoundly anti-Marxist/Bolshevik. His successors, 
the Generals Otto Hasse, Kurt von Schleicher, and Wilhelm Heye, followed the same 
path although they tried to reach an understanding with the most influential pro-Weimar 
faction within the parliament—the Reichstag—the Social-Democrats, according to Gor-
don.104 Yet, the economic and societal situation of defeat and the years of inflation and 
later the depression was a shock for many young officers. They felt inferior to civilians 
and the new men of Weimar, and were susceptible to new political approaches and doc-
trines, i.e., the Nazis. In contrast, older officers just refused to deal with politics in gen-
eral, resorting to nostalgia and dreams of a restoration of the old dynasties. The general 
aversion to parliamentarism among the officer corps played a key role within the later 
phase of political radicalization.105 Seeckt defined the Reichswehr as non-partisan state-
structure that embodied the state in its pure form, whereas political parties only manifest-
ed partisan interests that cost the nation its power. The anti-republican officers, confront-
ed with the principle of non-partisanship, had now an excuse to alienate themselves from 
politics and to cultivate their scornful stereotypes of the parliamentary state, democracy, 
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and party politics. The officer corps avoided identification with the new republic, and, in 
particular, with political factions that did not share the officer corps’ convictions.106 
Once the provisional Reichswehr passed into history, the new army law (Wehrge-
setz) of 1921 was framed to keep the Reichswehr away from political activity of any 
kind; however, the result was that the officer corps tended to be immunized not only 
against political radicalization but also against democracy and civilian control of the mili-
tary.107 This fact was not only an omission of the Reichswehr’s leadership, but also the 
failure of the most influential parties within the Weimar parliament. The major problem 
was the complicated relationship between the army and the Majority Socialists (later the 
Social Democrats). The Majority Socialists saw the Reichswehr as a stronghold of reac-
tionaries and conservatives while the army disdained the Majority Socialist as anti-
German, anti-patriots, Pacifists, and Marxists. A rapprochement between these two would 
have substantially contributed to the stabilization of the political situation in Germany in 
the first half of the 1920s.108 The refusal to cooperate between these two influential fac-
tions within the German republic would have changed the situation at the onset of Hit-
ler’s rise to power.109 Thus, the relations between the Reichswehr and the radical right-
wing parties, in particular, the Nazi party, were initially cordial but became more distant 
until 1927, following Hitler’s 1923 coup, according to Matthias Strohn.110 The supreme 
army command disapproved the extremists’ radicalization and distrusted their leadership 
claims despite some appealing aspects, such as rearmament.111 Finally, as Gordon has 
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convincingly outlined, absolute neutrality in political affairs is extremely difficult to 
maintain, particularly when the neutral entity finds itself in the focus of controversy.112 
The majority of the officer corps, and the GS officers, in particular, did not show 
fundamental respect for democratic norms or political pluralism, and did not accept a par-
liamentary democracy.113 However, despite sins of individuals like the protagonists of 
the Kapp-Luettwitz coup, the Reichswehr as a group made progress towards an ac-
ceptance of the republic during the early and mid-1920s and Seeckt’s isolationist course 
ended with his departure after 1927 since it became clear that a depoliticization would be 
unsustainable in the long run.114 The deep-rooted disrespect for democratic procedural 
norms within the officer corps, the leading entity of the Weimar Republic and its belief 
that an authoritarian government would be more suitable for the expected next war fueled 
the officer corps’ conviction that the end would justify the means. Most officers accepted 
and even welcomed Hitler’s rise to power in the years 1930–1933.115 The officer corps 
silently and willingly agreed that pluralistic diversity—as the core of liberal democracy 
and as an expression of the officer corps’ inner disruption about a never accepted state-
form—would be replaced by a totalitarian, militaristic, nationalistic, and racist integra-
tion.116 
3. Acceptance of Civilian Authority over Military Affairs 
As the leadership of the Reichswehr, the officer corpsincluding the GS officers 
who were referred to as Fuehrergehilfen due to the prohibition of a GS according to the 
Versailles treatyunwillingly accepted and never loyally respected the primacy of civil-
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ian oversight. Consequently, they did not accept civilian authority over military affairs. 
According to Detlef Bald, for these officers monarchy vs. republic and status by birth vs. 
status by merit were the antagonistic pairing detrimental to the liberal democratic ide-
als.117 As noted previously, Gen. Seeckt did not accept the civilian President Ebert and 
the civilian Reichswehrminister Noske as superiors despite their nominal positions as CiC 
or Deputy CiC. He would accept superiors only when the position’s holder was a former 
GS or general officer such as Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (later president) or 
Gen. Wilhelm Groener (later Reichswehrminister). Seeckt refused any civilian influence 
in military affairs and saw himself as the commanding general of the armed forces, ac-
cording to Gordon and Waldemar Erfurth.118 
On the contrary, Seeckt was convinced that the military leadership had the right 
and the duty to influence governmental affairs if this influence would be in the interest of 
the state. According to Gordon and Walter Goerlitz, this attitude was typical for the self-
understanding of the Great GS of the pre-war and WWI era.119 Such attempts of political 
initiatives led to heavy criticism and strict laws intended to impede any military influence 
on the parliament or the government.120 In the opinion of Seeckt and Groener, only the 
ministry of defense or the Truppenamt should be entitled to issue orders to the 
Reichswehr. All other authorities “must be eliminated.”121 Seeckt, known for his antipa-
thy for political parties and leading civilian politicians and his rejection of the Weimar 
constitution, never appeared in the Reichstag to advocate for his concerns. Although he 
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became a member of parliament after his dismissal in 1926, he called the parliament “the 
cancer of our time.”122 
The wait-and-see reaction of the Reichswehr during the Kapp-Luettwitz coup in 
1920, despite unequivocal governmental requests, must be denoted as symptomatic for 
the unstable political situation in the Weimar Republic and the military’s disrespect for 
civilian orders. According to Carsten and Patrick Oliver Heinemann, only a few regular 
commanders followed the orders of the mutinous units’ leaders, but the bulk of the army 
did react against the rebels only days after the governmental request. The coup finally 
failed due to a general strike of the workers. The civilian government subsequently ap-
proved the strike. This approval fueled the distrust of the military leadership towards the 
civilian government for its endorsement of the Marxist means ‘strike.’ The government’s 
authorization of a strike undermined the marriage of convenience between the 
Reichswehr and the Majority Socialists. The fact that the army refused to support the 
elected government against a domestic threat did not provoke any consequences for the 
military leadership.123 Even so, the Kapp-Luettwitz coup must be seen as a caesura in 
German military history, according to Peter Keller. In general, suppression of the mutiny 
would have been possible. Due to miserable political crisis management, the 
Reichswehr’s leadership refused to take the necessary actions and in turn transformed the 
Reichswehr into an unreliable instrument of governmental power in domestic affairs.124 
This outcome had disastrous consequences when Hitler later instrumentalized the army 
for his own goals. 
Hans von Seeckt and Wilhelm Groener must be seen as typical constitutionally 
loyal attentists (i.e., those who refuse to decide until the situation becomes clear) who 
shaped the security and military policy of the Weimar Republic. According to Keller, 
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Seeckt and Groener followed a reluctant policy path within the parliamentary system of 
Weimar. Only when it was for their own advantage did they acknowledge the legitimacy 
of the parliament, the constitution, or the government of the Weimar Republic. Their 
main interest was the coherence of the Reichswehr and the avoidance of civilian political 
influence within the armed forces.125 Seeckt later instantly rejected the political attempt 
to craft a national defense council (Reichsverteidigungsrat) that would have strengthened 
the institutional position of the Reichswehr within the Weimar Republic, in exchange for 
more civilian supervision.126 
After Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, one can argue that civilian authority com-
pletely and within a short timeframe took control of the armed forces in Germany. Hitler 
and his Nazi party gained significant influence over not only the brains of the army but its 
limbs as well. But, a totalitarian system comprises all means of the state (civilian and mil-
itary) for the objectives of the regime. A distinction between civilian and military authori-
ty can no longer be made. Such coordinating structures as the National Defense Commit-
tee in 1935 arguably were not institutions to control the military by civilian entities but 
institutions aimed to prepare Germany for a future war. In fact, the structure of the com-
mittee and Hitler’s pledge of February 1934 to consider the armed forces as one of the 
two pillars of the Third Reich (next to the Nazi party) had a substantial psychological im-
pact on the officer corps since it made appeals to their self-understanding of an elite that 
stood beside and above the political parties.127 Finally, it must be considered as of histor-
ical importance that since the Frederician era, Hitler's Germany was able to eliminate the 
Chief of the GS’s right to approach the head of the state directly (without endorsement of 
supreme military commanders or civilian authorities). This set an end to one of the two 
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main principles (the other is the principle of ‘co-responsibility’) of the old Prussian GS 
within German military leadership.128 
4. Extent and Proficiency of Civilian Education 
The most important developmental periods in education and training of the Ger-
man GS officer between 1859 and 1939 are two phases of reform: the 1850s–1860s and 
the 1920s, according to Detlef Bald.129 Moreover, during these phases of reform, pro-
found military training had been combined with academic education. Both phases of re-
form, however, had been succeeded by phases of reduction (after the foundation of the 
German Empire until WWI and after Hitler’s seizure of power) in which the humanistic 
education of GS officers had been condensed to purely tactical training and basic staff 
work. In the case of the Third Reich, this shift was exclusively in favor of the regime’s 
totalitarian goals.130 
Bald has defined the educational objectives for the highest military leadership as 
follows: provide long-term influence on individual abilities, self-understanding, capabili-
ties, consciousness, and performance of the GS; create favorable conditions to structure 
the relationship between military and state as well as between military and society; de-
termine how the future military leadership understands its social commitment to the state, 
society, and politics; promote the development or suppression of individual personality 
traits which were decisive for the GS from a historical perspective and which can influ-
ence the behavioral pattern with regard to the rest of the officer corps, to the military as a 
whole, and to the polity.131 
Gen. Gerhard von Scharnhorst—the reformer—must be acknowledged as the 
point of departure for an enlightened, humanistic, moral, idealistic, and modern mindset, 
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worldview, and military education. According to Goerlitz, after the Prussian defeats in 
Jena and Auerstedt in 1806, Scharnhorst tried to reform the Prussian military, state, and 
society with an opening to civil society and to civil education. Despite the fact that the 
direct effect of his early reforms was only short-lived, lasting until about 1819, they 
planted the seed for later reforms. Scharnhorst with his high sense of moral responsibil-
ity, profound religious conviction, and glowing idealism inspired a generation of military 
and political leaders in the 19th century. His students at the war academy were: Carl von 
Clausewitz, Carl Wilhelm von Grolman, August Ruehle von Lilienstern, and Herrmann 
von Boyen. These students received a philosophical, moral, and intellectual training, in-
spired by Kant’s universal law and the categorical imperative, as well as a profound mili-
tary and civilian education. Scharnhorst’s students later formed the core cell of the Prus-
sian GS.132 
Scharnhorst led a group of officers—known as the reformers—and initiated the 
Prussian military reform between 1807 and 1814, which comprised a number of aspects 
that broke with estate-based and dynastic customs and practice. Moreover and with re-
spect to military education, Grolman, the new Chief of the GS, and Boyen, later Prussian 
Secretary of War, initiated two substantially bourgeois reforms within the Prussian state 
order: general conscription and the academic education of the GS officers amid broader 
reforms of education to match the power of Napoleon's Europe. According to Goerlitz, 
these elements contradicted feudal principles and provoked the resistance of the noble-
men and the monarchy in Prussia (despite the manifest military success of the reforms 
against Napoleon after 1812). Grolman was the first to combine scientific education, spe-
cialist knowledge training, and independence in mind and character within military edu-
cation.133 Grolman and Boyen became victims of the restoration phase after 1819, came 
into conflict with the Prussian King, and resigned. During this reactionary phase, the 
German states—substantially influenced by Metternich—undertook measures against lib-
eralism, limited academic freedom at universities after 1817, and put the press under 
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strict censorship.134 The reformers—influenced by the Kantian idea of mankind—
intended to create a new role model of a military leader who would not legitimize its au-
thority just by noble birth but by own performance, education, and ability to convince his 
subordinated soldiers. This role model, however, comprised substantially nationalistic 
elements and undermined fundamental pillars of the ancien régime.135 
After the resignation of the reformers and during the restoration circa 1815–19, an 
era of concentration on military training in its narrow sense began. Known as the Muf-
fling era, it was named after Field Marshal Karl von Muffling who succeeded Grolman as 
Chief of the GS. During this era, Lilienstern, as Director of the Prussian military inspec-
tion, and Clausewitz, as Director of the military academy, institutionalized the training of 
the Prussian officer corps.136 Clausewitz contributed the necessity of pivotal attributes to 
the Prussian GS education: Anständigkeit (uprightness, decency, and reliability), Verant-
wortungsfreude (joy in responsibility), and Seelenkraft (spiritual and mental force), ac-
cording to van Creveld among others.137 
Gen. Eduard von Peucker, a liberal Monarchist, advocated for and ignited the 
second substantial reform of the Prussian officer education in the second half of the 19th 
century. According to multiple scholars, Peucker was convinced that the officer’s profes-
sion, combined with an academic education along with the liberal educational ideal, stood 
not in conflict to each other. After almost 30 years of restoration, the educational level of 
the Prussian officer corps must be assessed as deficient. Education should overcome dis-
crimination between the nobility (which constituted the bulk of the Prussian officer 
corps) and the middle classes (the bourgeoisie) of the Prussian society. Peucker’s objec-
tives were the reduction of feudal privileges and the implementation of equal treatment of 
people from all classes within the Prussian society. Peucker’s benchmark to accomplish 
this goal was education. Such a goal in an era substantially determined by the suppression 
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of the liberal revolution of 1848, aspiring middle classes during the beginning industriali-
zation, and the emergence of the nation-state must be assessed as revolutionary since it 
would endanger the core of state power within the authoritarian monarchy of Prussia. For 
Peucker, however, military and bourgeoisie were not a contradiction.138 
Peucker envisaged binding regulations and minimal educational requirements for 
all officer candidates but in particular for the GS, no matter whether noble or bourgeois. 
Peucker had been confronted with massive resistance by the nobility since the officer 
corps as the traditional social-political-military Prussian elite and enclosed military caste 
would potentially be opened to the middle classes. The nobility insisted on quotas for of-
ficer candidates from the middle classes, and that the principle of merit should not neces-
sarily be applicable for noble officers. The military leadership favored not a merit-based 
but a provenance-based recruitment model.139 In short, in 1850, a Prussian general with 
academic education was the exception and not the rule.140 
Despite all reform attempts from Scharnhorst to Peucker, the long-term goal of 
requiring a university-entrance diploma to enter the officer corps’ education must be con-
sidered far from institutionalized. In 1900, only 44 percent of the officer candidates pos-
sessed this diploma (including the cadets from military schools). This rate increased until 
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1906 to more than 50 percent, and until 1912 to almost 60 percent.141 The military cadet 
schools, with their legacy in the dynastic estate era, were of particular importance for the 
understanding of the officer candidates’ preparation. At the cadet schools, the students 
were completely excluded from the civilian world around them. The young cadets were 
uniformly indoctrinated even before they saw a military training ground for the first time. 
The estate-based impetus of the officer corps as an enclosed caste had been implanted 
years before the cadets joined the regular military.142 
Peucker invented and implemented the idea of military professionalism based on 
idealistic, humanistic education combined with the rationality of military training for the 
education of GS officers. According to Bald and Geoffrey P. Megargee, the reformers 
failed due to a backward society and an antiquated mindset of the contemporary leader-
ship in Prussia. Before Peucker, the allgemeine Kriegsschule (general war school) degen-
erated to the degree of complete insignificance for military training and was influenced 
by a narrow mindset and parochialism.143 Peucker redesigned the war academy in 1868 
according to Scharnhorst’s guidelines.144 The war academy should provide general 
knowledge and an academic mindset in connection to military education and training. 
The expected types of officer careers influenced the curricula at the war academy and the 
selected civilian lectures.145 The military subjects comprised only approximately 50 per-
cent of the overall curriculum (excluding languages and mathematic subjects): art of war, 
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staff duty procedures, war history, and lectures about weaponry and fortification. The rel-
ative importance of civilian education within Prussian and German GS education re-
mained for almost 50 years. Bernhard von Poten judged that Peucker formed the war 
academy along Scharnhorst’s ideals.146 
The combination of a new bourgeois elite with the old aristocratic elite crafted the 
pivotal social-political-military elite of imperial Germany in the second half of the 19th 
century. According to multiple scholars, shortly after the foundation of the German em-
pire in 1871, the nobility attempted to limit the access of the middle classes to the officer 
corps amid the growing class conflict of the time. Peucker’s reforms did not provoke the 
primacy of the bourgeoisie nor the primacy of the citizen in uniform but the moderniza-
tion of the Prussian nobility by implanting the bourgeois merit approach. The attempts of 
the nobility must be assessed as the first reduction phase. In 1872, the war academy was 
subordinated to the Chief of the GS. In 1888, the GS continuously diluted the liberal edu-
cation principles to restore the aristocratic principle of tradition within the officer corps, 
in particular, within the GS. The share of military topics within the curriculum was in-
creased by 30 percent. The officer corps should become “immunized” against the mod-
ernization and class conflict of the late 19th century. As a result, such officers were poor-
ly able to anticipate the societal challenges of the next decades, in particular, in the first 
half of the 20th century. Although a military genius, Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke 
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substantially triggered this development as Chief of the GS.147 The reduction of civilian 
lectures within the German GS education led to a narrowing of the overall scope of the 
war academy. The educational substance descended from the scientific level of a univer-
sity to those of a college, was perfected for the middle tactical echelon in wartimes, and 
substantially determined by the pretended antagonism between “character” and “intel-
lect.”148 
After the collapse of the German Empire in WWI, the Versailles treaty imposed 
severe restrictions on the German military: The Great GS, the military academies, the ca-
det corps, and all similar institutions had to be abolished or closed. As a response, the GS 
was camouflaged as part of the general attempt to defeat Versailles via secret measures. 
The Entente powers allowed only one military school per branch (infantry, cavalry, engi-
neers, and artillery) to train the officer on a technical level.149 Moreover, the Allies 
forced the German armed forces to cut back its strength substantially (full-volunteer ar-
my, 100,000 men). 
The Versailles restrictions led to the second reform phase in the education of GS 
officers; however, not because the German military leadership wanted it but to make a 
virtue out of necessity. Gen. Seeckt, as principal architect of the Reichswehr, was con-
vinced that a small full-volunteer army must be an elite cadre force to adjust to new 
forms of warfare and to rearm later. For Seeckt, the key for an elite force was education 
and training, based on strict and exceptionally stiff qualifications. For the first time in his-
tory, the German armed forces expected from a possible officer cadet a university-
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entrance diploma as prerequisite to entering an officer school. This precondition was a 
tool to keep the officer corps socially “clean” since most candidates from the lower clas-
ses of society did not finish secondary school.150 This restriction contradicted the liberal 
democratic Weimar constitution; however, it was the logical outcome of Seeckt’s policy 
of social uniformity within the leadership of the Reichswehr.151 The Prussian cadet corps 
had to be dissolved in 1920; however, most of the cadet schools were just renamed and 
performed their duties in ways similar to those in imperial Germany, along their tradi-
tional values: physical toughening, religious (Protestant) conviction, fidelity to duty, 
comradeship, honor-obedience, and abnegation.152 Finally, due to Seeckt’s policy of de-
politicization, the Reichswehr made no effort to inform or train its personnel about the 
new constitutional conditions, the form of a liberal state, or challenges or threats from the 
right. The mandatory lectures on ‘civic education’ tackled only the topics of civic rights 
and duties.153 
Since the Great GS and GS officers had been forbidden, the Reichswehr invented 
multiple ways to camouflage the GS itself (Truppenamt, troops agency), the GS officers 
(Fuehrergehilfen, aides-de-camp), and the GS education (Führergehilfenlehrgänge, train-
ing courses for aides-de-camp). Moreover, Gen. Seeckt assessed a profound education 
and military training as inevitable, in particular, for GS officers. The selection and the 
appointments of GS officers were among the tasks of the Truppenamt. Seeckt understood 
that since the new full-volunteer army was so small, he could easily impose new and 
stricter selection rules and did so with success. The GS candidates were chosen by the 
territorial commands (Wehrkreise) and thoroughly tested, not only in military questions, 
but also in languages, history, political science, economy, foreign affairs, physical 
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strength, and technical subjects.154 Seeckt’s objectives were to strengthen the GS officer 
corps’ coherence, improve its intellectual and moral level, and most importantly, to en-
force a clear separation between officers and NCOs.155 Due to the allied restrictions and 
the prohibition of a centralized education facility, the selection of the candidates, and the 
education during the first two (of three) one-year terms had to be decentralized; however, 
the troops agency was in charge for providing the same conditions to every candidate 
(i.e., the same exams). The first new GS education in the Reichswehr took place in 1920, 
as depicted in Figure 2.156 
 
 Covered and decentralized GS education in the Reichswehr be-
tween 1920 and 1933.157 
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The most important aspect of the second reform phase within the German GS ed-
ucation was the “Reinhardt courses.” According to numerous authors, Gen. Walther 
Reinhardt was the first Chief of the armed forces, the Reichswehr. After his dismissal in 
1921 and replacement by Gen. Seeckt due to political reasons, he profoundly reformed 
the third and final year of GS education within the Reichswehr. While the first two years 
of the training program comprised merely military topics, the third year should anticipate 
the deficits of the GS in WWI, in particular, the GS’s deficiencies in strategic planning 
and analytical thinking, inexperience in political and economic questions, and missing 
knowledge in international law as consequence of Moltke’s reduction phase in the late 
19th century. Reinhardt intended to widen the scope of GS officers from pure military 
knowledge to an ability to instinctively understand the realities of the term total war, 
which came into vogue as an expression of ideological and industrialized war. Rein-
hardt’s guiding theme in the vein of Clausewitz and Moltke was independent thinking 
and self-dependence.158 The Reinhardt courses contributed to the mutual understanding 
between military and the society and supported the acceptance of the republic by the mili-
tary. Such a merit-based approach stood in sharp contrast to the officer corps’ rejection of 
the republic. Along with the bon mot “the army of weapons and science,” Reinhardt tried 
to reduce the tensions among state, society, and Reichswehr. The curriculum along the 
guideline “studies of the strategic interdependencies between warfare, policy, polity, and 
economy” comprised the lectures: warfare and policy; introduction into foreign and do-
mestic policy; questions of contemporary politics; importance of press and propaganda; 
joint warfare; as well as colloquia about social influences, national defense and its rela-
tion to the people, economy in peace and war, nutrition in war, industry and trade, bank-
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ing and finance, and transportation and traffic system. In 1933, the NS-regime immedi-
ately terminated the courses in favor of tactics and Nazi ideology.159 
Reinhardt’s reform concept—a GS education based on the changing socio-
cultural and socio-political situation—must be assessed as extraordinary within the his-
torical context. According to multiple scholars, in contrast to the contemporary reaction-
ary developments within the German society and military as well as in contrast to the up-
coming Nazi ideology, Reinhardt’s idea to combine military professional training with 
academic education based on tolerance towards the society, and the young liberal-
democracy was exceptional, in particular, since his idea got realized from within the in-
stitution Reichswehr without any external impetus. Reinhardt’s objectives and guidelines, 
as well as the curriculum itself, would fit into every modern education doctrine within the 
Western defense hemisphere. Unfortunately, too few officers per year (between 12 and 
20 from the army and two from the navy) had been selected to participate within these 
courses. One cannot argue that these courses were institutionalized enough to provide a 
comprehensively profound education within the German GS corps in the first half of the 
20th century. Nor were such courses in and of themselves a remedy for the civil-military 
relations and domestic politics of the republic in its crisis-laden beginning and especially 
its record from 1930 until 1933. This deficiency of the GS education within the Weimar 
Republic was one of the most significant deficits of the Seeckt era.160 
With Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933, the second phase of intellectual reduction 
within the German GS education started. The first changes took place almost immediate-
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ly as a result of the decision to expand the armed forces greatly amid a shortage of offic-
ers. The drastically lowered entrance requirements for officer education, which had been 
already envisaged during the second cabinet of Gen. Wilhelm Groener, had been put into 
effect.161 With a nod to the ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft (people's society), as well as 
the Nazi assault on higher education generally, less than 50 percent of the officer candi-
dates between 1934 and 1939 received a university-entrance diploma, which is less than 
in the Wilhelmine era.162 The Reichswehr re-installed the old prioritization of “charac-
ter” before “intellect.”163 The first lectures of Nazi political indoctrination within the mil-
itary schools and academies (national-politische Schulung) were implemented within all 
military curricula in Winter 1933/34.164 In 1933, multiple graduates of the GS training 
courses openly supported the Nazi party.165 However, the leadership of the Reichswehr 
still was convinced of its intellectual superiority and political immunity over the Nazi 
ideology. Many officers still believed that they could use the Nazis as a compliant tool to 
re-install their former leading status.166 The war academy re-opened in 1935 and subor-
dinated to the new (old) GS as the Wehrmacht expanded greatly in size and the need for 
GS officers exploded at the expense of quality.167 
The curriculum for GS officers at the war academy in Berlin in 1938–1939 com-
prised a forced concentration on a few subjects. Moreover, even military subjects were 
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reduced, and all other subjects with no direct link to military aspects had been erased 
from the curriculum.168 According to Bald, political and manpower requirements of this 
rearmament, in particular, readiness and availability, determined the new curriculum de-
spite flaming protests of older GS officers about the decreasing knowledge of their 
younger colleagues. The GS lost its autonomy about structures and education almost im-
mediately after 1933 as part of Nazi civil-military reforms and the expansion of the 
armed forces and the security sector overall. In the shadow of the Fuehrer (leader) prin-
ciple, the new regime replaced Scharnhorst’s and Peucker’s principles of responsibility 
and reliability within less than a decade.169 The GS officers of the 1930s never had a real 
chance to accomplish the requirements of the handbook for GS duty in war, written and 
published by their older comrades in 1939. The education in the 1930s and 1940s never 
emphasized “creative thinking,” “logically consistent action,” “calm consideration,” and 
“reliable and honest advisory to his commander.”170 The regime added some ideological 
aspects to the handbook, such as the Fuehrerprinzip (the totalitarian principle of the lead-
er=Hitler). Nevertheless, the changes of the Nazi regime to the GS education encouraged 
and strengthened “some of the worst cultural and intellectual trends within the military,” 
according to Megargee—violence, action for its own sake, and tactics as the sovereign of 
strategy.171 During the later phase of World War II (WWII), after the Blitzkrieg era, 
those young GS officers came into leading positions. Many of them were not able to ac-
complish their superior’s expectations, not the least for failures of command in the opera-
tional and strategic levels. In contrast to the first reduction phase before WWI, the phase 
in the 1930s radically reduced and partly minimized all kinds of intellectual education.172  
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The Israeli contrarian Martin van Creveld praised the German military education 
in his book The Training of Officers (1990), in particular the GS education, and outlined 
its strength and weakness: 
The German system for teaching officers (…) has never been equaled in 
the modern world. (…) Its greatest strength, (…) the single-minded con-
centration on the conduct of war (…) was also its greatest shortcoming 
(…) [because] it did not offer sufficient instruction in the nonmilitary as-
pects of war, including politics, economics, technology, and business ad-
ministration.173 
Nonetheless, it is astonishing how van Creveld, in his role as contrarian, and lecturer at 
U.S. and NATO war colleges, was later contradicting himself by arguing that profession-
al militaries in higher ranks do not need any profound academic education since they 
should concentrate on their main profession: military effectiveness and war. 
Whether studying a variety of nonmilitary subjects at a civilian postgradu-
ate school can do much to promote the military effectiveness of most of-
ficers is, in principle, doubtful.174 
The effect of this process (of a civilian, higher education) on military ef-
fectiveness, by which I mean the ability to fight and win a war, has almost 
certainly been negligible. (…) It has often been argued that intellectual ex-
cellence as such is not what the military is all about. Their task is to pro-
duce practitioners capable of running their country’s defense, not to en-
gage in intellectual debates or issue academic publications. Few would 
deny that there is much truth to this argument. (…) The present system, 
under which very large numbers of officers are encouraged, even pres-
sured, into taking advanced degrees in all kinds of probable and improba-
ble fields is, militarily speaking, quite useless. When all is said and done, 
however, there is no question that the vast majority of officers should fo-
cus on their own profession: war. (…) At the staff college level, the focus 
of study should be on military training rather than on general educa-
tion.175 
Van Creveld is in good company with a long tradition of the foes of education at 
arms reaching back to the 17th century, and also, at odds with the practice in the Israeli 
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military. The German history of military education makes it highly questionable to advo-
cate for such an anti-education agenda. The qualitative analysis of the reform and reduc-
tion phases and their subsequent outcome in political, military, and societal developments 
showed the linkages between a lack of profound civilian education and the military pro-
fession, and their impact on the military’s negative behavior towards a democratic civil 
society.176 
5. Mindset and Worldview of the General Staff Officer 
The mindset and worldview of the GS officer at the onset of the Third Reich did 
not appear by mistake but was the result of gradual historical development over the 19th 
century and the first half of the 20th. In particular, four epochs in German history had a 
profound impact on the development of the German GS officer’s mindset and worldview 
in 1933: the Prussian phase after the Napoleonic wars; the second Reich (imperial Ger-
many) including WWI; the short phase of the provisional Reichswehr between 1919 and 
1920; and the Reichswehr under Gen. von Seeckt. 
After the end of Scharnhorst’s reforms and during the restored absolutist monar-
chy in Prussia, the officer corps developed its strong mindset of a military elite estate 
with its pivotal and perpetual role within the state, attached only over the monarchy as the 
living representative of the state itself. Boyen’s romantic understanding of the estates led 
to self-chosen isolation of the officer corps within the Prussian society.177 According to 
Demeter, the officer corps—dominated by nobility—represented this new first estate di-
rectly and only responsible to the crown since the armed forces were the private matter of 
the king, untouched by any civilian authority, such as the Reichstag. The liberal revolu-
tion of 1848 affected neither the inner structure nor the officer corps’ position within the 
state at all. Moreover, politics, social developments, and the officer corps were elements 
completely alien to each other. The officer’s interest had to be the state, symbolized by 
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the crown, and the officers strongly refused all sorts of non-royal influence on the mili-
tary.178 Yet, as late as the mid-1850s, the Prussian nobility was no longer able to provide 
sufficient officer supply. The ivory tower ‘officer corps’ had to be opened to the middle 
classes, however, only under strict limitations. The fusion between the mentalities of the 
feudal officer corps and the handpicked group of middle-class officer candidates did not 
provoke a substantial shift in mindset, as happened in the commercial world following 
industrialization.179 The assimilation of nobility and bourgeoisie with equally conserva-
tive mindsets provoked only a blended overwhelmingly conservative mentality.180 
After the foundation of the second Reich—the German Empire—in 1871, the con-
servative Prussian mindset had been adapted with great power ambitions, nationalism, 
and the impetus of the new concept ‘nation-state’ to a unique self-centered worldview 
with the Emperor at its core. According to multiple scholars, the bulk of the educated and 
wealthy German bourgeoisie became increasingly nationalistic, enthusiastically support-
ed the political wishes and objectives of the German officer corps, and enforced the of-
ficer’s expectation and claim to be a social-political-military elite. Despite marginal dif-
ferences, the bourgeoisie and officer corps were finally synchronized on a state model 
which must be described as a nationalistic, militaristic, and authoritarian great power. 
The rule that duty as officer meant social privileges had been implanted in the DNA of 
the German understanding of a state in the Wilhelmine era despite any liberal approaches 
of the mid-19th century.181 Out of this realm, the German officer corps developed the 
recruitment principle erwünschte Kreise (expected circles), meaning that only members 
of these restricted social circles (the nobility and the upper-middle classes) should join 
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the officer corps.182 The continuous role of the bourgeois in the officer corps, the only 
limited democratization of the German society, and the profound support of a substantial 
share of the German middle classes provoked a deep entrenchment and privileged status 
within the German society. Additionally, the nobility and the educated and wealthy bour-
geoisie welcomed the officer corps as an ideological ally against Communism and Social 
Democracy.183 Some authors called this phenomenon the “alliance between militarism 
and capitalism.” In 1966, the authors Gerhard Foerster, Heinz Helmert, Helmut Otto, and 
Helmut Schmitter wrote in a work on East Berlin (German Democratic Republic) that 
“the bourgeoisie indeed had an economic interest on modern militarism. (…) Long before 
WWI, the military leadership represented an important link by unifying capitalism and 
militarism and by connecting war and big business.”184 
In 1919, after the defeat in WWI, the collapse of the German Empire, and the res-
ignation of the Emperor, the officer corps was unprepared for and stunningly confronted 
with the Weimar Republic and an international system that defied easy prescriptions of 
policy made from the battlefield. Moreover, the traditional self-understanding of the of-
ficer corps as a bulwark against parliamentary democracy was shattered since it had to 
subordinate itself to parliamentary politics, according to Bald. For decades, the military 
elite and the GS corps, in particular, had refused to subordinate itself to any entity except 
the Emperor. The historical relationship between the military and the democratic state 
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with its new, unknown, and alien ruling elites made an honest analysis of the officer 
corps’ deficiencies and smooth integration into the new state practicably impossible.185 
The officer corps of the provisional Reichswehr must be distinguished from the 
imperial army and the later Reichswehr (i.e., after 1921) since the officer corps’ mindset 
was far more determined by the contemporary conviction that the traditional Prussian-
German worldview led the Reich into the catastrophe and the collapse of WWI. Accord-
ing to Keller and Waldemar Erfurth, the provisional Reichswehr was the conglomerate of 
German military forces between 1919 and 1920, that is, in the immediate aftermath of 
defeat and the near civil war conditions of demobilization and the post-war fighting. The 
provisional Reichswehr was determined by the numerous staff reductions after the Ver-
sailles treaty to reach the imposed number of 100,000 men. The officer corps of the pro-
visional Reichswehr was not the monolithic bloc of officers unanimously stuck in tradi-
tional mindsets and worldviews—far from it. The impact of the collapse inspired a sub-
stantial part of the officer corps to assess the outdated mindset and worldview critically. 
Therefore, the provisional Reichswehr was by far more liberal and heterogeneous than its 
predecessor and successor. The military leadership, in particular, Gen. Seeckt as Chief of 
the Truppenamt, instrumentalized the imposed staff reductions and tried to dismiss all 
officers who would potentially not agree with his objective to reform the later 
Reichswehr into a depoliticized force with its homogenous, Frederician officer corps. 
One of these officers, for instance, was Ernst Röhm, who did not fit the pattern because 
of his background, his sexual mores, and his free-booter spirit. In short, Seeckt executed a 
mindset-and-worldview cleansing within the officer corps based on the old principle of 
the expected circles with an emphasis on the GS and the Emperor Alexander guards, of 
which he was a veteran.186 
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After the Versailles staff reductions and the new army law in 1921, the relation-
ship between the Reichswehr and the Weimar Republic can be characterized as a clash of 
mindsets; Heinemann is not the first to have defined this experience as a “marriage of 
convenience and not a marriage of love.” Besides, in the trenches of WWI, the traditional 
mindset and worldview of the German officers fused with violently racial militarism, 
which provoked an even sharper black-white mind pattern.187 This configuration perfect-
ly fit later with Carl Schmitt’s identification of the enemy and his definition of poli-
tics.188 However, the first Chief of the Reichswehr, Gen. Reinhardt, and his Chief of the 
Truppenamt, Seeckt, were of totally different personalities. While Reinhardt together 
with Reichswehrminister Noske, tried to republicanize the officer corps, Seeckt’s first 
goal was to transfer as many members of the dissolved great GS into the new Trup-
penamt or other key positions since he knew that the merely conservative GS officers 
would support his convictions the most.189 
On the one hand, their uniform background, their knowledge, and experience in 
professional matters, as well as their mindset, supported the crafting of the Reichswehr 
along with Seeckt’s convictions. On the other hand, Seeckt's code endangered (and final-
ly sabotaged) the republicanizing of the Reichswehr since young officers with opposi-
tional, critical, and liberal mindset and worldview had significantly lower chances to find 
a position within the Reichswehr and were dismissed from service.190 Seeckt’s mindset 
cleansing made the Reichswehr significantly less popular beyond in a skeptical society, 
especially beyond the liberal middle classes and the working class, which recognized the 
Reichswehr as a stronghold of reaction.191 The officer corps and the GS remained rela-
tively homogenous until 1933. Particularly, the reintroduction of the conscription led to a 
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change in mindset and worldview as National-Socialist paradigms started to influence the 
bulk of the officer corps, particularly beyond the young officers.192 
Hitler’s chancellorship in 1933 brought the German officer corps into a dilemma. 
The Frederician and Wilhelmine concepts, which were pivotal for the officer corps for 
decades, could be said to cooperate with National Socialism, i.e., nationalism, while other 
aspects, such as the totalitarian leader principle, collided with traditional privileges of the 
officer corps. According to Klaus-Juergen Mueller, the traditional officer corps’ mindset 
and worldview made it vulnerable and unable to resist the National-Socialist totalitarian 
claims. The officer corps misunderstood National Socialism as authoritarian, counter-
revolutionary, and nationalistic power that could still be tamed as was the case in the pe-
riod of the 19th century.193 The psychological condition of the officer corps, divided be-
tween tradition and the National Socialist approach, made it impossible to reach a group-
based opinion consensus.194 
For many officers, National Socialism offered a grand political solution for the 
German problems at that time, i.e., the disarmament consequences of the Versailles treaty 
and party politics. According to Carsten, Demeter, and Mueller, in 1929, the young Lieu-
tenant Henning von Tresckow lectured in Potsdam about the necessity to break the dic-
tate of finance and the market, a popular Nazi goal. Colonel (GS) von Tresckow together 
with Colonel (GS) Stauffenberg later became key figures within the military resistance 
against Hitler.195 In 1929 and 1930, in Ulm on the Danube, two young lieutenants to-
gether with senior officers of the Sturmabteilung (Storm Troopers, the Nazi party militia) 
were recruiting members for the Nazi party. This affair became known as the officer’s 
affair of Ulm—a pivotal event in the transformation of younger officers to the cosmos of 
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National Socialism even prior to Hitler's taking power. The involved officers were con-
victed for high treason. Interestingly, both officers were subordinated to Colonel (GS) 
Ludwick Beck, later Gen., Chief of the GS, and also by 1938 a prominent member of the 
military resistance. In particular, the young officers increasingly had lost trust in their 
older superiors in the face of the mass politics of the Republic and the latter phase of 
Weimar with its state of emergency.196 These examples showed that the officer’s con-
servative-nationalistic convictions (troop or GS officers) did not substantially diverge, at 
least at the beginning of Hitler’s rise to power. They differed only in form and style.197 
Nonetheless, this generational gap contributed to the general political paralysis of the of-
ficer corps, which was a significant feature of the corps once the regime embarked on ag-
gressive war and genocide.198 
Confronted with Hitler and National Socialism, the officers became prisoners of 
their own traditional mindset and worldview, to say nothing of their own ideology. Ac-
cording to Carsten, the blatantly and violently promulgated nationalism made the officers 
believe that the National Socialist ideology seemed to be close to their own. That is, Hit-
ler's admiration for soldier supposedly embodied the same objectives, which proved later 
not to be the case in many instances. Also, the young officers were impressed by the re-
gime’s domestic results, i.e., by the overcoming of the violent political struggles of the 
1920s.199 As Hitler reinstalled the conscription in 1935, he increased the status of the 
armed forces within the society, which thrilled career officers though they soon found 
themselves in a minority amidst a huge increase and opening of the officer corps that 
brought members of Nazi formations into the ranks by the tens of thousands.200 
Upbringing, historical experience, mindset, and political worldview prevented the 
officers from recognizing the totalitarian potential of National Socialism and how it en-
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dangered a traditional concept of honor and service. Moreover, the officer corps did not 
own the intellectual key to understanding Hitler.201 According to multiple authors, the 
officer honor code was intimately linked with the estate and dynastic concept of the sov-
ereign and their service within a society bounded by the code of the estates. When the 
monarchy collapsed, the officers felt betrayed and found their tradition broken. Without 
their lord, the officer corps lost its fixed point in state and society and became emotional-
ly unstable. The ups-and-downs of the Weimar era did not contribute to a firm commit-
ment to republicanism. Hindenburg and Hitler represented a sort of substitute Kaiser 
(emperor) figure, an impression that was betrayed at least in the gangland violence of 
June 30, 1934, and thereafter. The loyalty oath to Hitler in 1935 represented the climax of 
the officers being made a tool in the Nazi state and its dual pillar principle that gutted tra-
ditional features of the state in favor of the totalitarian apparatus. All these aspects cumu-
lated in a disastrous mental deficiency of the officer corps along with other leading social 
elites: the inability to resist Hitler’s seduction.202 
6. Acceptance of Heterogeneity within One’s Social Group 
Despite the enlargement of the Prussian army in the 19th century, accompanied 
by the increasing role of the bourgeoisie based on the fact that the Prussian nobility was 
unable to provide necessary numbers of officers, social or ethnic mobility in Prussia and 
later in the German Empire was strictly limited by dint of demographics.203 According to 
Bald, monarchy and nobility enforced the principle of the expected desirable social cir-
cles within the officer corps, particularly against other ethnic groups, such as Jews, or 
against underprivileged classes, workers, and peasants. In this way, a commission of a 
former NCO was almost literally impossible because of estate and class prejudices.204 In 
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Prussia, only nobles, wealthy landlords, and educated (and wealthy) members of the 
bourgeoisie had been recognized as able to become a commission.205 Besides, it was for-
bidden for Jews to join not only the Prussian guards’ regiments, the cadet corps, or the 
officer corps but also the judiciary and other vital structures of the Prussian state.206 In 
other states of the empire, this stricture was less enforced, especially in southern Germa-
ny. Until WWI, within an increasing climate of virulent anti-Semitism ignited by nation-
alism, the exclusion of Jews from public service (including the reserve officers) became 
standard. Anti-Semitism is by far not an invention of Hitler.207 Despite the decreased in-
fluence of nobility in imperial Germany (compared to old Prussia), lesser social classes 
were intentionally excluded from the polity’s socio-political formation.208 
The overwhelming majority of the Prussian and later the German officers have 
been of Protestant confession although multiple Prussian territories were populated by a 
majority of Catholics. Within the 19th century, Protestants were the main bearer of the 
enlargement of general education within the bulk of the wealthy bourgeoisie. In turn, 
since the nobility was overwhelmingly Protestant and the upper middle classes—from 
which the needed additional share of bourgeois officer candidates had been merely re-
cruited—the bourgeois-noble officer corps remained overwhelmingly Protestant (in 1913, 
96.2 percent of the general officers were Protestants). The officer corps’ almost religious 
homogeneity significantly supported the assimilation of the exclusively Protestant, bour-
geois officers.209 
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The principle of desirable circles ethnically and socially homogenized the already 
conservative Reichswehr’s officer caste. According to Bald, despite industrialization, the 
liberal revolution of 1848, and all social revolutions between 1914 and 1921, the monar-
chical core of the German officers, led by Seeckt, managed to transfer themselves from 
the imperial army to the Reichswehr in an astonishing manner. This core was responsible 
for the Reichswehr’s reorganization and downsizing, including the reactionary concentra-
tion process in the Seeckt cult of tradition.210 Despite the qualitative results, the quantita-
tive share of nobles within the Prussian and later the German officer corps was compara-
tively small. In 1914, 30 percent of the officers belonged to the nobility. This share 
shrank to 21.7 percent in 1920 and 20.5 percent in 1926, before it raised again to 23.8 
percent in 1932. On the other hand, the analysis confirmed the principle of desirable cir-
cles: in 1926, 44.4 percent of the officers were sons of former officers while 41.5 percent 
were sons of higher officials or members of the intelligentsia. The share of officer’s sons 
continuously rose to 49.2 percent in 1927 (34 percent higher officials and intelligentsia) 
and 54.4 percent in 1930 (28.1 percent higher officials and intelligentsia).211 
Nepotism seemed to play a minor role in officer promotion within the 
Reichswehr, especially within the GS. Even so, a potential candidate needed to be born 
into one of those classes belonging to the expected circles to enjoy a substantially merit-
based career, according to Gordon. Given how regiments recruited their officers in a de-
centralized manner that might be said to have only reinforced Seeckt's dictum. The of-
ficer corps and the GS were “extremely self-conscious ‘in-group [s],’ with strong tradi-
tions and a sense of brotherhood.”212 A former officer’s son would have always been 
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preferred instead of an alien from an impoverished social milieu. Once inside the officer 
corps, an entry into the GS corps provided the most promising career chances. Member-
ship within this elite of the elite in the state within a state facilitated preferential treatment 
and exceptional opportunities for advancement—also based on good connections to gen-
eral officers. In short, the members of the officer corps were members of a family or a 
caste.213 Nevertheless, according to Bald, despite the merit-based promotion approach, 
the increasing share of nobles within higher officer ranks led to the assumption that this 
approach was not fully institutionalized.214 In contrast, Gordon would argue against 
Bald’s stake by outlining that there was little or no serious friction between the noble and 
bourgeois officers concerning the promotion policy. He explains that the competitive 
methods of performance and examinations within the GS would preclude favoritism.215 
Not only within the officer corps and the GS but also other ranks, the 
Reichswehr’s leadership followed a policy of social exclusion; however, the provisional 
Reichswehr included a significant share of workers and republicans. According to Gor-
don, candidates from outside groups were often rejected for various reasons: socialists 
because of the stereotype of them as pacifists or due to such ostensibly insufficient pre-
requisites as education, and liberals because of their republican conviction, among others. 
On the other side, many outsiders were repelled by the strict military discipline or the 
lack of support from their families and dependents. Finally, liberal and socialist parties 
made no parliamentary or organizational effort to force the Reichswehr to include those 
social classes. Besides, the Reichswehr paid extremely low salaries and allowances for 
what was essentially an extended service in penury. While noble and upper-middle-class 
officers usually had enough private funds, the outlook of poor living conditions kept 
many republicans from joining the military, especially when the republic stabilized after 
1924.216 Nevertheless, during the economic downturns after WWI, the bulk of soldiers in 
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the Reichswehr and the Freikorps (Freekorps) were people who had difficulties in finding 
civilian employment, mostly unqualified workers, according to Keller.217 The 
Reichswehr’s recruitment policy for enlisted personnel can be summarized by three prin-
ciples: first, the provisional Reichswehr was ethnically and socially more heterogeneous 
than its successor, therefore not risking a systematic disintegration from the polity; sec-
ond, the Reichswehr was a force full of volunteers that did not serve the Weimar Repub-
lic due to a personal commitment to republicanism; and third, under good economic con-
ditions, only politically indifferent personnel who would be easy to indoctrinate would 
serve within the Reichswehr.218 
During the Reichswehr era, anti-Semitism did not exist in the form of discrimina-
tory laws but as subliminal paradigms and behavioral patterns that were found in society 
in general and that had worsened in the wake of the war, especially during the economic 
crisis in 1929. The share of Jews within the Reichswehr was significantly lower than 
within the rest of the population. Based on the principle of the desirable circles, a Jewish 
officer would have had quantitatively and qualitatively to outperform his non-Jewish fel-
lows to maintain his chances for a promotion. By contrast, Hindenburg rejected National-
Socialist approaches to dismiss Jews from the Reichswehr. Before Hitler’s rise to power, 
many Jews hoped to find protection and tolerance within the Reichswehr. One of Hitler’s 
first judicial laws, however, affected the Reichswehr and its Jewish members (soldiers 
and officers) profoundly. Between January and February 1934, over 800 Jewish (“non-
Aryan”) officers were dismissed. The officer corps’ reaction was consternation, not be-
cause of their dismissed fellows but because this policy interfered with the century-old 
principle that the army autonomously regulated its inner structure.219 
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7. Self-Understanding of the Role of a Soldier within the State 
The historical developments in Prussia and later Germany, particularly class con-
sciousness, the assimilation of the bourgeoisie into estate prerogatives, the foundation 
and the collapse of the Empire after WWI, and the questionable behavior of political sol-
diers at the onset of the Third Reich, all created the GS officer’s self-understanding as 
ruler of the state. This process blinded all too many how the Nazi state was taming them 
and not as they expected since 1819, which was to direct mass politics to the needs of the 
leadership of the army. According to Demeter, four historical impacts are of particular 
importance. First, the German officer corps inherited its communal, corporate spirit from 
medieval chivalry via absolutism and the system of estates combined with the medieval 
concept of loyalty to the ruler, the crown. Second, within absolutism, the officer corps 
had been transformed into a modern form of the second estate. Third, the officers became 
servants not only of the royal personality but also of the sole representative of state power 
in the era of mass politics, a role for which this caste was unequipped to master. It was an 
irrational link, but the officer’s loyalty grew from absolute obedience to the autocratic 
king against the people as the nation-state. Fourth and last, the constitutional monarchy of 
Germany in the epoch 1848–1918 absorbed the essence of nationalism and boosted the 
officer’s self-understanding in spheres that made it later impossible for them to accept 
limitations on their status imposed by the checks and balances of liberal democracy, rep-
resenting the people.220 
The revolution and the foundation of the Weimar Republic replaced not only the 
Empire, it destroyed the officer corps’ tradition and narrative of state, society, and privi-
lege based on either bloodlines or military skill. Moreover, for the first time in history, 
the German officer corps and its GS were not united in how to react to this catastrophe. 
According to Carsten and Gordon, for decades the strength of the officer corps laid in the 
fact that it always acted in unison in the face of change, be it in absolutist Prussia or the 
revolutionary challenge of 1848. The question of whether to adopt the new republican 
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situation as a matter of fact after a disastrously lost war or to resist and to fight this de-
velopment openly led to the formation of competing groups and factions within the of-
ficer corps.221 According to Gordon and Keller, the finally dominant share within the of-
ficer corps—substantially determined by their upbringing within the society of imperial 
Germany, their origin, and their self-understanding as a state elite—was able to agree on 
three constitutive pillars for the future Reichswehr officer corps: first, the Reichswehr 
should be an anti-Communist bulwark; second, as long as republican parties would con-
tain the influence of the Communists, they would be recognized as acceptable partners as 
had happened in the Groener-Ebert phone call in the moment of defeat; and third, as long 
as republican parties would accept the Reichswehr’s powerful and somewhat autonomous 
role within the new state, their leading place within state affairs—except military—would 
be tolerated.222 
The decisions of Groener, Seeckt, and Schleicher during the 1920s, particularly 
their attempts to influence or outmaneuver the civilian authorities and republican checks 
and balances, perfectly demonstrated the political soldiers’ disrespect for the primacy of 
democratic-civilian authority. According to multiple scholars, it is of specific importance 
since the young and unstable democracy would have heavily depended on loyal forces, 
i.e., during the Kapp-Luettwitz coup. The Reichswehr’s officer corps consisted of monar-
chical officers who had been raised in a climate of only marginal respect for civilian au-
thority. The Bismarck era must be seen as an exception since Moltke, the Chief of the GS 
at that time, never acted without prior consultation with the chancellor, even if he also 
was sometimes unhappy about the relationship. Yet, despite the Bismarck era and Gen. 
Reinhardt’s pragmatic approach to republicanize the Reichswehr between 1919 and 1920, 
this original defect could not be corrected later in crisis after 1930 once it had been insti-
tutionalized during the era of Gen. Seeckt. It must be recognized as a tragedy that Gen. 
Reinhardt had been dismissed so early from his post due to a political intrigue, which 
opened the Reichswehr to the reactionary caste led by Seeckt. As a counterfact, one can 
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suggest that a republicanized GS most likely would have had defended the republic’s 
democratic core in the 1930s and especially in the period 1932–1933 when the camarilla 
around Hindenburg made Hitler chancellor. The actions of the political soldiers of whom 
Kurt von Schleicher was the most egregious weakened not only the fundamental princi-
ples and democratic structures of the Weimar republic but—unknowingly—also the of-
ficer corps’ center of gravity since this center increasingly depended upon a weak gov-
ernment. A strong government, such as the Nazi regime, would immediately end the of-
ficer’s political ambition and instrumentalize the corps to totalitarian goals that shattered 
traditional professional and political limits of service.223 
The state and the Reichswehr were one unit; therefore, the Reichswehr recognized 
the Nazi movement, which ostensibly supported the state, as an ally in the goals of restor-
ing German military power and of the revision of the European order by war. Moreover, 
this mistaken conclusion of an influential entity with the self-understanding of being the 
state’s ruler impeded the recognition of the gravest threat to the German state that created 
a totalitarian security sector. And, that sector soon challenged and undermined the politi-
cal role of the army, especially the GS. According to Bald et al., Strohn, and Mueller, 
Gen. Seeckt believed that the state was an historical eternal, supreme entity, far more 
than the sum of its people, its rulers, and constitutional instruments of power. Seeckt un-
derstood the state in a conservative Hegelian hierarchy of the power vertical and not in a 
Weberian sense of community and society. This supreme entity must be detached from 
daily politics, and the duty of the officer corps must serve this supreme and eternal state 
but not the individual cabinets and ministers, nor their special interest institutions or the 
representatives. Seeckt contrasted the negative term ‘republic’ with the positive term 
‘state.’ The terms ‘state,’ the ‘Reich,’ or the ‘nation’ replaced the Emperor within the ide-
as of the conservative revolution in Weimar whereby the right made its peace with mass 
politics, and one result of this process was National Socialism and the conservative alli-
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ance with it.224 Seeckt was convinced that this re-interpretation would provoke the officer 
corps’ functional loyalty to the Weimar state. He failed; he produced a conditioned loyal-
ty and cooperation with steadily changing governments and ended in a consensus with 
another government with a totalitarian approach. Hitler intentionally did not oppose the 
state itself; Hitler opposed ‘only’ the form of the state. This pattern impeded the officers’ 
recognition of Hitler as a totalitarian threat to Germany and to conceptions of profession-
alism and service rooted in the 19th century. The Reichswehr and its officer corps identi-
fied their interests as the interests of the state. The army became an end in itself among 
other entities of the Nazi totalitarian party state.225 
8. Interpretation of Elitism within the Framework of the State 
A 130-year history substantially influenced the officer corps’ and its GS’s suscep-
tibility for a totalitarian leader masquerading as a dynastic emperor-like figurehead who 
could restore the officers’ elite/estate-based prestige beyond a conflicted society beset by 
class war and decadence. According to Gerhard Ritter, Bald, and Goerlitz, the Frederician 
kings promoted the officer corps to the first estate of the Prussian state; a position gener-
ally not disputed beyond the population.226 The origins of the officer corps as a state and 
society elite (and the GS as the elite within the elite) dated back to the fusion of the noble 
and upper-middle-class officers in the 19th century in Prussia and Germany.227 Despite 
the minority percentage of nobles within the officer corps, the nobility was able to trans-
fer its attitude of estate-based superiority and its relatively medieval concept of honor and 
loyalty into the professional self-understanding of the officer corps in a time of nation-
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states and classes in mass politics. This conception was a stimulus for the sons of the 
Wilhelmine bourgeoisie to become an officer.228 The Prussian GS’s mystical respect as 
military elite evolved from the outstanding military victories in the second half of the 
19th century.229 The reciprocal penetration of bourgeois plutocratic and militaristic ele-
ments in officer corps, the nobility, and the bourgeoisie was a consequence of the officer 
corps’ definition as the first estate in Wilhelmine Germany.230 This penetration showed 
its effect within the increasing military leadership in foreign and domestic policy within 
the Schlieffen era (1905) and reached its climax within the military dictatorship of Lu-
dendorff and Hindenburg (1916) during the second phase of WWI.231 The endgame of 
defeat and its mitigation in domestic politics in WWI represented a caesura within the 
officer corps’ elitism. The traditional political-societal-military elite increasingly lost its 
influence within the new republic and its struggle with defeat, inflation, and depression. 
The potential success of a revolution’s violent suppression was merely an illusion in 
1918–1923 since WWI destroyed the nimbus of the German officer corps’ invincibility at 
home and abroad.232 
Hitler’s policy of the dual pillar and the massive rearmament of the armed forces 
led to a dilution of the officer corps’ composition as the elite caste drawn from the old 
regiments and the GS clique. Hitler caused the destruction of the officer corps’ homoge-
neity, its political influence, its identity, and tradition, according to multiple scholars.233 
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After WWI, the understanding of elitism within the officer corps of the Reichswehr must 
be traced back to the Junker tradition within Prussia and the political-societal-military 
status as German elite after the foundation of the Reich and influenced, however, by the 
modern industrial society. According to Martin Broszat, Klaus Schwabe, and Ludolf 
Herbst, those convictions influenced the actions and omissions of the Reichswehr’s lead-
ership between 1918 and the 1930s and led to the conflict between the Reichswehr’s in-
tegration and legitimation within the Weimar Republic.234 Gens. Groener and Seeckt in-
sisted on the transfer of a higher share on GS officers from the rest of the imperial army 
into the Reichswehr in order to save the traditional understanding of the estate-based sol-
dier elite.235 Nevertheless, the importance of the prevalence of nobility should not be 
overestimated, according to Bald. Many influential officers within the Reichswehr were 
of bourgeois origin as Ludendorff himself had been. They were as conservative and na-
tionalistic as their noble counterpart since they were raised by the same educational sys-
tem. The pivotal esprit de corps as the elite of the elite provoked the complete assimila-
tion of officers, even those from different backgrounds, as long as they belonged to the 
desirable circles.236 Gen. Heye declared in 1927 that an officer must possess a Her-
renbewusstsein (the consciousness of being a kind of feudal lord in the sense of Junker or 
superior master) and that the officer must be separated from civilian and enlisted 
ranks.237 At least from 1935, the Wehrmacht’s officer corps must be characterized as re-
markably young, upwardly mobile, overly urban, merely in a status of identification with 
the Nazi regime and its formations, i.e., the Hitler youth and the storm troopers, and in-
creasingly challenging the older, traditional share of the officer corps.238 
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Within the Third Reich and for the first time in its history, the old German officer 
corps had been downgraded to a purely functional elite in the social revolution of the 
people's community in National Socialism. According to multiple authors, Hitler’s re-
shaping of the officer corps’ position and status must be seen as a modernization since 
the National Socialist revolution relied on social equality based on racial criteria and 
broke with the estate-based social order of Wilhelmine Germany and of Seeckt's 
Reichswehr. Within a functioning and stable liberal democracy, the role of the officer 
corps and its GS would be those of a functional elite. However, this standard never exist-
ed in Prussia nor the German empire, not even in the Weimar Republic. Hitler was the 
representative of the racially determined victory over estate/class privileges and the great 
alternative for a majority of Germans. It was impossible for the old elites, much less the 
GS, to challenge this revolutionary totalitarian, who used the tradition of the soldier for 
his own total ends of European domination and racial empire via mass murder.239 There-
fore, many officers willingly accepted the illusion of still being an influential state elite—
while all the same being degraded to a functional military elite. In essence, they agreed to 
an instrumentalization and transformation from being a political leadership instrument 
into a functional military tool.240 
The elitism of the GS must be distinguished from the elitism of the ordinary of-
ficer corps; it must be adapted by the functional facet of an even more uniform approach 
to deduce and to approach challenges or problems. It was more than the specified addi-
tional, common training and background that distinguished the GS officers within the 
Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht from the troop officers. They were not expected to think 
alike, but they were profoundly trained—not to say indoctrinated—to use the same meth-
ods of reasoning. The GS officer always tried to reduce a particular problem to its essen-
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tials before making a decision. Different GS officers confronted with the same question 
would give a similar answer. Thus, the GS officers were convinced that for every prob-
lem there is a correct solution and the GS officer should be able to find it.241 
B. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE REICHSWEHR AND THE WEHR-
MACHT 
Within this section, the author describes the extent of civilian control of the Ger-
man Armed Forces. The section aims to conceptualize the abstract construct of ‘civilian 
control’ within a specified social group, the German GS corps. The author, however, does 
not intend to compare the German GS with its Swiss counterpart, except in cases that are 
inevitable for the understanding of the context. 
1. State Structure and the Determining Social Paradigms 
In Prussian and German history from the 18th century until the middle of the 20th 
century, the German state-structure would not allow adequate preconditions for efficient 
democratic civilian control of armed forces until the end of WWII. Prussia, the German 
Empire, and the Weimar Republic provided incomplete constitutional and ministerial in-
struments for the civilian control of armed forces. In fact, because of the traditional au-
thoritarian structures of Prussia and imperial Germany respectively disabled republican 
control of the Reichswehr, those instruments remained without sufficient effect when 
compared to the record of the Federal republic since the 1950s. 
Within the Frederician military state, public life had been substantially deter-
mined by an oversized military in the dynastic state, which was without any parallel in 
Europe. According to Ritter, two-thirds of the public revenue was invested in the army 
and 3.8 percent of the population served in the army. The nobility and its subjects alike 
were drafted. The state administration was militarized. In short, society and people be-
came militarized, a condition that reached its climax in WWI when the supreme com-
mand erected a modern, proto-totalitarian military dictatorship in the years 1916–
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1918.242 Nonetheless, the idea of a ministerial state structure that would provide the pre-
requisite for civilian control—the primacy of civilian authority—existed also in Prussia 
later in the 19th century when such practice was established in Britain, France, and the 
United States. Already in 1807, Chancellor Hardenberg advocated for the structural, min-
isterial subordination of military commands beyond civilian authorities and defined the 
organization of the army as political affair.243 
In contrast to other great powers in Europe, the appreciation for the military as a 
source of national pride reached its peak during the prime-age of liberalism, around the 
1840s until the 1850s. According to Ritter, Chancellor Bismarck successfully managed to 
combine bourgeois-liberal ideals with great power politics driven by nationalism and 
called it Realpolitik. Over time, people and historians reinterpreted German militarism as 
political progress and as a national institution and abandoned the stereotypes of the army 
as the threatening stronghold of reaction.244 The more important militarism became, the 
more influence on policy the military got.245 Shortly after 1870, also the other great 
powers joined the path of militarism. The appreciation of the military also increased in 
other nation-states; in France and Great Britain particularly enforced by colonialism. Fi-
nally, during the first decade of the 20th century, the blocs of the Entente and the central 
powers formed their lines of demarcation.246 
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In imperial Germany, the traditional position of the Prussian-style military stood 
in a problematic relationship to the rule of law, and to the human rights and ministerial 
portfolios of the constitution.247 According to Ritter and to Heinemann, the crux of this 
conflict was the subordination of a military entity beyond a civilian one. While in other 
European states, the subordination of the military beyond a civilian defense minister may 
have led to friction but no catastrophic defeat in wartime; in Prussia, it would have been 
recognized as inappropriate. In a Prussian sense, a civilian ministerial intermediary be-
tween the king and his army would be recognized as counterintuitive and against the na-
ture of an army. In short, only soldiers should give orders to soldiers.248 
With the collapse of the Empire, the political and social paradigms which deter-
mined the power of the military and its GS within the state were finally replaced by liber-
al constitutional prerogatives without the power of the dynasty; thus, the leadership of the 
new Reichswehr managed silently to introduce autonomous structures to maintain its 
power base within the Weimar Republic.249 The objective of the Reichswehr’s leadership 
was to preserve militaristic structures for a future national, authoritarian state in a con-
servative Hegelian sense. According to Heinemann (and Seeckt), in such a state, the mili-
tary and its officer corps should regain the first place and privileged status. Until then, the 
core cadre of the “new” old elite cell should covertly survive within the unloved republic. 
This idea must be characterized as conservative revolution with anti-liberal, anti-
egalitarian, and estate-driven conceptions of state and society.250 According to Goerlitz 
and Carsten, the founding father of this concept, Gen. Seeckt, reinterpreted Hegel’s idea 
of an almighty state as an exalted, apolitical eternal value, despite any sullying societal or 
party political developments. In other words, if republican interests would conflict with 
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the interests of the state, the Reichswehr would have the right and the duty to change the 
constitution, if necessary, also with violence and also against the civilian CiC or the gov-
ernment.251 In 1848, the Prussian military already suppressed a public revolution with 
military violence.252 
The Reichswehr and the republican state always stood in a complicated relation-
ship with each other. Moreover, in a practice from the estates and the dynastic rule, the 
Reichswehr requested extraordinary judicial standards for itself, compared to other ‘re-
publican’ militaries, according to Heinemann. These standards must be seen as conces-
sion of President Ebert and Reichswehrminister Noske to the military leadership during 
the violent mayhem in Germany after WWI. The state suspended substantial civil rights 
to suppress the Spartacist coup in the 1920s. Furthermore, the civilian government grant-
ed the covering up of flagrant violations of the Versailles treaty.253 While in the early 
German empire, the military represented a pillar of absolutism; in the Weimar Republic, 
the Reichswehr represented the endurance of the dynasties within a parliamentary repub-
lic.254 Heinemann defined the extra-constitutional position of the Reichswehr within the 
Weimar Republic as “para-legal.”255 Gen. Seeckt and his successors enforced and culti-
vated this para-legality during the entire existence of the Weimar Republic.256 Mean-
while, the Generals Groener and Seeckt tried, by all means, to cultivate the ‘stab-in-the 
back-theory’ to blame the guilt for the November 1918 armistice of Compiègne on the 
civilian government and undermine the government’s credibility in order to increase the 
military’s influence.257 
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At the beginning of 1933 and after Schleicher’s chancellorship, which brought the 
Weimar Republic close to the shape of a military dictatorship, the pivotal decision needed 
to be taken whether the Reichswehr should resist Hitler’s rise to power in order to protect 
the Prussian idea of a state. According to Wohlfeil, Matuschka, and Heinemann, Schlei-
cher accepted Hitler’s seizure of power and resigned in 1933 and did nothing substantial 
to resist an event that was seen by him and others as inconsequential because of the con-
servatives in the cabinet who were to tame the Nazis. Nonetheless, and what showed it-
self in the months to come through the summer of 1934 and beyond, the social paradigm 
of “classical Prussian militarism” with its leadership claim for the state as a whole had 
ended. The Weimar constitution failed to integrate the military into the pluralistic state 
and society, and it failed as state structure effectively to control, restrict, and limit mili-
tary power within democracy.258 
After Hitler’s seizure of power, he greatly accelerated the rearmament that Schlei-
cher had begun on a moderate scale in 1932. Moreover, he intentionally began to Nazify 
the officer corps via this rearmament and expansion of the military, and ignited one of the 
most important social paradigms of the entire officer corps: military might and influence 
within the state in service of a totalitarian party state bent on European domination. Ac-
cording to Salewski et al., the military leadership easily accepted the changes of state 
structure in exchange for a potentially more influential status. The officer corps com-
pletely ignored that Hitler’s intentions were based on Social Darwinism and not on the 
traditions of the officers, which was used in Nazi propaganda as a weapon.259 Latest by 
1937, the last structural elements of independent controls within the German state and the 
Wehrmacht were abolished.260 
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2. Constitutional Checks and Balances 
From the Prussian era until the Third Reich, constitutional checks and balances 
never reached sufficient effectiveness to restrict the military’s autonomy and controlled 
the armed forces compared to other Great Powers. According to Gordon and Goerlitz, the 
old Prussian army had never been fully under control of the parliament. The Reichstag 
(the equivalent to the House of Representatives) and the Landtag (the equivalent to the 
Senate) comprised the right to limit the military using budgetary powers. Nevertheless, 
the parliament was not allowed to intervene in command, personal, or other internal af-
fairs of the military. The military was the personal privilege of the king. As already out-
lined, the officer corps, the military cabinet, and the war ministry felt responsible only to 
the monarch and not to parliament—a fatal flaw. The cabinet and the ministry were con-
trolled by military personnel who had become politicized.261 With the dissolution of the 
old empire and the foundation of the republic, however, the chain of command ‘emperor-
military’ broke and was replaced by a system that was anything other than effective dem-
ocratic civil-military relations.262 
The constitution of the Weimar Republic comprised legal instruments that would 
subordinate the military under civilian control and establish effective checks and balances 
in order to regulate the entire military accordingly. According to Gordon and Bald, the 
first Reichswehrminister Noske and the first Commander of the armed forces, Gen. Rein-
hardt, intended to subordinate the Reichswehr under civilian control and accepted civilian 
oversight of military affairs as a matter of fact in a liberal democracy. Reinhardt’s suc-
cessor, Gen. Seeckt, was strongly opposed to this policy. He desired internal independ-
ence and tried to keep the army withdrawn from civilian control, in particular from the 
parliament.263 Bald quoted Gen. Seeckt by stating, “The more influence parliamentarism 
gained, the more important it is to liberate at least the leadership, the GS, from such omi-
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nous influences.”264 Similar to his Prussian ancestors, Seeckt did not accept his superi-
ors, the president as CiC, and the Reichswehrminister as Deputy CiC. They were not 
military personnel and therefore not entitled to issue orders to the Reichswehr. Seeckt 
saw himself as the commanding general and bitterly resented any civilian intervention 
into military matters.265 
Two movements must be considered in describing the debate about constitutional 
checks and balances as well as civilian control within the Weimar Republic: those forces 
that intended to democratize and republicanize the military and those which tried to treat 
the military as the state within the state in republican structures and grant extra-
constitutional autonomy. According to Heinemann, primarily the leftwing parties had a 
historical and also increasingly contemporary interest to subordinate the military under 
civilian control. These parties intended to institutionalize the democratic standard of par-
liamentary approval prior to any exemption from civilian control. On the other hand, 
Gen. Seeckt argued for the institutionalization of the para-legal exception “military with-
out parliamentary control,” along with the historical pattern in Prussia and Imperial Ger-
many.266 
The Weimar constitution contained severe deficiencies related to civilian control 
of the armed forces. According to Heinemann, Weimar’s constitution was a milestone for 
civilian control in contrast to the documents that had existed since the mid-19th century. 
For the first time in German history, the supreme commanders of the armed forces were 
not necessarily military personnel.267 Furthermore, officers and soldiers had to swear an 
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oath to the civilian government.268 The basic maxims of the constitution can be traced 
back to the constitution of the second Reich. The Reich’s president replaced the Emperor 
of the Reich.269 Furthermore, the president would act as CiC.270 However, it can be ar-
gued that the sole statement of the president as CiC cannot be the civilian primacy’s defi-
nition. In contrasting the authority of the president and the Reichswehrminister, the defi-
ciencies of the Weimar system become obvious. The president had the constitutional 
right to overrule the Reichswehrminister and the parliament. Fatefully enough, and as 
happened in 1930, the president retained the right to issue emergency decrees and to dis-
solve the parliament. The political soldier and former Field Paul von Marshal Hindenburg 
massively abused his rights as president and influenced particularly military policies by 
presidential decrees, similar to the German Emperor and the Prussian King. After 1930, 
the state of emergency became normal condition, and the president took over the role of 
as a kind of Ersatz- (replacement) Emperor. The intended parliamentary supreme com-
mand was a facade. Constitutional checks and balances for the military were an illu-
sion.271 After Hitler’s rise to power, the oath on his person consisted literally of the same 
wording as in Wilhelmine, Germany, except the term “Adolf Hitler.” This oath finalized 
the instrumentalization of the armed forces by Hitler. The Reichswehr, its officer corps, 
and the GS were now bound to the dictator especially after Hindenburg's death in 
1934.272 
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In summary, on cannot say that solely the civil-military problems of Weimar pro-
duced Hitler's dictatorship—but they did not protect human rights either. Moreover, simi-
lar deficiencies can be found in multiple old-fashioned constitutions around the globe. 
According to Wohlfeil and Matuschka, the constitution of the Weimar Republic com-
prised the potential constitutional and legal tools to establish a parliamentary control of 
the armed forces and to force the Reichswehr to subordination, i.e., the budgetary au-
thority. Yet, a constitution is only as effective as the people in charge will execute their 
constitutional duties. For a variety of ideological and also domestic and international po-
litical reasons, the representatives refused to apply their authority, and they refused to do 
so not only during the revolutionary chaos between 1919 and 1923 but also during the 
succeeding years in which the republic was prosperous and stable. But, Seeck’s legacy 
was enduring resistance to democratic civil-military relations, such that in 1930, it be-
came fairly certain that soldiers either would willingly or blindly aid the dictator. The 
missing parliamentary opposition to the anti-democratic behavior of the Reichswehr’s 
leadership must be assessed as a sign of indifference and weakness.273 
3. Degree of Autonomy within Institutional Limits 
The GS’s of imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic (i.e., the sub rosa Trup-
penamt), and of the Third Reich enjoyed various degrees of autonomy within institutional 
limits. Moreover, while the Great GS in Wilhelmine Germany, in particular during WWI, 
enjoyed almost maximal freedom of action, the Truppenamt of the Reichswehr consider-
ably disposed a higher degree of autonomy than any other comparable institution within 
democratic countries. The irony here is that the GS's autonomy hit rock bottom during the 
time of the Third Reich, which is commonly recognized as the most militarized period in 
history. 
In Wilhelmine Germany, at the onset of WWI, the Great GS comprised 21 
branches led by six General Quarter Masters who were subordinated to the Chief of GS. 
Moreover, the Great GS covered more than purely military topics and had substantially 
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administrative civil-military influence in other executive ministries. The Great GS, how-
ever, lacked profound expertise in domains that were contemporarily attributed to the 
definition of total war, such as the economy, press, propaganda, or international law. In 
particular, the grave deficiencies in managing these domains belonged to the main defi-
cits of the Great GS, which became clear during WWI. The first General Quarter Master 
led the branches for mobilization and operations, railway transport, the military intelli-
gence section for foreign fortification, and the section for military transports. The second 
and fourth General Quarter Masters led each of the two military intelligence sections with 
different regional attributions. The third General Quarter Master led the branches in 
charge of operational studies and the war academy. The fifth General Quarter Master led 
the branch for warfare history and the archives. The sixth General Quarter Master led the 
branches for trigonometry, topography, cartography, photography, and the section for co-
lonial affairs. Directly subordinated to the Chief of the GS were the branches for person-
nel and maneuvers.274 
The treaty of Versailles prohibited the existence of a Great GS on the strategic 
level; however, it allowed the Reichswehr to maintain GS on the operational level of the 
so-called Wehrkreise, that is, the core role of the staff was pushed to a subordinate territo-
rial level. According to multiple scholars, the first Chief of the Reichswehr, Gen. Rein-
hardt, tasked Gen. Seeckt to take over the affairs of the Great GS within a new organiza-
tional structure. Gen. Seeckt indeed had another intention: to preserve the spirit and “the 
kernel of the fine and nobly conceived institution of the Great GS.”275 The acceptance of 
operational GS provided sufficient possibilities to transfer and hide the core elements of 
the Great GS in subordinate entities in order to deceive the arms control authorities who 
enforced Versailles on the ground. Ironically, in an attempt to destroy the core of German 
militarism, the Allies—in particular the French Marshal Foch—permitted relative free-
dom of action to the GS and provided the tools to cover the GS from its foreign and do-
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mestic opponents.276 Gen. Seeckt managed to transfer a comparatively high number of 
imperial GS officers into the newly born Reichswehr. Even more, Seeckt ensured a heg-
emonic influence of GS officers within the officer corps of the Reichswehr.277 Immedi-
ately after Seeckt’s dismissal in 1926, the Social Democrats failed in parliament to curtail 
the political autonomy of the military and to integrate the Reichswehr into the republican 
state.278 
The Truppenamt was directly subordinated to the Chief of the Reichswehr and 
took over the bulk of the tasks from the Great GS, such as mobilization, education, and 
operations. The agency was structured along the branches “operations (T1)”; “organiza-
tion (T2)”; “statistics (T3) [the cover term for military intelligence]”; “personnel, training 
and education (T4)”; “national defense (T5)”; “Inspector General of training and educa-
tion (T6)”; among other minor sections.279 In February 1920, the troop agency already 
reached full operational status.280 Figure 3 shows the chain of command. 
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 Organization chart of the Reichswehr in 1920.281 
The crucial benchmark to assess the autonomy of the Reichswehr and its GS is the 
distinction between Befehlsgewalt (supreme military authority) and Kommandogewalt 
(subordinate command authority). According to Wohlfeil, Matuschka, and Erfurth, mili-
tary authority was limited to the defense administration and held by the Reichswehrminis-
ter, while command authority was held by the Chief of the Reichswehr and comprised the 
authority over military units and administration. In other words, the military commander 
of the armed forces held literally more authority (and therefore autonomy) than his supe-
rior civilian official, who had been elected by parliament.282 Legitimacy and control are 
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therefore the crucial challenges between the Reichswehr and its subordination and inte-
gration into the state hierarchy. Notwithstanding, in the context of the constitutional 
structure, the autonomy of the Reichswehr and its GS must be characterized as undemo-
cratic, conflict-prone, and dangerous. This structure did not support the crafting of a re-
publican and reliable officer corps and is best described by Heinemann’s definition of a 
para-legal state.283 By allowing and encouraging the circumvention of the Versailles re-
strictions, the civilian government not only granted an irresponsible extent on autonomy 
to a military entity within a democratic state, the government also undermined its position 
towards the Reichswehr leadership and made itself an accomplice by violating the rule of 
law.284 
From 1933 onwards, Hitler incrementally revoked the core principles of the Prus-
sian GS conception—the co-responsibility and the GS channel—which fundamentally 
restricted the autonomy and influence of the GS and degraded the GS to an ordinary staff 
structure. In 1933, the Nazi regime replaced the critical Gen. Wilhelm Adam with Gen. 
Ludwig Beck as Chief of the GS. At this time, Gen. Beck—by the time of the Sudeten 
crisis in 1938 part of the military resistance against Hitler—still had a positive attitude 
toward National Socialism.285 In 1938, Hitler revoked the principle that the GS officer 
had the duty to advise the commander (and bore the responsibility for his advice) while 
the commander bore the responsibility for his decision. Furthermore, he revoked the 
Chief of the GS’s right to approach the head of state directly (and the right of every GS 
officer to approach the Chief of GS directly).286 Nonetheless, other attempts of the Nazi 
regime to interfere in the internal affairs of the armed forces had been successfully re-
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pelled until 1938, i.e., the influence on religious freedom.287 In 1938, Hitler dismissed 
Gen. Beck for his opposition to the regime’s plans of war over the Sudeten issue.288 
Within the Third Reich, the Chief of GS encompassed the responsibility concern-
ing all questions connected to the conduct of war; determined the army’s staff manage-
ment, material, economic requirements; defined the guidelines for the organization, train-
ing, arming, and equipment; but did not hold any particular responsibility for forces, ac-
cording to Megargee and Salewski et al.289 The position of the Chief of GS within Nazi 
Germany must be characterized as much more restricted than in 1919. The Chief of GS 
was the primus inter pares of the department heads within the supreme command of the 
army. Even so, he did not possess any command authority. He needed the cooperation 
and support of his superior—the supreme commander of the army—for any orders that 
would affect the troops themselves. In particular, since Hitler revoked the Chief of GS’s 
right to approach the head of state directly, autonomous actions were no longer possible. 
The GS’s tasks, however, remained merely the same as during the Reichswehr era. With-
in the Wehrmacht era, Hitler created in 1938 a new entity, the Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht (OKW, Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces); however, this 
body cannot be characterized as supreme GS since it acted only on behalf of Hitler him-
self. The reorganization of the Wehrmacht led not to a concentration but to a decentrali-
zation of war efforts, which was characteristic of Nazi governance and harmed the wag-
ing of war despite the initial successes.290 In 1939, the GS of the army was structured 
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into 13 branches (including the central branch), led by five Assistant Chiefs of Staff, as 
shown in Figure 4.291 
 
 Organization chart of the Wehrmacht’s 
high command in 1939.292 
The air force formed its own center of gravity, with its convoluted command 
structure attached to Goering, while the Navy also operated with some autonomy, so that 
a unity of effort as had in the maritime democracies was not achieved. From the French 
campaign onward, and especially with the setbacks in Russia in 1941/1942, Hitler in-
creasingly restricted the GS autonomy by downgrading, restructuring, or by implanting 
reliable political officers in critical positions within the GS. The latter is exemplarily 
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shown in Figure 5. Moreover, already by 1942, Hitler short-circuiting the GS (and other 
ministries or departments) after disagreements about the objectives of the campaign 
“Barbarossa” (the plan to attack the USSR in 1941) became predominate and more ag-
gravated in the defense phase of the war leading to total defeat. By the end of WWII, the 
GS had lost all its unique autonomy and influence on state policy and sunk to the level of 
a military executive tool.293 
 
 Organization chart of the Wehrmacht’s 
high command in 1942.294 
4. Integration of the Armed Forces within the Institutional Framework 
Since the Prussian state and imperial Germany were substantially militarized 
states, not all scholars argued that the army represented a state within a state.295 In con-
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trast, during the Reichswehr era, the armed forces—designed as a full-volunteer-elite ca-
dre force—became insulated from the institutional framework and the officer corps de-
veloped itself into a Praetorian guard, which then allowed itself to be instrumentalized by 
Hitler after his seizure of power. 
The Reichswehr era must be distinguished into a phase shortly after WWI when 
the provisional Reichswehr—not yet fully developed, institutionalized, and structured 
along the conditions of Versailles—represented the leftovers of the imperial army, and 
into a phase when the Reichswehr developed its Praetorian-guard character, substantially 
influenced by Gen. Seeckt’s guidelines. According to multiple authors, after 1919, the 
provisional Reichswehr merely acted as loyal guarantor of statehood, under the command 
of President Ebert as Spare-Emperor, until the Kapp-Luettwitz coup in 1920.296 After the 
dismissal of the charismatic Social Democrat Noske until the end of the Weimar Repub-
lic, no Social Democrat became SECDEF again, which substantially contributed to the 
missing republicanization of the Reichswehr.297 The policy of the provisional 
Reichswehr, at least until the Kapp-Luettwitz coup, must be characterized as pragmatic 
integration into the democratic statehood.298 After the Kapp-Luettwitz coup and the dis-
missal of Gen. Reinhardt, republic and Reichswehr started to detach from each other.299 
The pragmatic reform policy of Reinhardt had been replaced by Seeckt’s policy of at-
tentism. While the leftwing parties abstained from acting responsibly in defense matters 
for ideological reasons, Seeckt’s Reichswehr and the Nazis shared the rejection of liberal 
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democracy and parliamentarism.300 Although the provisional Reichswehr would have 
had the potential to develop itself into a republican army—well integrated into the institu-
tional framework, as the army law in 1921 with its clearly formulated civilian primacy 
defined—Seeckt’s Reichswehr became a Praetorian guard disconnected from the demo-
cratic institutions of the Weimar Republic.301 
The missing integration of the Reichswehr into the institutional framework was 
the result of Seeckt’s negative attitude towards the republic and parliamentarism as well 
as ideological attitudes and policies in the parties in parliament who failed to do more for 
the constitutional demands of the era. According to Carsten, Regling et al., Seeckt re-
mained loyal to the monarchy and its traditional symbols and rejected even the republican 
flag (black, red, and gold). Seeckt’s conviction influenced the Reichswehr from the bot-
tom of the enlisted ranks to the top leadership. Seeckt avoided any identification between 
army and democracy. Instead, he installed the abstract term ‘state’ as master of the sol-
diers. Seeckt’s quote concerning the relation between the army and the state is well-
known: “The army serves the state, and only the state, for it is the state.” A young officer 
commented on Seeckt’s quote later: “In our hands lies the state. We affirm that it has 
been linked to the life of our nation for thousands of years and has developed with it. Its 
fate is our fate. We are the bearers of the state.”302 Seeckt’s attentism policy led directly 
into a hostile isolation of the Reichswehr from the republic and the population, in particu-
lar, from the urban working class, the liberal middle classes, and the intelligentsia. In the 
early 1920s, the Reichswehr halfheartedly invoked recruitment campaigns to bind these 
                                                 
300 Keller, “Die Wehrmacht Der Deutschen Republik Ist Die Reichswehr” - Die Deutsche Armee 1918-
1921 [the Wehrmacht of the German Republic Is the Reichswehr - the German Armed Forces 1918-1921], 
82:273; Salewski et al., Handbuch Zur Deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648-1939 [the Handbook About 
German Military History 1648-1939], 7:35; Broszat, Schwabe, and Herbst, Die Deutschen Eliten Und Der 
Weg in Den Zweiten Weltkrieg [the German Elites and the Way into World War II], 401:236; Hess, 
Demokratisches Engagement: Beiträge Aus Drei Jahrzehnten [Democratic Commitment: Three Decades of 
Contributions], 77. 
301 Keller, “Die Wehrmacht Der Deutschen Republik Ist Die Reichswehr” - Die Deutsche Armee 1918-
1921 [the Wehrmacht of the German Republic Is the Reichswehr - the German Armed Forces 1918-1921], 
82:281; Erfurth, Die Geschichte Des Deutschen Generalstabes Von 1918 Bis 1945 [the History of the 
German General Staff from 1918 Until 1945], 1:57; Strohn, The German Army and the Defence of the 
Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918-1939, 93. 
302 Carsten, Reichswehr Politics, 102:400; Regling, Borgert, and Kroener, Handbuch Zur Deutschen 
Militärgeschichte 1648-1939 [the Handbook About German Military History 1648-1939], 9:534. 
85 
parts of the population to the armed forces; however, with insufficient success.303 Still in 
1927, after the dismissal of Gen. Seeckt, the selection of new recruits laid as in former 
times in the hands of regional commanders at the company level. All civilian influences 
concerning a proportionate recruitment of members from all classes of society remained 
excluded. New recruits had to present a certificate of good conduct, which had to testify 
that the recruits had previously abstained from political activity.304 
Besides, Seeckt intended to preserve, transfer, and safeguard the traditional ethos 
of the officer corps through the parliamentarian struggle until the appearance of an au-
thoritarian military state, according to Goerlitz, Heinemann, Wohlfeil and Matuschka. 
Seeckt, as Chief of the armed forces and former Chief of the Truppenamt had a dominant 
influence and personal authority within the Reichswehr.305 Seeckt was convinced that 
officers do not feel any ties to democracy but to the fatherland or the state as a Hegelian 
and anti-pluralist idea. An officer does not need to identify itself with democracy.306 
Seeckt effectively built a “Great Wall” around the army and a citadel around the officer 
corps. He invoked multiple regulations and guidelines to maintain a rigid separation from 
all new political ideas, political parties, among others. Yet, Seeckt’s policy of contempt 
did not come openly into effect. Young Reichswehr officers reported that the atmosphere 
was neither hostile nor friendly towards democracy and parliamentarism; rather it was 
impersonal, detached, and not affected by the state’s institutions.307 
Seeckt intended completely to depoliticize the army in order to ban every civilian 
influence and interference in inner affairs of the Reichswehr. Moreover, the dividing as-
pects were not primarily hostilely written laws and regulations, but subliminal restrictions 
intended to damn pluralism and party politics as an evil. Common interests between of-
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ficer corps and republican institutions had been suppressed.308 An integration of the 
Reichswehr and its officer corps into the Weimar Republic became impossible.309 
In contrast to other entities of the Weimar Republic, such as the free press, the in-
tegration of the Reichswehr into the Third Reich after Hitler’s rise to power must be 
characterized as Anpassung (adaptation) rather than the often-used term Gleichschaltung 
(forced coordination and equalization).310 Similar claims and political positions between 
the Reichswehr and National Socialism facilitated the complete instrumentalization, 
which took place within the first two years of the new regime. The Nazi policy integrated 
the Reichswehr into the new state paradigms by providing a pivotal position to the army 
as part of Nazi governance of using existing institutions and party formations to carry out 
Nazi rule in steps.311 In 1935, with the introduction of the widely accepted conscription, 
the regime used the opportunity to penetrate the heart of the Reichswehr not by Bolshevik 
methods but by a kind of indirect approach of expansion and multiplicity of institutions, 
i.e., the armed Schutzstaffel (protection squad) once the stormtroopers had been pushed 
aside as a kind of militia on the model of the Red Army. The character of a full-volunteer 
elite force was replaced by a full-conscription army. The Nazi norms supplanted Prussian 
officer norms or co-opted these norms with a totalitarian goal. The integration of the 
Reichswehr into the regime was completed.312 
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Nevertheless, Hitler was well aware of the strong esprit de corps of the German 
GS. Moreover, even though he assessed the GS as a “club of intellectuals,” he knew that 
the Nazi ideology would require more time to influence and instrumentalize this elite 
caste within the Reichswehr since he was going to attack the strongest institution of the 
Prussian heritage.313 Hitler did not trust the GS and saw it as a sort of secret society, sim-
ilar to the masonic lodges.314 It must be stated that the core of the military resistance that 
executed the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944, were GS officers.315 The resistance 
fighters Stauffenberg, von Quirnheim, Finckh, Beck, von Tresckow, among others, held 
influential positions within the GS. Yet, most of them first had to learn the evil of Na-
tional Socialism since most of them welcomed the Nazi regime in the 1930s.316 The coup 
of July 20, 1944, resulted in the killing of over 60 GS officers and substantially contrib-
uted to the further disempowerment of the GS.317 
5. Degree of Professionalization of the General Staff 
In contrast to the Swiss GS, which deliberately comprised not only career but also 
drafted GS officers, the Prussian and later the German GS comprised only career officers 
who saw themselves as the most elite. The Prussian army, as well as the imperial army, 
were armed forces based on general conscription; not so the Reichswehr. The author has 
widely outlined the reform and reduction phases within GS education and their implica-
tions; however, all German armed forces until the Third Reich comprised the unique fea-
ture that the GS corps as professional military elite understood itself also as political-
social elite and state-leading caste based on military paradigms. The GS corps embodied 
the pre-industrial Junker elite as well as its norms and represented an autonomously ex-
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ceptional position within the Prussian and German states. Multiple scholars advocated 
that this dualism caused the structural dilemma of the GS corps (Integrationsproblematik) 
as professional military as well as political-social elite when confronted with National 
Socialism.318 This dualism facilitated the professional integration of the GS corps into 
the Nazi state while in the meantime the structural dilemma provided isolation from reali-
ty and paralysis of the corps when it should have resisted the destruction of the corps’ 
heritage. 
In Prussia of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the contrast between the newly 
raised expectations of the bourgeoisie and the traditional noble privileges was the core of 
the conflict beyond the professional officer corps in state and society. According to Bald, 
the assimilation of officer candidates from the desirable circles of the upper-middle clas-
ses into the officer corps and the military success of mass armies on the battlefield facili-
tated the esteem of state power and the prestige of Prussia’s professional officer corps in 
the second half of the 19th century. The profession “officer” received extremely high es-
teem. The determining factors for the social mobility of the officer’s profession, however, 
were the problematic quantitative supply of candidates and not the industrialization or 
economic progress.319 
The degree of specialization within the officer corps, i.e., the differentiation be-
tween GS officers and troop officers, appeared parallel to the increasing permeation of 
technology in warfare and the rise of managerial science in the economy and society in 
general from the society of the estates. According to Mueller, this disintegration process 
started first within the navy, what with its bourgeois origins and ethos as well as the role 
of machines in naval architecture. The navy was the branch most significantly impacted 
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by technology in the 19th century. This both bourgeois and more technology-savvy 
branch was the more differentiated the leadership of this branch became.320 
In imperial Germany, the GS held the monopoly of the brain and nerve centers of 
the military organization. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of general officers were 
former GS officers. The GS controlled the army, according to Gordon.321 However, in 
particular, during the Bismarck era, the charismatic (but civilian) Chancellor effectively 
imposed policy over the fully professionalized GS under the military genius Moltke, who 
came to see strategy at the operational level and was so fixated on principles of battle that 
he lost sight of Clausewitz's core insights about the nature of war. Professionalization did 
not necessarily mean that a civilian official voluntarily subordinated himself to the 
GS.322 The Great GS and the troop GS represented a relatively small in-group of elite 
officers within the German officer corps. The number increased from 350 in 1888 to over 
650 officers in 1914, by an army strength of 800,000 (0.1625 percent). Only the best 
former students from the officer academies were chosen for this selection process for the 
GS education. By far not all candidates graduated the War Academy. The influence of the 
Chief of GS in war, however, was limited since he had no command authority over 
troops. The decreasing influence of the Emperor on daily politics and military operations 
led to the increasing influence of the Chief of GS within political, military, and domestic 
affairs.323 Despite the high professionalization of the GS, it was oblivious to the reality 
of total and machine war in the 20th century, and the military leadership made ludicrous 
mistakes in war preparations. Notably, comprehensive coordination of all state efforts 
prior to WWI never took place, not the least because of the false dogma of an elite that 
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also failed to embrace the managerial revolution in the German society and economy, and 
was better apprehended by members of the Entente.324 
After the defeat of the Empire in 1918, numerous and influential officials of the 
Entente, i.e., Marshal Foch, advocated for a medium-sized (200,000 men) Reichswehr 
combined with short-term conscription. According to Gordon and Ritter, the Allied offic-
ers intended to prevent the new German army becoming a closed caste. They were con-
vinced that a citizen army, although rather inefficient, with a socially mixed leadership 
would provide the best prospects of not becoming a state within a state. By contrast, the 
French and British Prime Ministers, Georges Clémenceau and Lloyd George overruled 
their military experts with very fateful consequences as was shown 25 years later.325 
The Reichswehr and its officer corps became—as predicted—a small, compact, 
efficient, fully professionalized elite army. This army nourished a contemptuous attitude 
toward republicanism and democracy with an obsession about the “ideal state” that was 
identical with the army and its leadership, according to Gordon, Strohn, and Mueller.326 
Despite the Reichswehr’s de-facto subordination to Weimar civilian control, the standard 
officer within the Reichswehr—and increasingly also the GS officers—fulfilled the stere-
otype of an educationally limited, profoundly trained, military specialist whose thought 
pattern was strongly influenced by a traditional, standardized, hollow rhetoric. This was 
in contrast to a century earlier, when officers and civilians had sought enlightenment to-
gether as a means out of national defeat in 1806. Such officers could be easily seduced by 
the siren song of the former NCO turned totalitarian politician in a time of para-military 
politics amid political parties equipped with their own militias as occurred in 1919–1932. 
Only a small group of officers remained critical of the army’s leadership and political de-
velopment in Germany, particularly after Hitler’s seizure of power.327 Gen. Seeckt was 
convinced of the long-serving, professional soldier as the most valuable soldier in total 
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war—a corps of professional soldiers at the helm of a warfare state as had happened in 
the years 1916–1918.328 Seeckt’s depoliticization policy cultivated an attitude of con-
tainment and isolation between the officer corps and the society and politics of a pluralist 
nation, manifesting remarkably progressive and forward-looking facets of the 20th centu-
ry. As a result, the officers concentrated primarily on their military profession, which de-
termined the bulk of their life preparing for a future war with Poland and possible civil 
war at home in the hope of a new Reich once the November criminals were eradicated.329 
The officer corps and the GS—despite their high tactical and operational proficiency—
were individually unable to understand and fight the Nazi domestic threat in 1932 and 
1933. After Hitler’s seizure of power, he took full advantage of the easily instrumental-
ized officer corps for his ends of achieving a totalitarian state and European domination, 
and finally, mass murder on an unparalleled scale.330 
Within the Third Reich, the GS officer still represented a specialized career be-
yond the ever-growing mass of the Wehrmacht’s officer corps. According to Salewski et 
al., GS officers were appointed to prestigious and exclusive positions within the GS and 
other supreme command structures in the Third Reich. Between 100 and 150 officers per 
year graduated from the War Academy.331 Despite their high proficiency and profound 
military training, the GS officers—except the honorable exceptions who joined the mili-
tary resistance—represented a fully instrumentalized military caste and, despite post-war 
apologia to the contrary, were willing accomplices of the Nazi regime. 
  
                                                 
328 Strohn, The German Army and the Defence of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the 
Defensive Battle 1918-1939, 95, 101. 
329 Müller, Das Heer Und Hitler: Armee Und Nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933-1940 [the Army 
and Hitler: Armed Forces and the National-Socialist Regime 1933-1940], 10:25; Wohlfeil and Count of 
Matuschka, Handbuch Zur Deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648-1939 [the Handbook About German Military 
History 1648-1939], 6:156. 
330 Ritter, Staatskunst Und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem Des “Militarismus” in Deutschland Volume 
2 [Statecraft and Warcraft: The Problem of “Militarism” in Germany], 2:149. 
331 Salewski et al., Handbuch Zur Deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648-1939 [the Handbook About 
German Military History 1648-1939], 7:367. 
92 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
93 
III. THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN SWITZERLAND 
This chapter characterizes the role of the Swiss GS against the backdrop of the re-
search question and the specified time period. The chapter also intentionally describes 
aspects that are beyond the analyzed era (1933 until 1945). The designated aspects had 
impacts within the specified period or are of vital interest for the context’s understanding. 
On the other hand, the chapter does not draw comparisons to the German GS. Those are 
exclusively described in Chapters V and VI. 
A. LIBERAL VALUES WITHIN THE SWISS GENERAL STAFF CORPS 
In this section, the author describes the extent of liberal values within the Swiss 
GS corps. The section outlines the abstract construct of ‘liberal values’ within a specified 
social group, the Swiss GS corps. The author, however, does not intend to compare the 
Swiss GS with its German counterpart, except in cases that are inevitable for the under-
standing of the context. 
1. The Attitude of the General Staff Officers toward the Polity 
The attitude of the Swiss GS officers toward the polity between 1933 and 1945 
can be characterized by decentralization of power, neutrality, and altruism. Moreover, the 
attitude substantially upheld liberal principles. It is a base determinant of republics to 
avoid the concentration of power in one single person. The cultural, historical, and politi-
cal heritage as liberal-republican servant defined the attitude of the majority of the Swiss 
GS officers.332 Two German ambassadors to Switzerland underlined this aspect for dem-
ocratic politics shortly before WWII. Ernst von Weizaecker, the father of the later presi-
dent of the Federal Republic of Germany, summarized that two National Socialist ele-
ments (the leader principle, and the race principle) would endanger the federalist struc-
ture of Switzerland. He emphasized that even those Swiss officers who would sympathize 
with Nazi Germany were convincingly defending their national heritage, Swiss neutrality, 
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and Swiss independence.333 Von Weizaecker’s successor, Otto Carl Koecher, stated that 
the Swiss would understand and feel that their country had consistently been purely dem-
ocratic and that the worldview of its Northern or Southern neighbor never took root in 
Switzerland.334 Hans Senn summarized the pivotal idea of duty within the Swiss GS as 
“to altruistically serve the commanding officer and the troops with full devotion and be 
more then you seem to be.”335 In particular, the terms ‘altruistically’ and ‘be more than 
you seem to be’ described two national narratives of Switzerland: first, to serve and pro-
vide without direct compensation, and to act more than you speak. These values are of 
inherent democratic and republican character. 
National defense, the actions of officers, and neutrality have consistently been of 
pivotal importance to Switzerland, particularly, if Switzerland should request or accept 
foreign support to strike back at an aggressor. According to Hans Rapold, neutrality ini-
tially was an incentive for the European powers after the Napoleonic wars, as well as for 
the shattered Swiss population, to accept the rise of a federal state instead of the old con-
federation. As the federal state became consolidated within the late 19th century, neutrali-
ty was no longer understood as imposed from outside. It was understood as a voluntarily 
chosen, national principle to maximize the Swiss political courses of action, and to avoid 
the involvement in great power politics under unfavorable conditions.336 Neutrality was 
not only an essential principle of the Swiss state towards conflicts of its neighbors; it had 
become an inherent principle in the meaning of self-restraint, in particular, in dealing 
with conflicts and contradictions among the various facets of the Swiss federal state. 
The role of the General, the CiC of the SAF, as well as the role of the SECDEF, is 
of importance in explaining the role of the Swiss GS officer. Switzerland has no supreme 
commander in peacetime. Only in the case of mobilization of the SAF does the united 
federal assembly elect an officer as CiC. According to Alfred Ernst, the General compris-
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es a prominent political role. He is a trustee of the people, represented by the united as-
sembly, for national defense and not only the appointee of the government, a decisive fact 
defining the relationship between the civilian representation of the people, the polity, and 
the officer corps.337 According to Hans Senn, in peacetime and therefore in the absence 
of a General, the SECDEF as a civilian politician is not only the head of the military ad-
ministration, he also embodies the leadership over the armed forces. The military decree 
of 1907 subordinates more than a dozen administrative sections, military branches as well 
as the three army corps commanders to the SECDEF. The most critical subordinate is the 
chief of the GS because he supervises all questions concerning the national defense and 
the armed forces. However, he does not have the authority to decide. He literally is the 
first adviser to the SECDEF (who incorporates the authority to decide), underlining the 
subordinated and advisory character of the military to the civilian leadership as repre-
sentative of the polity.338 
Even so, both generals in the 20th century, Gen. Ulrich Wille during WWI, and 
Gen. Henri Guisan during WWII, were not immune to foreign totalitarian, aristocratic, or 
class influences. According to Ernst, Gen. Wille was impressed by the German victories 
in the 19th century, and highly inclined to the traditional German doctrines of the pre-
WWI era. In particular, he supported Ludendorff’s convictions to throw down an enemy, 
and rejected Hans Delbrueck’s approach to exhaust an enemy. These approaches influ-
enced the Swiss defense concepts also during the interwar period, although they were 
solely interpreted from a military standpoint. Wille openly criticized the deficiencies of 
the civil–military relations in Switzerland in the case of a national emergency.339 Moreo-
ver, Senn describes Gen. Guisan’s manners as aristocratic. Visitors from outside got the 
impression of a royal household and not of a military command post. The relationship 
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between the CiC and the GS could be characterized as distant, which would have caused 
severe complications in the event of war. These quirks seemed to have their roots in the 
individuals’ personalities, though, and less in an anti-democratic attitude.340 In a nutshell, 
no scholar or contemporary witness would characterize these generals (Wille was a ger-
manophone, Guisan was a francophone) as anti-democratic, anti-republican, or authori-
tarian. They would be seen as profoundly patriotic and typically Swiss. They were prod-
ucts of their era, defined by their ancestry, influenced but not determined by contempo-
rary influences. 
2. Experience of and Respect for Democratic-Procedural Norms of Polit-
ical Pluralism 
The experience of and respect for democratic norms and political pluralism within 
the Swiss GS corps can be assessed as a substantial impetus for the corps’ upholding of 
liberal values, particularly during the evaluated period. Ernst quotes Lt. Gen. Huber, chief 
of the GS at the onset of WWII, when he states that a clear relationship between the CiC 
of the SAF and the civilian government needs the subordination of the former under the 
latter, which is inevitable in a liberal democratic state.341 This statement underlines the 
importance of democratic-procedural norms and political pluralism for senior Swiss of-
ficers. It was and is a fundamental political narrative on which complex systems and 
structures of a democratic state, such as the armed forces, need to rely. According to 
Senn, in complex structures and systems, areas of conflict (i.e., between the civilian ad-
ministration and military leaders) are omnipresent, because the decision-making and 
opinion-building processes are different. Both sides are approaching the same topic from 
different perspectives. The civilian administration and political leadership primarily 
acknowledge the political constraints and are in constant search for compromises. The 
military leadership, on the other side, primarily highlights military necessities. The armed 
forces expect that military needs have to be made politically possible. Benchmarks for 
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war preparedness do not exist.342 How military officers (in particular, the GS) and the 
civilian leadership approach this dilemma is of importance for civil–military relations. 
Yet, the Swiss GS never questioned the primacy of democratic procedural norms, which 
are a consequence of political pluralism. 
It is common knowledge that the phrasing of law always limps behind political 
realities. According to Huber and Ernst, constitution and law of the post-WWI era did not 
define the CiC’s political role and its relationship to the civilian government in detail. 
Without any doubt, the legislator intended to maximize the CiC’s authority and compe-
tence to allow him to centralize the military command and maximize the country’s effort 
to withstand foreign aggression. The political task given to the CiC automatically ends 
with the demobilization of the armed forces. Contemporary witnesses of the political dis-
cussion reported discomfort about the extent of the military act, which could open the 
doors to a military dictatorship in the case that the CiC would literally execute its legal 
power. Huber concludes that the CiC did not have a legally independent role from those 
of the civilian government even though he would be elected by the same body (the par-
liament). Ernst adds that Gen. Guisan assumed that the legislator intentionally abstained 
from assigning the authority for mobilizations to the CiC, leaving this task to the civil 
authorities. Also, the federal council repeatedly stated that this task must be solely as-
signed to the federal government. Political constraints must limit the CiC's military free-
dom. Nevertheless, the law was not evident at this point. Both generals in the 20th centu-
ry shrank back from executing their full authority (i.e., the mobilization of reserve forc-
es). In fact, both CiCs consulted (and acted only in coordination with) the civilian gov-
ernment.343 Since the civilian government, the federal council, is a collegial body con-
sisting of seven ministers according to the power of the political parties’ electorate (the 
so-called magic formula), these decisions and behavior showed the military leadership’s 
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respect for and awareness of the historical responsibility for democratic procedural norms 
and political pluralism. 
Markus Feldmann, Max Schafroth, and Edgar Schumacher underline the im-
portance that the drafted officers and NCOs should not be replaced by a professional 
military leadership cast along the model of standing armies. In 1874, during the discus-
sion about the adaptation of the Swiss constitution, multiple stakeholders proposed such a 
change. Feldmann et al. quote federal councilor Welti, the SECDEF, when he stated that 
the training of the conscript soldiers by conscript cadres would be inevitable for the con-
solidation of statehood and the inner strength of the armed forces. Welti emphasizes that 
the character of the armed forces has to reflect the basic principles of Swiss statehood and 
the social conditions. The armed forces should be the people in uniform. Welti points out 
the well-known argument of the armed forces as a school of the nation, the altruistic ap-
proach to subordinate individual needs under national requirements, the sense for legal 
order, the rise of national self-confidence, and the value of the armed forces as a lever of 
national unity. Therefore, all classes of the population would have to contribute to this 
instrument of national unity, the armed forces.344 The Welti reforms prevented the creat-
ing of an army as a state within a state and enabled the representation of political plural-
ism within the armed forces. 
According to Feldmann et al., the Welti reforms provided sufficient and modern 
armament, a unified training approach, and most important, an amalgamation of the poli-
ty and the objective of national defense. This amalgamation guaranteed the incorporation 
of democratic, republican, and liberal values (“ethical values”) into the SAF since the 
most important political school of thought in that era in Switzerland was liberalism.345 
Rudolf Jaun explains the contrast between the dignitaries in a society structured along 
with estates and in a republican society along with Weber’s principles. The self-
understanding of an officer in an estate-driven society represented its traditional, inherit-
ed right for leadership, while in a republican society, the leadership would evolve only 
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from merit. Within the second half of the 19th-century, the outcome of the liberal revolu-
tion in Switzerland ignited a patriotic democratic self-understanding in civil and military 
life which the armed forces completely absorbed.346 
3. Acceptance of Civilian Authority over Military Affairs 
The acceptance of civilian authority over military affairs—as an aspect of liberal 
values—within the Swiss GS between 1933 and 1945 must be assessed as uncontested. 
At the core of civil–military relations in Switzerland is the autonomy of the military lead-
ership in military-technical decisions but subordination in political questions of national 
relevance, according to Ernst.347 Senn explains that during the consultation for a new 
military act and a new structure for the armed forces, some members of the parliament, 
officers, among others, occasionally mentioned that a CiC would also be necessary for 
peacetime, especially after Hitler’s seizure of power in Germany in 1933. Finally, in 
1938, the draft for the new military act did not define the function of a CiC in peacetime. 
The parliament enacted this law in 1939. Due to the general mobilization in the wake of 
WWII, the act has never been ratified, but most of the determining aspects were intro-
duced into the civil defense administration and the armed forces between 1939 and 1945. 
The military act of 1939 defined the National Defense Committee as a paramount consul-
tative institution to the federal council for all questions of national defense. The Commit-
tee consisted of the SECDEF (with decision-making power), the chief of the GS, the In-
spector General of the armed forces (chief of training), the four army corps commanders 
(one is the commander of the air force including the ground-based air defense forces), 
and the chief of the services’ inspector generals.348 Huber emphasizes that the National 
Defense Committee was not a military body; the power of command in peacetime was 
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concentrated in the hands of the civilian government.349 The chief of the GS was respon-
sible for the war preparedness of the SAF. He received his tasks from the National De-
fense Committee.350 To sum up, in 1939 and later in 1947, all attempts to install a single 
military person with the authority of a military CiC at the top of the military were 
doomed to failure. The primacy of the civilian policy was more important than all mili-
tary considerations. Military leadership never questioned these decisions.351 
The question remains whether the Swiss military would have ever gained suffi-
cient power to endanger this primacy of civilian supremacy: the answer is no. According 
to Rapold, even during the months following the end of WWI with the national strike, a 
starving population, inflation, radical opinions, and violent struggle—the national crisis 
of 1918–1919—the armed forces never developed their own political aspirations. The 
relatively brutal suppression of the national strike in 1918 with several dozen casualties 
was an order given by the civilian government. In other words, drafted soldiers under the 
command of drafted officers, following the orders of a democratic government opened 
fire on rioting citizens to reestablish state order. An army of citizen-soldiers along the 
militia principle can hardly be an independent political power factor in the case of nation-
al struggle.352 
The civil defense administration has consistently been involved in military affairs 
(“military administrative power”), which must be recognized as additional checks and 
balances. According to Huber, since the units of the SAF, as an (almost) full conscript 
force, have been activated on a timely limited basis and only for a specified purpose 
(training, assistance, or active duty), the civilian defense administration has been assigned 
tasks which, in standing armies, would have been executed by military structures. In or-
der to accomplish these tasks, the civilian administration has used military orders. In par-
ticular, the basic military training as well as the primary education of NCOs and officers 
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have taken place in training centers and not within the particular military unit. The in-
structors have been professional military staff. These institutions have been subordinated 
to the civilian defense administration, not to the military chain of command. Once the 
education of privates and cadres has been accomplished, the trained military personnel 
would have been appointed to particular military units responsible only for the repetitive 
annual training.353 
As previously mentioned, during WWI and WWII, the commanders in chief never 
contested the civilian government and conflicts could have been solved on an informal, 
cooperative basis.354 Moreover, Ernst argues that in severe conflict, either a formal sub-
ordination of the military under the civilian leadership or a military dictatorship during 
wartime (with full responsibility also for purely political decisions) must have been the 
logical consequence of such a conflict. Since a single institution never intended the latter 
scenario within Switzerland, the former must come into effect: the military leadership 
must be unconditionally subordinated to the civilian government.355 Ernst outlines that 
only the U.S. approach, which recognizes the permanent adaptation of military warfare 
by civilian political guidance, best fit the Swiss purpose.356 By highlighting the most 
substantial disagreement between the generals in WWI and WWII and the federal coun-
cil, namely the extent of mobilization, Ernst argues that the CiC had to request the num-
ber of troops he minimally needed to fulfill his military tasks, and the civilian govern-
ment would have had to weigh all national interests, in particular, military, economic, and 
financial. Therefore, the extent of mobilization is a crucial aspect of the civilian authori-
ties’ primacy and purely political nature.357 
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4. Extent and Proficiency of Civilian Education 
The author assesses the broad and comprehensive civil education of the Swiss GS 
officers between 1933 and 1945 as the backbone for the understanding of liberal values 
within the armed forces’ leadership. The educational and tactical proficiency, as well as 
the ethical attitude of the Swiss GS officers at the onset of WWII, is neither the result of a 
pedagogical genius nor the consequence of long-lasting war experience. Moreover, it is 
the outcome of a trial-and-error process that lasted over 90 years. In 1847, Gen. Dufour, 
the CiC of the Helvetic forces during the Sonderbund war, attested that his GS officers 
were devoted and committed to their task. Nevertheless, he criticized their inexperience 
and low proficiency in military matters.358 A couple of years later, the federal council 
reported to the parliament that the level of education and training of the GS still seemed 
to be unsatisfactory and that a national military, educational facility (the Zentralschule) 
should be instituted.359 Furthermore, Jaun quotes Bruno Uebel as stating at the end of the 
19th century that an “army of minute men which would consist of instincts such as patri-
otism, liberty, and pugnacity, should establish a small corps of [general staff] officers, 
enlightened by science and ethics.”360 In other words, a GS officer should be steeped in 
soldierly discipline, disposed of comprehensive military knowledge, and provided with 
complete operational understanding, based on a profound civilian education.361 
Since the time available for military training in Switzerland was (and is) always 
very limited, external qualifications and civil education were decisive for GS officers, 
according to Jaun.362 After 1876 the successful graduation from the GS courses I and II 
was mandatory. These courses were relatively short and inconsistent, compared to well-
known foreign military academies. The satisfactory institutionalization of the selection, 
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career regulation, and training of Swiss GS officers along with the Prussian and later 
German role model lasted nearly 60 years. The German GS concept comprised tactical 
education, command experience on multiple levels, and permanent exchange between 
staff and command functions. The federal structure of Switzerland and the conscript sys-
tem impeded a straight innovation of the GS.363 Yet, several attempts to provide a sup-
porting pre-military education, especially for later officers (i.e., voluntary cadet corps), 
have been instituted on a regional basis.364 
Since the basis for the selection to the Swiss GS, a small and thoroughly selected 
military elite, was the traditionally educated bourgeoisie, it also constituted an aspect of 
an elite of the contemporary Swiss society, according to Hofer and Jaun.365 In particular, 
during industrialization, the professionalization of entrepreneurs and the institutionaliza-
tion of an economic leadership cast with respective qualifications provided leadership 
experience which then could be combined with military experience and training in the 
service as a conscript officer—a classical win-win-situation for the economy and armed 
forces.366 Until the mid-20th century, however, only people with economic independence 
were available for higher leadership positions within the armed forces because the state 
did not provide financial compensation for military service. The precondition for eco-
nomic independence was higher civil education (which itself presupposed a certain finan-
cial capability). After 1895, over 75 percent of the GS officers finished an academic edu-
cation and could be defined as part of the national intelligentsia.367 Most of the GS offic-
ers finished their studies with a doctorate (average 43.2 percent, from 23.7 percent in 
1875 to 60.9 percent in 1945). Most of them graduated in studies of law (50.1 percent), 
the second largest group (25.6 percent) was polytechnical engineers. Over the same peri-
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od, only a minority of GS officers finished their civil education with a degree from a jun-
ior (average 8.5 percent) or technical (average 4.8 percent) college. The coincidence of a 
relatively low number of GS officers with a non-academic background (merchants, arti-
sans, peasants, among others) can be attributed primarily to their individual limitations 
due to economic constraints, and secondly, missing intellectual preconditions that could 
not be substituted within the short GS courses.368 
The requirement for admission into the GS was an immaculate attestation of good 
military conduct, a “good general [civil] education, and the knowledge of [multiple] lan-
guages, as well as the successful graduation after the GS courses I and II,” according to 
Rapold and Senn.369 The military training in the courses consisted of theoretical and 
practical lectures, staff, and field exercises.370 The topics within the courses were organi-
zation and structure of the army, mission briefing, staff work, signal and command sup-
port, logistics, military leadership, and field fortification. The scope of course II was 
broader and consisted of topics such as information warfare (including media relations), 
mobilization, the building of bridgeheads, mountain warfare, aviation, chemical warfare, 
evacuation of civilians out of a warzone, exercise design, art of war based on military his-
tory, and the neutrality of Switzerland. The goal of the practical lessons was the practice 
as chief of staff (including the paperwork) in a division or mountain brigade. The first 
four-year deployment of the newly graduated GS officers took place within the GS at the 
headquarters of the armed forces in Berne after which the officers were redeployed to the 
staffs of their brigades or divisions. Most of them received a command in every echelon 
of their career, similar to the practice within the German armed forces.371 In the first 
quarter of the 20th century, selection, training, deployment, and share of graduates with 
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an academic background (around 75 percent) stayed the same. From 1914 on, the share of 
regular officers within the GS courses steadily increased due to the intensified training 
needs and size of the armed forces during WWI.372 
5. Mindset and Worldview of the General Staff Officer 
The mindset and worldview of the Swiss GS officers form the core of the mili-
tary’s perception of liberal values between 1933 and 1945. According to Jaun, the most 
substantial impact on the worldview of the career officer in general has always been the 
fact that the armed forces were a national amalgamation. The Swiss military has been 
crafted of officers and soldiers of all classes of the society, of four language areas (Ger-
man, French, Italian, and Romansh), of multiple religions (Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Methodism), and of all political camps (Liberals, Radicals, Christian-Democrats, Social-
Democrats). In short, the armed forces have been a primary provider of a multiethnic, 
multilingual, multi-religious, and pluralistic but national network.373 Moreover, the activ-
ity of the GS was influenced but not determined by the domestic and the international 
environment. Another decisive influence that affected the attitude of the GS positively, 
and drastically increased its esteem beyond the population and the enlisted personnel, 
was the charismatic and accountable chiefs of staff, and the CiCs during WWI and 
WWII.374 
The impact of foreign military academies on the mindset and worldview of Swiss 
GS officers was limited. During the interwar period, the SAF regularly deployed officers 
for further education to the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris (French command and 
staff college). Furthermore, between 1935 and 1939, three Swiss officers graduated from 
the German war academy in Berlin.375 Based on the numbers of deployed officers, it 
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could be argued that the influence of the French military doctrine must have been of 
higher importance than those of its German counterpart. Nevertheless, the private con-
tacts between Swiss and German officers were substantially more intensive, which led to 
a more profound doctrine transfer between the Reichswehr, later the Wehrmacht, and the 
SAF. Also, the German approaches in command and leadership (“command by di-
rective”) showed more similarities to the Swiss doctrine and provided, therefore, higher 
compatibility. The knowledge taught in foreign military academies, however, could not 
be directly imported. The Swiss military approach, with its numerous specialties (plural-
ism, conscription, militia, mountainous terrain, among others), impeded a direct imple-
mentation and doctrine transfer.376 
The mindset of the Swiss officer corps, and particularly that of the GS, was sub-
stantially determined by patriotism, the right and will to self-defense, as well as neutrali-
ty. According to Feldmann et al., Swiss neutrality was a product of the Congress of Vien-
na in 1815. The great powers recognized Switzerland as an independent state under the 
condition that this state must have been able to defend its borders autonomously. There-
fore, the independence of Switzerland after the Napoleonic wars evolved from neutrality. 
The precondition for neutrality was the capability of self-defense. Almost all military 
regulations after 1817 refer to a deep national idea, such as patriotism, the national unity 
of the different parts of the country, the commitment to establish powerful federal forces, 
defense of the country, and independence no matter the cost, among others.377 Theo Rus-
sel, the British ambassador in Switzerland during the interwar period hit the nail on the 
head by stating: “The Swiss character will never tolerate the abandonment of one iota of 
its independence.”378 
Finally, the personal courage and intellectual independence of the leaders in 
charge were decisive in limiting and impeding any form of radicalization or anti-
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democratic shifts in the mindset or worldviews. Ernst quotes Ulrich von Hassel, a Ger-
man resistance fighter killed by the Nazis in 1944, that leaders “have a responsibility to-
wards the nation, which is more important than the duty to obey orders.”379 Ernst was 
convinced that the Swiss GS would have prioritized historical responsibility over blind 
obedience. 
6. Acceptance of Heterogeneity within One’s Social Group 
The acceptance of heterogeneity within the social group of GS officers was lim-
ited to a particular set of attributes during the specified era and must be assessed as only 
partly upholding liberal values. Within the Swiss society, two factors were constant in 
determining social status: profession and education, according to Jaun. Moreover, educa-
tion must be seen as a precondition for status within a specified profession and was close-
ly related to the status of the individual’s social origin (family). In other words, social 
mobility in Switzerland was limited. In particular, within an elite of dignitaries, military 
and political careers usually were synchronized.380 This career synchronization was typi-
cal within the Swiss society. As mentioned, the profession follows education. In “leisure 
time,” voluntary commitments for the society were possible, such as a career as a reserve 
officer, a part-time political career within the council of a municipality or in the parlia-
ment of a canton, or a principal function within influential clubs or associations. Because 
on national, cantonal, or local level the state provided only marginal financial compensa-
tion, these commitments presupposed available time and financial or economic independ-
ence, which were quite rare in the lower classes of the society. Members of these classes 
only occasionally received the opportunity to take over such responsibilities. Jaun con-
vincingly shows that social groups that did not have a minimum of availability at their 
disposal were rarely selected for a career as GS officers.381 
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Furthermore, an officer career, which can last between 30 and 40 years, required 
sufficient economic resources. Economic failure (i.e., bankruptcy) usually led to exclu-
sion from the officer corps, according to Jaun.382 Between 1875 and 1945, the Swiss GS 
consisted overwhelmingly of members from the wealthy upper classes and typical bour-
geois profession groups (excluding the regular officers). In contrast, in 1910, only 6 per-
cent of the Swiss population belonged to the wealthy and educated bourgeoisie (1.5 per-
cent economic bourgeoisie; 1.5 percent higher civil officials or independent professions 
such as lawyers; and 1.5 percent property bourgeoisie).383 Academic education was deci-
sive for entering the GS for the reserve officers. 
Surprisingly, within the same period, a member of the lower classes had a signifi-
cantly higher chance to climb up the social ladder as a regular rather than as a conscripted 
officer. According to Jaun, merchants, artisans, and peasants had better chances to enter 
the GS if they become a regular officer prior to their aspiration for the GS. Within the 
group of regulars in the GS, 27 percent came from lower class families. Beyond the share 
of conscript officers within the GS corps, an average of only 14 percent came from the 
working or lower middle classes. In other words, the probability of entering the military 
elite was almost twice as high for a regular than for a conscript. Jaun assumes that re-
cruitment for a regular was less selective in terms of an academic civil education. Fur-
thermore, another reason for this circumstance seems to be the fact that regulars within 
the SAF in that era were military coaches in uniform, which was less attractive for the 
traditional elite.384 
By contrast, Huber argues that such a state order had its roots within the demo-
cratic character of the Swiss statehood. Moreover, the crafting of a caste or the preference 
of a particular caste would have been atypical for the Swiss self-understanding. Huber 
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emphasizes that every officer or soldier is an equal citizen.385 Feldmann et al. would 
support Huber’s stake, stating that “the army cultivates the will to use body and life for 
the common welfare. If the army cultivates genuine camaraderie and selfless devotion, it 
will unify all social classes and strengthen ties among people, which is the best way to 
ensure the continuing existence of the statehood.”386 In theory, this was correct; social 
groups were generally not discriminated against or excluded due to their ethnicity, their 
religion, or their class. In practice, without availability and sufficient funds to study and, 
therefore, to gain higher economic status, an individual had little chance to start a military 
or political career. This was the case until the rise of Social-Democracy in the 20th centu-
ry, according to Jaun.387 
7. Self-Understanding of the Role of a Soldier within the State 
The Swiss GS officers between 1933 and 1945 unconditionally understood their 
role as servants of a liberal-democratic state, and this must therefore be assessed as a 
multiplier for liberal values beyond the armed forces. The self-understanding of the GS 
officer’s role (or of an officer in general) within the state substantially relies on the GS 
officer’s status beyond the civil society’s elite. Moreover, the Swiss officer corps, and in 
particular the GS, recognized its status within the caste of state dignitaries as being the 
sole part of this elite that has been able to defend the country while other parts of the 
same elite were responsible for performing all other state tasks. In short, the officer corps 
saw itself not as a prioritized state elite but as part of the state elite for a particular era or 
period (national defense). Jaun argues that the government and the military in Switzer-
land were (and are) two organs (structures or authorities) of one body—the state’s admin-
istration. Military leadership and political guidance relied on each other and were not able 
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to perform their duties without one another.388 Huber states that militarism in the mean-
ing of a state-defining narrative has no history in Switzerland. In peacetime, the military 
had a bourgeois feel (“ganz bürgerlicher Anstrich”), and the SECDEF, the leader of the 
military and civilian defense administration, has always been a civil official. Huber sum-
marizes: “the army will be managed, not led.”389 Feldmann et al. write in a dated style 
and patriotic words that the relation between the military leaders and the enlisted person-
nel in a full-conscript army was (and is) essential for performance. A Swiss officer was 
(and is) only during a short period in contact with his NCOs and soldiers (during the an-
nual activation phase of the units). During this time, he has to perform, or he will lose his 
informal authority. Therefore, additional individual training and studies beyond the annu-
al time in uniform were needed.390 This approach appeared not only within the armed 
forces, but can be recognized in the pre-military preparation within youth organizations, 
such as the cadet corps or the young marksmen (Jungschützen), after 1848.391 In sum, the 
Swiss system instilled in the officer corps that its status is not God-given but a result of 
merit and performance, and that the status is linked to a particular task, those of national 
defense. 
This unique relationship among the officer corps, the enlisted personnel, and their 
task had been recognized by neighbor states, according to Senn. On November 6, 1939, 
the German ambassador Koecher informed Berlin about a meeting with a ‘German-
friendly’ Swiss GS officer. This officer seemed to have insisted that, without any doubt, 
Switzerland would resist any aggression or violation of its neutrality. Koecher continued 
that the Swiss officer corps was homogenous and inspired by the conviction to defend the 
Swiss neutrality.392 
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Despite patriotic theories, every organizational system heavily depends on the 
human beings working in those structures. Within a military structure in the wake of a 
possible war, trust beyond the leadership is a pivotal aspect of structural performance. 
According to Senn, the CiC of the SAF during WWII, Gen. Guisan, replaced almost all 
higher officers in the GS about whom he was not convinced, due to their performance or 
their political mindset. The majority of their replacements were francophones and gradu-
ated from the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris.393 Ernst adds that the immediate ef-
fect of this staff shift was better-performing cooperation among civil government, par-
liament, armed forces, and public opinion. Ernst quotes Gen. Guisan’s statement within a 
report about active duty 1939–1945: “there were no trenches beyond the Swiss society 
anymore—government, people, and armed forces were unified.”394 
8. Interpretation of Elitism within the Framework of the State 
The contemporary interpretation of Swiss GS officers as a national elite was sub-
stantially influenced by exclusive aspects that did not entirely reflect liberal values. Jaun 
defines the term elite as “dignitaries in positions within areas of domination and interpre-
tative power which subsume economic and political leadership positions, leading func-
tions within the jurisdiction, science, education, among others.”395 Between 1817 and 
1874, the leading idea within the armed forces was that the “GS should consist of the best 
and most proficient and that the proportional cantonal representation within the GS is of 
less importance.”396 The military decree of 1874 insisted on a small, skillful corps of of-
ficers for the GS that would allow a profound staff selection.397 After 1880, a paradigm 
shift took place. The GS officer should no longer be only an editor of orders, as he was 
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within the Napoleonic and early post-Napoleonic era, he should be a competent, military 
all-rounder with complete operational understanding, providing fundamental, foresighted, 
and reliable basics for the decision of the commanding officers. The basis for this para-
digm shift was the German GS concept along with the manual The Service within the GS 
from Bronsart von Schellendorff.398 
The Swiss GS corps heavily depended on a pool of officers who provided the 
necessary civil and military competences, and who were willing and economically and 
financially independent enough to provide their competences in favor of the armed forc-
es, according to Jaun.399 The military aspect perfectly fits into the overall picture of the 
contemporary Swiss elite as a group of dignitaries whose members could rely on a stable 
economic situation, sufficient availability of individual time, and which would already 
inherit relevant leadership positions in politics and civil society.400 In sum, the structure 
of the GS was heavily interlinked to the structure of the civilian elite within Swiss socie-
ty.401 In contrast, as mentioned, artisans and workers usually did not have the funds and 
the time for a military career. The human capital of the modern dignitary relied on a solid 
economic basis.402 After the liberal revolution in Switzerland in 1848, this dignitary, the 
“excellent citizen” within the (civil and military) elite, could be characterized as political-
ly liberal, wealthy, highly educated, and with an honorable way of life.403 
Since the 20tht century, modern Swiss dignitaries have primarily depended on 
formal (such as education) and informal qualifications (such as availability), as well as 
individual performance and merit, according to Jaun.404 Tradition as the legitimacy of a 
dignitary has been replaced by a reversed social-Darwinist proof of merit, issued by a 
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bourgeois-economic performance-type aristocracy. The general principle of “honorable 
duty” has been adopted from the traditional patrician elites, especially as long as the duty 
as officer was an inevitable contribution to the national fight to survive and, therefore, 
provided the highest sort of societal appreciation.405 A particular way of life along with 
the criteria of the traditional patrician elites was no longer a sufficient precondition for 
selection into the GS. However, as external attitude, as gestus et habitus, it still played an 
influential role within the Swiss GS.406 
B. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE SWISS ARMED FORCES 
Within this section, the author describes the extent of civilian control of the SAF. 
The section intends to outline the abstract construct of ‘civilian control’ within a speci-
fied social group, the Swiss GS officers. The author, however, does not intend to compare 
the Swiss GS with its German counterpart, except in cases that are inevitable for the un-
derstanding of the context. 
1. State Structure and the Determining Social Paradigms 
The state structure and determining social paradigms were effective elements of 
civilian control over the Swiss military, and in particular, over the Swiss GS. According 
to Rapp, the SAF are not the invention of a single military genius, nor the outcome of a 
single war, but more the product of the will, the visions, and the intellectual power of 
generations of political and military leaders, as well as the impact of European history, 
which all together formed and crafted those forces.407 According to Huber, in the evalu-
ated era, warfare indisputably was an instrument of policy. A war had political goals. 
Therefore, warfare has to be subordinated to politics and should never be an end in it-
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self.408 Particularly in republics, governmental power must be superior to military power 
but must not consist of military power itself.409 
According to Huber, self-preservation is the most important task of statehood, 
which implies the importance of the military.410 The SAF fell under the authority of the 
federal government, except for those aspects that remained under the responsibility of the 
parliament, as well as minor cantonal (state) duties, usually concerning questions of per-
sonnel.411 The agencies of the civilian authority are the judiciary, parliament, and federal 
council. The latter is the executive, the highest civilian authority of the Swiss Confedera-
tion, while the united federal assembly, the parliament, is the legislator. In case of mobi-
lization, the assembly elects a CiC in the rank of a general who then executes the state 
action in defense matters. The civilian government defines the final objective of the mo-
bilization as a military mission and assigns it to the CiC.412 The military is part of the 
federal administration; therefore, the federal council bears the responsibility for military 
action towards the parliament. In short, despite the fact that the CiC will be elected by 
parliament, the CiC will be subordinated to the federal council (the government) and not 
the parliament.413 
In the event of war or mobilization of the armed forces, the CiC, as a single per-
son, comprises the complete military power. Of course, despite factual reasons for a 
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strongly hierarchical, supreme military command, it could create conflicts in combination 
with the democratic narrative of the division of power. Conversely, division of power 
within the military sphere can endanger the decision-making process, the unity of leader-
ship, the personified responsibility, and the maintaining of discipline, among others.414 
Yet, a concentration of power is atypical for Swiss statehood and reveals a sharp contrast 
to other countries’ institutions. Almost all political authorities in Switzerland are struc-
tured along with the collegial approach, according to Huber.415 Even beyond the military 
structures, Switzerland introduced the collegial approach within the SAF: the National 
Defense Committee is the highest military advisory board to the SECDEF. This advisory 
board only existed in peacetime. After the election of a CiC, the General took over the 
Committee’s advisory responsibility to the civilian government. The Committee had been 
suspended until the demission of the CiC.416 Huber explains that this structure evolved 
from historical constraints. A permanent CiC would contradict the most important max-
ims of Swiss statehood: federalism, equality, minority protection, and direct democra-
cy.417 
Huber also underlines the militia principle in which the military command power 
lays in the hands of conscripted officers, with minor exceptions, such as the regular offic-
ers in their function as instructors. However, even those regulars have to serve on an an-
nual basis within their conscript unit. In other words, if the unit in which a regular officer 
is incorporated will be mobilized (i.e., for training purposes), the officer interrupts his 
regular duty, and enters his conscript duty similar to the conscripted officers. Within the 
conscript function, the regular officers serve under the same guidelines as their conscript 
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counterparts.418 The Swiss conscript system comprises the advantage of providing state 
stability since the armed forces cannot develop themselves into a state within a state. 
Moreover, according to Ernst, the obvious disadvantage is the lack of military experience 
and expertise of a conscripted officer, compared to a regular officer, due to the limited 
amount of training time. The system has been criticized, however, and adapted multiple 
times. Nevertheless, a full volunteer force never had a real chance of being instituted in 
Switzerland, primarily due to political-psychological reasons, and secondarily due to fi-
nancial considerations.419 
The SAF, their GS, and the corps of the GS officers were and are an interdiscipli-
nary, military command instrument.420 As already stated, the corps of the GS officers 
belonged to the highly educated bourgeoisie, representing a part of the military and socie-
tal elite of Switzerland, and must not be understood as a caste; rather, it is more a linking 
joint between military, politics, economy, and culture.421 Even in the phase of political 
polarization after 1919 until the mid-1920s, also under the influence of radical left- and 
right-wing extremists and foreign attempts to gain control over domestic authorities, the 
Swiss GS always acted as a state and democracy stabilizing entity. This was particularly 
true during the 1930s when it acted as a bulwark against totalitarianism, and has always 
served as a force multiplier for the national defense capabilities.422 
2. Constitutional Checks and Balances 
Various constitutional checks and balances within the national structures of Swit-
zerland provide effective civilian control over the country’s armed forces and its GS. The 
implementation of the 1939 military act concretized and simplified several ambiguous 
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points within the Swiss military organization of the pre-WWI and interwar era and 
strengthened the constitutional checks and balances at the onset of WWII. Already men-
tioned is the fact that the united federal assembly has to elect the General if the federal 
council decides to mobilize a substantial part of the armed forces or if the council as-
sumes that such mobilization will come into effect soon.423 Furthermore, it further clari-
fies the aspect that the federal council is responsible for a general mobilization, a mobili-
zation of parts of the armed forces, and the demobilization: the CiC has the right and the 
duty to firmly request mobilizations. Nevertheless, it also became clear that the govern-
ment’s decision shall not be a pro forma decision.424 Although useful from the viewpoint 
of a decentralization of power, the automatic appointment of the senior army corps com-
mander as deputy CiC (instead of the Chief of the GS) must be assessed as a militarily 
doubtful adaptation.425 Furthermore, in order to facilitate the General’s authority, he has 
been allowed to decide about the inner structure of the armed forces (i.e., the transition of 
commands, structure of the GS, among others) in a simplified way. This authority, 
though, has been limited to a specified period (wartime).426 
Another critical point of constitutional checks and balances can be recognized in 
the relationship among the political authorities, the SECDEF, and the CiC. The adapta-
tions that came into effect defined where the boundaries between military and political 
responsibility were, i.e., military logistic elements behind the front fell under military 
command, specifically, under the responsibility of the GS. The term “national assets of 
staff and material,” however, never has been scrutinized precisely.427 The political au-
thorities have been in charge to declare war, to sign armistices or alliances. A further in-
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novation was that the CiC would have been allowed to sign treaties of a military-
technical nature.428 
In sum, the Swiss cut of the Gordian knot “constitutional checks and balances” 
was twofold: the General is militarily independent from the civilian authorities. Yet, he 
had command only over assets of military, personnel, and finances, which the civilian 
authorities, such as the federal council, have assigned to him.429 In terms of pure military 
decisions, the CiC inherited the same level of authority as the federal council. However, 
the federal council remained in charge of the general’s and military’s audit, which in-
cluded the GS. Furthermore, the federal council had the authority to request the dismissal 
of the CiC. In case of conflicts between the federal council and the CiC, the parliament 
would have been the appeal authority.430 Even though the parliament elected the CiC, the 
law stated that the CiC is not subordinated in military matters but in all others.431 In 
short, the General represents the military executive of the federation’s warfare objectives, 
based on law and conscription.432 
3. Degree of Autonomy within Institutional Limits 
During the evaluated period, the SAF, particularly the GS, had a sufficient degree 
of autonomy at their disposal, however, it was not critical with respect to civilian control 
over armed forces. According to Huber, in the case of aggression, the military leadership 
needs broad autonomy and independence to accomplish the task of national defense since 
the faith of the country would be endangered. On the other hand, anti-democratic forces 
could take advantage of this autonomy. In Switzerland, the military is subordinated to the 
civil authorities. In the event of mobilization, the united federal assembly would elect a 
General who would legally invoke a military authority and create an independent rela-
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tionship to the existing civil authority, but only during wartime.433 Furthermore, the ci-
vilian defense administration is heavily intertwined with the military forces, since a mili-
tary based on conscription needs to delegate a substantial share of its tasks to this admin-
istration (i.e., procurement of equipment and weapon systems, production of munition, 
among others).434 In the case of mobilization, several tasks would be taken over by mili-
tary structures. The result would have been twofold: on the one hand, the integration as-
sured a certain degree of autonomy to fulfill the task of national defense because no other 
structure would own the expertise to perform these processes properly. On the other 
hand, it also represented a degree of civil checks and balances over the armed forces.435 
Additionally, the synchronization of civilian, partly politician, and military career as a 
reserve officer, as seen earlier, led to civilian officials or politicians who often were re-
serve officers before.436 This amalgamation of civilian control and military expertise 
supported the mutual understanding concerning duties, responsibilities, dependencies, 
and necessities. Rapold points out that the SAF, with their principles of conscription and 
militia, cannot become a state within the state.437 
The implementation of the 1939 military act’s essence strengthened not only the 
civil checks and balances; it also provided a more autonomous and more efficient institu-
tional environment for the SAF at the onset of WWII. According to Senn, Ernst, and Hu-
ber, the task sharing between SECDEF and CiC simplified the logistic structure and im-
proved resilience. The CiC’s authority to define the wartime staff structure without time-
consuming consultations between the different administrative levels facilitated the mili-
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tary’s flexibility and readiness.438 Huber points out that this measure to create more effi-
cient armed forces did not endanger the democratic state order since the military leader-
ship had not obtained more influence by itself.439 
By contrast, Gen. Guisan, the CiC during WWII, was well aware not only of his 
military responsibility but also of his political and historical responsibility. He carefully 
controlled the GS since he knew about his individual gaps in operational understanding, 
especially at the beginning of WWII. Furthermore, he completely recognized the power 
of knowledge, military practice, and expertise, which was concentrated within the GS. He 
crafted a personal staff of GS officers as an advisory board and devil’s advocate.440 He 
did not trust his Chief of the GS, Lt. Gen. Labhart. This animosity between the CiC and 
the Chief of the GS created duplicated efforts, conflicts, and misunderstandings. Finally, 
Gen. Guisan replaced him at the earliest possible opportunity, exemplarily exercising his 
autonomy, which was necessary to maintain military efficiency.441 
4. Integration of the Armed Forces within the Institutional Framework 
Between 1933 and 1945, the SAF and their GS were integrally implemented into 
the national, institutional framework. Moreover, this implementation represented an ef-
fective aspect of civilian control over the armed forces. Constitutional frameworks are of 
unique national character—almost no one is identical to another. Moreover, since these 
frameworks are the result of historical processes within a particular society in connection 
to its international environment, the integration of armed forces within such a framework 
is as unique as the framework itself. In Switzerland, over decades since the post-
Napoleonic era, the integration of the armed forces, starting from their transition as can-
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tonal forces until their contemporary, federalist structure, were part of the state-building 
process. The implementation of foreign narratives without adaptation caused conflicts 
and inefficiency. Jaun states that the integration of Dutch, French, Spanish, Austrian, and 
Neapolitan military principles caused immense damage to the cohesion of the SAF within 
the 19th century because they were incompatible with the Swiss conscript and militia sys-
tem.442 
In 1874, the Welti reforms introduced a hierarchical body within the Department 
of Defense (DoD). Figure 6 shows the pivotal position of the SECDEF (Chef EMD), as a 
civilian, surrounded by civilian and military staff departments, military units, and a small 
GS (Gst Abt). The particular functions of these entities are not of importance; however, it 
is obvious that this chaotic structure was inherently ineffective and questionable. Note 
that the chief prosecutor of military justice (Oberauditor) and the SECDEF had the same 
advisory position as army corps commanders (AK Kdt 1891), among others. 
 
 Structure of the Swiss DoD 1874.443 
In 1907, a number of improvements were implemented, and the position of the 
SECDEF was strengthened. The structure (Figure 7) had been stripped of several sections 
and departments, which earlier were directly subordinated to the SECDEF by tradition. 
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The obvious weaknesses of this structure were the number of the SECDEF’s direct sub-
ordinates (18), and the overall complexity (eight military subordinates, five civilian sub-
ordinates, four advisory or supporting bodies, and the chief prosecutor of the military jus-
tice). Standardized organizational principles, such as thematic domains or a clear delega-
tion of competences, were missing. The consequence was the SECDEF’s capacity over-
load, resulting in a slow and chaotic business routine.444 
 
 Structure of the Swiss DoD 1907.445 
During the interwar period, no essential organizational changes were introduced. 
According to Senn, after WWI, the illusion of a peaceful future along Woodrow Wilson’s 
reinterpretation of H. G. Wells’s famous statement about the war that would end all wars 
led to decreasing investments in modern military equipment, and a lack of interest in pub-
lic opinion in defense matters. However, wise politicians never held back their conviction 
and insisted on the strengthening of the conscription as a state stabilizing element. Fede-
ral councilor Motta stated in 1933: 
Qu’il ne suffisait pas de réduire la durée du service pour obtenir une mi-
lice, qu’il fallait avant tout créer dans le pays un état d’esprit qui per-
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mette... d’avoir des citoyens-soldats. Pour créer cette esprit, je n’hésite pas 
à déclarer qu’il faut de longues, très longues années. 446 
(It is not enough to reduce the duration of service to maintain a militia. It 
is necessary, first of all, to create a commitment which allows … to create 
citizen-soldiers. I do not hesitate to declare that this will need long, long 
years to create such a commitment.) 
At least, since Switzerland was not involved in war actions during WWI, it did 
not suffer the same extent of decreasing birth rates as other European countries. The 
strength of the SAF constantly increased (in 1850: 104,000 equivalent to 4.5 percent of 
the population; in 1874: 215.000 equivalent to 7.9 percent of the population; in 1914: 
450,000 equivalent to 11.8 percent of the population; in 1939: 630,000 equivalent to 14.9 
percent of the population).447 The German defense attachée in Switzerland, Lt. Col. 
Wiktorin, reported in 1926 that the Swiss militia system characterized the highest degree 
of national conscription and truly represented the people in arms.448 
In Switzerland, the term GS comprised multiple meanings: first, the corps of GS 
officers as staff pool that included all graduated active and retired GS officers, and inher-
ited all specifications of a national elite. Second, it supplied the organizational structure 
(the staff of the armed forces), which can be summarized as the military entity responsi-
ble for all military matters of high importance. After the election of a CiC, the GS repre-
sented its military command instrument.449 
In 1939, the implementation of the transferrable aspects of the old German GS 
concept had been completed. The structure of the SAF (Figure 8) showed five pivotal 
structures: the GS as the entity responsible for planning and preparation, the inspector 
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generals in the lead for the training, the army corps commanders, as well as the National 
Defense Committee (civil–military), and defense administration (civilian). 
 
Due to the general mobilization in September 1939, the military act of June 22, 1939, re-
garding peacetime organization of the armed forces has never been formally enacted. 
However, a majority of its aspects, such as the reorganization of GS and the responsibil-
ity for military training, were implemented during WWII.450 
 Structure of the Swiss DoD 1939.451 
In contrast to a standing army, the organizational structure of a conscript army 
needs the administrative distinction (and division) between the military leadership and 
the civilian defense organization. Conflicts were likely since the majority of the military 
commanders were only in service for a limited time within the year while the civilian de-
fense organization was a professional entity. One objective of the civil–military National 
Defense Committee as an advisory board was to balance the needs of a permanent civil-
ian administration, non-permanent military commanders, the civil authority over the 
armed forces, and the military decision-making processes.452 The SECDEF as head of 
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the National Defense Committee was a member of the government and a civilian politi-
cian, not a military professional. He was not war minister and not a peacetime General, 
rather he was the multifunctional linking part between a collegial governmental body—
the federal council—and the military. The SECDEF had no military command authority. 
His legal authority was based on a hierarchical relation between officials within an ad-
ministration.453 This integration of a civilian politician as a mediating agent between the 
civilian government and the military leadership, supported by a highly professional advi-
sory board represented the integration of the armed forces into the institutional frame-
work of Switzerland.454 
5. Degree of Professionalization of the General Staff 
Despite military deficiencies, the limited degree of the Swiss GS’s professionali-
zation provided an effective form of civilian control over armed forces. After the Napole-
onic era until WWII, the degree of professionalization of the Swiss GS was always com-
pared to its German counterpart and other entities within regular armies. The expectations 
of professionalism and efficiency were high (as high as they were for the German role 
model). These expectations substantially influenced the profile of requirements for a 
Swiss GS officer.455 After WWII, Gen. Guisan positively evaluated the GS officers while 
he heavily criticized the rest of the (non-GS) officer corps for its low educational horizon, 
its paperwork-oriented mentality, and its weak tactical understanding.456 
Within the Swiss military, the command authority had been laid in the hand of 
conscript officers. According to Huber and Ernst, there were only a few minor excep-
tions: first, the army corps commanders; and second, the instruction officers (and NCOs) 
who remained as officials under public law.457 Furthermore, only a small number of full-
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volunteer forces existed; namely, forces for the protection of the Alpine fortresses, border 
protection units, and some squadrons of the air force. These forces stood in opposition to 
the constitutional prohibition of regular forces. Nonetheless, after judicial inquiries, these 
forces were allowed as necessary exceptions as long as they were not questioning the 
non-standing character of the SAF as a whole.458 
Despite the increasing complexity and differentiation of military tasks within the 
first half of the 20th century, the degree of professionalization was limited, even in the 
GS, according to Jaun. Enlisted personnel as well as officers, including those of the GS, 
had been recruited on the basis of conscription.459 The parallels between the military, 
political, economic, and societal elite provided a homogenous pool of social dignitaries 
for various leadership positions within society. Yet, the most noticeable impact of the in-
creased complexity and differentiation can be explained by the rising numbers of regular 
officers within the GS after 1907. Experienced instruction officers switched into func-
tions within the GS that demanded more time and expertise, (30 percent regulars in 1907 
vs. over 40 percent in 1939).460 These functions could no longer be performed on the ba-
sis of conscription. The increasing differentiation and complexity impacted the military 
after 1900, however, to a significantly lesser extent in Switzerland than in other coun-
tries.461 The reason for this difference could have been that the GS always overwhelm-
ingly consisted of officers with an academic background or an equivalent education. In 
other words, the backbone of the GS was regulars, substantially backed up by highly 
qualified and educated conscripted officers who served during particular periods of the 
year.462 This backbone of regulars graduated from academic institutions in much lower 
numbers (57.8 percent), compared to their conscript counterparts (around 75 percent, av-
erage 71.5 percent). However, Jaun assumes that this lower rate of academic preparation 
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beyond the regulars within the GS emanated from their social origin, which was signifi-
cantly different from that of their conscripted colleagues who overwhelmingly came out 
of the societal-economic-political elite. Jaun argues that the regulars were able to com-
pensate for their educational deficiencies with military proficiency.463 In sum, the limited 
professionalization of the GS in the first half of the 20th century must not be recognized 
as the emergence of a functional elite as in other European countries. The evaluation pro-
cesses, which were the basis for promotions, were linked to the career as a conscript of-
ficer (not to the professional function within the GS). The amalgamation of regulars (with 
a lower educational level and more military expertise, but a broader spectrum of social 
origins) and conscripted officers (usually with the highest civilian educational qualifica-
tions and civilian leadership experience, but less military expertise and a weaker connec-
tion to the majority of the population) created a GS that was an effectively stabilizing en-
tity of the liberal-democratic state order and a true representative for the Swiss socie-
ty.464 
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IV. CASE STUDY OF LT. GEN. HERBERT CONSTAM 
This chapter illustrates the character of a high-ranking Swiss officer, Lt. Gen. 
Herbert Constam, the first general officer of Jewish origin in the SAF. Furthermore, the 
case study outlines how the mentioned aspects of liberal values and the armed forces’ ci-
vilian control played out from an individual perspective. The chapter emphasizes Con-
stam’s attitude and understanding of democratic-procedural norms, political pluralism, 
the subordination of the military under civil primacy, and the multiethnic, but not neces-
sarily multi-class, perception of an elite within Switzerland. Since the case study substan-
tially relies on incomplete primary sources, not all 13 aspects mentioned previously could 
be covered. Photos of relevant primary sources are provided within the appendices. 
A. SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
According to Senn and Jaun, Herbert Constam was born on December 15, 1885, 
in Zurich. He died on June 11, 1973, in Zurich. His father, Emil Joseph Constam (origi-
nally Kohnstamm), born on February 19, 1858, in New York, converted from the Jewish 
faith to Protestantism in 1880 and was U.S. vice-consul in Zurich. Herbert Constam stud-
ied law in Zurich and Goettingen (Germany). He graduated in 1909 and was awarded the 
license to practice law in 1910. Furthermore, he continued his education at the École Su-
périeure de Guerre in Paris in 1922 and 1935. Between 1935 and 1955, he lectured on 
the art of war and mountain warfare at the military academy of the ETH Zurich (Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology).465 
According to Jaun, Herbert Constam (Figure 9) joined the armed forces as a regu-
lar officer in 1912. The essential deployments were chief of staff of the 4th infantry divi-
sion (1925–35), commander of the 15th mountain brigade (1935–37), commander of the 
6th infantry division (1938–1943), and commander of the 3rd Mountain Army Corps 
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(1943–51). In 1937, as colonel, he had been deployed to Spain as a military observer dur-
ing the Spanish Civil War.466 
Soldiers, NCOs, and officers adored Herbert Constam for his commitment and his 
human comprehension. He was a protégé of and the tactical adviser to the CiC, Gen. 
Guisan. He developed and led the implementation of the operational defense plan Reduit 
(the citadel) to withdraw the SAF into an alpine, fortified, stronghold-based defense posi-
tion while encircled by German forces between 1940 and 1944. He was the first general 
officer of the SAF with Jewish origins, according to Senn.467 
 
 Lt. Gen. Herbert Constam (1885–1970).468 
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B. FINDINGS 
In 1923, Herbert Constam as a young officer already showed a profound under-
standing and appreciation of, and respect for democratic procedural norms and political 
pluralism. These qualities were reflected in his emphasis on the importance of democra-
cy, equality in terms of rights and duties, and the necessity of morale as the rule of law’s 
underlining ethical principle in a proposal to his superiors. Moreover, he wrote this pro-
posal a few months before Hitler’s first attempt to seize power in Germany (Figure 13 
and Figure 14).469 In 1939, a cantonal senior official wrote an inquiring letter to Herbert 
Constam—who was at that time the commanding officer of the 6th infantry division—
casting doubt on the loyalty and democratic attitude of one of Constam’s battalion com-
manders. The battalion commander was a member of the Frontist movement (the Swiss 
nationalist movement with close ties to Hitler’s Nazi party). Although Constam’s answer 
was concise, it showed the close bonds and cooperation between the civilian authorities 
and the military leadership even in very delicate affairs (Figure 24, Figure 25, and Figure 
26).470 Constam’s convictions and attitude must be seen as a consequence of the 1874 
Welti reforms, as described by Feldmann et al.: a pluralistic liberal democracy, ethical 
values, and conscription constituted the founding basis for a federal army as a school of 
the nation.471 
Ernst sharpened the leading principle for civil–military relations in Switzerland: 
Autonomy of the military in military-technical decisions, but subordination in political 
matters.472 Moreover, military autonomy but political subordination represent two sides 
of the same coin, which requires mutual respect and acceptance. This respect and ac-
ceptance can be explained by various letters that Herbert Constam received during his 
career. In 1931, the cantonal governments of Schwyz (Figure 15 and Figure 16) and Uri 
(Figure 17) congratulated Constam on his promotion to the rank of Br. Gen (he led units 
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whose troops came from these cantons).473 In 1937, the SECDEF informed Constam that 
the federal council promoted him to the rank of Maj. Gen. and transferred the command 
of the 6th infantry division to him (Figure 21).474 Following this promotion, the mayor of 
Kuesnacht, Constam’s hometown, congratulated him on his promotion and command 
(Figure 22).475 On the other hand, in 1939, Constam wrote two respectful, constructively 
critical proposals about the draft of the military act of 1939. He pointed out that a perma-
nent CiC must be avoided due to political reasons (he possibly meant the contemporary 
international tensions), and due to the federalist structure of Switzerland. Furthermore, he 
proposed a pool of candidates who should be prepared for their possible role as CiC in 
the event of war and, therefore, should receive more influence within the civil–military 
National Defense Committee. His proposal was not been implemented. However, Con-
stam’s critique and his acceptance of civil authority underlined his sense for responsibil-
ity towards the liberal democratic state order of Switzerland (Figure 35 through Figure 
44).476 
The mindset and worldview of Lt. Gen. Constam was substantially influenced by 
the multiethnic, multi-religious, pluralistic character of Switzerland, as well as by patriot-
ism, the nation’s right and duty to self-defense, and neutrality as described by Jaun and 
Feldmann et al.477 Constam, as a German-speaking, liberal, Protestant of Jewish origin, 
and commanding officer of units which consisted entirely of Catholics, embodied multi-
ple preconditions of a “nation of will” within his person. Furthermore, the Swiss GS’s 
esteem was founded not only on tactical and operation proficiency but also on charis-
matic and accountable officers such as Constam, as the letter of appreciation from his of-
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ficers and soldiers showed (Figure 12).478 Although Constam had been deployed multi-
ple times to France and Spain, the impact of foreign doctrines on him remained limited. 
He abstained from blindly copying these doctrines but incorporated his experiences into 
his operational considerations.479 In 1923, Constam already defined in his proposal the 
future pillars of national defense, such as the main tasks of the army (defense, protection 
of neutrality, the armed forces as school of the nation), conscription as perpetual narra-
tive, no blind trust in alliances, first ideas of the Reduit-concept (flexible defense in the 
plains, tenacious defense in the mountains), a simplified order processing, human com-
prehension of the soldier’s needs, among others. Most important, he quoted Archduke 
Karl and stated that a parvenu and self-declared military genius could easily instrumental-
ize a standing army and that only a citizen-army would be able to prevent such a devel-
opment.480 In the light of history, the question remained: Did Constam foresee the future 
and would he have had the personal courage to oppose an anti-democratic shift in state-
hood as Ulrich von Hassel pointed out?481 
Although Herbert Constam did not represent all elements of the contemporary 
Swiss elite that Jaun described, Constam embodied most aspects of it, such as a wealthy 
bourgeois origin, sufficient economic reserves, profound civil education through study in 
Switzerland and Germany, best preconditions for a successful start as lawyer, and mem-
bership within the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), among others.482 Moreover, his suc-
cessful career, especially within the armed forces as a regular or within academia, never 
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seemed hindered or impeded by his Jewish origins; on the contrary, his career must be 
characterized as comet-like.483 
In 1908 and 1910, Constam received the best grades as a young Lieutenant and as 
a candidate for the regular service (Figure 10 and Figure 11).484 In 1933, Constam had 
been appointed as a lecturer at the ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)—
six months after Hitler’s seizure of power (Figure 18).485 In 1934, shortly after the 
Roehm coup in Germany, the Inspector General of the infantry congratulated Constam 
for 25 years in regular service (Figure 19).486 In 1936, the ETH renewed Constam’s pro-
fessorship shortly before the Nazis invoked the Nuremberg race laws in Germany (Figure 
20).487 In 1938, the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party in Zurich appreciated Con-
stam’s advice for a letter of inquiry to the federal government (Figure 23).488 In 1942, 
Constam started a correspondence with the CiC, Gen. Guisan, in which he requested to 
stay in his post as commander of the 6th infantry division since he expected involvement 
in WWII. The CiC complied with Constam’s wish; moreover, Guisan informed Constam 
that he intended to transfer the command of an army corps to him if the federal council 
would approve Constam’s promotion to Lt. Gen. (Figure 27 through Figure 30).489 In 
1943, the federal council promoted Constam and Guisan ordered the change of command 
of the 3rd Mountain Army Corps to him (Figure 31 through Figure 33).490 In other words, 
more than one year after the Wannsee conference in Germany (when the Nazis outlined 
the ‘final solution of the Jewish question’), the Swiss president signed Constam’s promo-
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tion to Lt. Gen. and Gen. Guisan handed over the most powerful army corps to him 
(Figure 34).491 
According to Huber, Feldmann et al., and Jaun, Herbert Constam was an es-
teemed member of the Swiss elite for which education, profession, commitment to the 
Swiss civic state, devotional patriotism, and a bourgeois self-understanding was much 
more vital than a particular religious belief or ethnic origin.492 Nevertheless, if Constam 
would have come out of a lower class family, even with his essential qualities he never 
would have contributed to the operational planning of the armed forces. 
  
                                                 
491 Constam, vol. 1. 
492 Huber, “Die Staatsrechtliche Stellung Des Generals in Der Schweiz [the Constitutional Status of the 
General in Switzerland],” 94; Feldmann, Schafroth, and Schumacher, Hundert Jahre Schweizer Wehrmacht 
[Hundred Years Swiss Armed Forces], 80; Jaun, Das Schweizerische Generalstabskorps 1875-1945 [the 
Corps of the Swiss General Staff Officers 1875-1945], 8:486. 
136 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
137 
V. COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION 
Within the setting of the research question, this study juxtaposes the role of the 
German GS with its Swiss counterpart. The chapter introduces events, timespans, re-
gions, or circumstances beyond the scope of the study in order to set the results of the 
study into the historical as well as contemporary context. This task is vital for under-
standing the results themselves, as well as when and how a set of liberal principles and 
the convictions of a democratic civilian authority as moral primacy must be implanted in 
the hearts and minds of future military leaders to avoid a repetition of a Third Reich. 
A. LIBERAL VALUES 
A “professional” GS officer, inextricably linked to a set of constitutional and lib-
eral values, would never challenge the supremacy of civilian authority.493 Thomas C. 
Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson compare Huntington’s claim (in The Soldier and the 
State) that the soldier should be limited to military “professional” tasks to ensure civilian 
authority with Masland and Radway’s view (in Soldiers and Scholars: Military Educa-
tion and National Policy) that military officers with a fuller understanding of policy 
would be less prone to challenge civilian leadership.494 The liberal GS officer constitutes 
a sui generis “moral unit” and has a primary social responsibility to its people. A GS of-
ficer who would use his or her skills to question civilian authority would instantly change 
his or her role from society’s protector to its threat.495 Furthermore, a responsible GS of-
ficer, bound to a set of liberal values, would not challenge civilian authority even in the 
case of a corrupt political culture. The officer would not recognize himself or herself as a 
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messiah with a duty to rescue the society, the state, or the nation from an incompetent 
government by a coup d’état.496 
A set of liberal values, inculcated through a humanistic approach within the mili-
tary education system of a country, is essential for the self-understanding of a liberal 
military leader and GS officer. According to Bruneau and Tollefson, military leaders, 
bound to liberal values, need to pass a thorough educational program that includes the 
liberal arts in addition to military, tactical-technological topics. This approach enforces 
the development of an enlightened appreciation for the liberal democratic society. A lib-
eral education must be seen as an indispensable part of a professional GS officer to find 
its place and status within a liberal democracy. As a product of the military education 
system, the crafting of a professional GS staff (or a similar entity)—equally bound to lib-
eral values as its members—is likewise essential for a modern military to perform its du-
ties as protector of liberal democracy.497 
Therefore, military education must complement and not compete with civilian au-
thority and civil society—a goal that, say, in the Federal Republic of Germany remained 
unachieved until the 1970s. According to Bruneau and Tollefson, the inclusion of liberal 
values within a professional military education in no way contradicts the soldierly esprit 
de corps or the cohesiveness of military forces. Even more, the unconditional loyalty to 
civilian authority and the nation’s society strengthens the military and the state’s effec-
tiveness to counter threats, particularly in the long term. In contrary, if officers take con-
trol over a country in order to discipline the country's civil society or civilian leadership, 
they fundamentally sabotage the country's development in the long term. In particular, 
within unstable democratic societies, the teaching of respect or tolerance for civilian au-
thority to the military must be seen as a crucial challenge within nation-building. Within 
stable liberal democracies, civilian involvement in military education—to keep military 
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minds competitive against threats and cooperative towards liberal values—substantially 
improves civil–military relations.498 
The Federal Republic of Germany, with the introduction of the Bundeswehr’s 
code of conduct Innere Führung, and Spain after 1975, with its fundamental transfor-
mation of the military education system, serve as valuable examples to emphasize this 
study’s theses beyond its stated scope. According to Bruneau and Matei, the Bun-
deswehr’s framework Innere Führung substantially influenced military education in West 
Germany during the Cold War. It substantially contributed to the liberal democratic shap-
ing of military entities and was a fundamental pillar of West Germany’s state and institu-
tion building, as well as an example for professional military education within countries 
in transition to democracy.499 In Spain, before the democratization in 1975, professional 
military education was a purely military domain. Legitimated by their military ranks on-
ly, senior officers without any academic credentials taught officer cadets. After the transi-
tion, the military education system slowly but steadily introduced the principles of civil 
academic education. Today, teachers within the Spanish military schools and academies 
must have university degrees, and the cadets receive an education that is certified and 
synchronized with the Bologna model (European Credit Transfer System).500 The facul-
ties consist of civilian and military, domestic and international lecturers, who facilitate 
critical thinking and civilian perspectives to enforce the junior officer’s professional ex-
pertise. From the mid-1980s, the Spanish armed forces never again posed a threat to the 
democratic state order.501 
By comparing and interpreting the case studies of Germany and Switzerland be-
tween 1933 and 1945, this research uncovered fundamental differences in the internaliza-
tion of liberal values. The primary factors influencing the predominant attitude of the 
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German GS prior to 1945 were nationalism, the conviction of an authoritarian state’s ne-
cessity, anti-Marxism, and the belief in the military’s pivotal role beyond the German so-
ciety. The overwhelming majority of the GS officers remained hostile to a pluralistic re-
public and rejected political parties as ruling entities. The democratic reality seemed to be 
a nightmare for them. The German officers in the Weimar Republic had been raised with 
the principles of royalism and the privileges of being the first estate within the nation. 
Political affairs were no place for an officer. 
Political experience of constitutional rights and privileges in a pluralist society 
and state among German officers was almost non-existent. The political sphere played no 
part in military education and training and was often left to the terrible simplifier and 
demagogue with an ideal of the state that was anti-pluralist and made the professional 
soldier an easy target for the totalitarians. In particular, during the Reichswehr era, party 
politics and political influences from outside were banned, respectively, and prohibited 
within the armed forces since the military leadership was concerned about a possible dis-
ruption of the Reichswehr’s inner coherence. Indeed, the general aversion of parliamen-
tarism among the officer corps played a vital role within the later political instrumentali-
zation. The officer corps avoided identification with the republic. The officer corps and 
the GS became immunized against democracy. 
The German officer corps and its GS did not have respect for democratic norms 
and political pluralism. This disrespect originated in the historical roots of the officer 
corps and in its belief that an authoritarian government would be more suitable for the 
leadership of the nation. From their perspective, the end would justify the means. The 
majority silently and willingly accepted the replacement of pluralistic diversity in a liber-
al democracy by a totalitarian, nationalistic dictatorship. 
Prior to 1914 and more so prior to 1933, the German officer corps and its GS un-
willingly accepted and never loyally respected the primacy of democratic civilian au-
thority over military affairs. The highest leadership, as well as the officer corps, refused 
civilian influence in military matters. On the contrary, the officer corps, as the self-
elected guarantor of the state, saw itself as authorized to influence political affairs if—
from the officer’s perspective—the civilian interests would interfere with the state’s in-
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terests. Repeatedly, the Reichswehr committed insubordination to direct orders of the ci-
vilian government and become an unreliable instrument of governmental power in do-
mestic affairs. Hitler’s policy of the two pillars confirmed the officer corps’ conviction 
that only an authoritarian state would respect the unique character and influence of the 
officer’s caste. 
In Switzerland, the determining narratives for a majority of the Swiss GS corps 
were the cultural, historical, and political heritage as a liberal-republican servant; the al-
truistic commitment to the statehood; and distinct disapproval of personified concentra-
tion of power. Autonomous military capabilities to defend a pivotal maxim of Swiss 
statehood—neutrality—were out of question. The respect for the civilian leadership as an 
expression of the people’s free commitment for independence within a liberal democracy 
automatically subordinated the officer corps to the primacy of democratic procedural 
norms, which evolved from political pluralism ignited by the liberal revolution within the 
19th century in Switzerland. The officers did not accept this subordination only because it 
was written within a law; they even applied liberal democratic principles in cases where 
the law lacked sufficient regulation. Furthermore, Switzerland managed to institutionalize 
political pluralism and avoided the crafting of a Praetorian guard through the officer 
corps’ composition (regulars and conscripts), the decisive influence of the civilian de-
fense administration, and the civil–military advisory bodies within the armed forces. 
Although the subordination of the SAF beyond civilian authority could create 
conflicts, the permanent enthronement of a single person who concentrates all military 
power would contradict the federalist character of Swiss statehood, which evolved from a 
loose confederacy of smaller states. Such a concentration of power never had a real 
chance of implementation. Also, the Swiss military, a citizen-soldier army, must be seen 
as the most improbable instrument to overthrow a freely elected government. All con-
flicts between the military leadership and the civilian authorities had been solved either 
on the basis of an informal, cooperative compromise or by a militarily respected decision 
of the elected civilian bodies. 
The analysis of the educational reduction phases and their subsequent negative 
outcomes in political, military, and societal development within German history empha-
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sizes the importance of a profound civilian education for the professional officer, and in 
particular, for the GS officer. The marginalization of a comprehensive civilian education 
in imperial Germany and the Reichswehr—despite the honorable attempts of Gen. Rein-
hardt—were substantially responsible for the intellectual instrumentalization by Hitler. 
The neglect of Scharnhorst’s and Peucker’s principle to provide not only military, but 
also philosophical, humanistic, and liberal education on an academic level to GS officers 
led to the disastrous intellectual deficits of the GS officers within the Reichswehr. De-
spite Gen. Seeckt’s approach to increasing the academic level of the Reichswehr’s offic-
ers, his approach failed to provide sufficient understanding of the socio-cultural and so-
cio-political interdependencies among the state, the society, the economy, the military, 
and the liberal democratic republic. Seeckt’s approach intended to create a highly profi-
cient, fully obedient, and socially as well as ethnically uniform, military leadership caste. 
The educational reduction phase during the Nazi era amplified these deficits. 
Informal external qualifications, such as civil education, were inevitable to join 
the Swiss GS corps. The SAF provided comprehensive defense knowledge and the un-
derstanding of complex military operations within compact military training courses, re-
lying on a profound individual preparation and the civilian education of the candidates. 
Mainly members of the traditionally educated bourgeoisie—whose education inherently 
required a sufficient economic reserve—received the chance to be selected for a GS ca-
reer. Even so, the selection did not automatically presuppose successful graduation. Thus, 
the GS training was merit based. 
The German officer corps and its GS, as a military elite estate, developed a con-
servative authoritarian mindset, substantially determined by nationalism, militarism, great 
power ambition, and the expectation of a resumed privileged role within the state amid 
mass politics. The collapse of the Empire in 1919 substantially shattered the officer 
corps’ worldview but it was also possible to reconstitute itself amid the revolution and its 
aftermath in the early 1920s. The subsequent social cleansing during the Seeckt era sabo-
taged the republican reform of the officer corps and especially its GS. The uniform and 
limited mindset made the officer corps vulnerable to the seduction of National Socialist 
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ideology and paralyzed its intellectual ability to assess the threat of the Nazi ideology ac-
cordingly. 
The mindset and worldview of the Swiss GS officer were substantially influenced 
by the heritage of the heterogeneous amalgamation of the Swiss polity. Switzerland, as a 
civic and multinational state, consists of ethnicities from multiple language areas and of 
people who belong to several religious groups. This heterogeneity is expressed within the 
political pluralism in Switzerland, which in turn has been absorbed by the citizen-soldier-
type armed forces. The armed forces were the first national network after the evolving of 
the Swiss federal state in the mid-19th century. This multinational, multilinguistic, multi-
religious state-building approach represented the founding roots of Swiss statehood and 
was resistant to foreign influences. Nonetheless, this approach was domestically centered. 
Switzerland abstained from exerting its own rules and principles beyond its geographical 
and social borders. Furthermore, Switzerland praised its self-serving concept of a “special 
case Switzerland” (even decades after WWII). This concept explains the ambiguous role 
of the Swiss authorities (and therefore also the military) during WWII, the Holocaust, and 
the Swiss rejection of refugees at its borders.502 The Swiss elite (including the GS) failed 
to apply its moral guidelines to persecuted and vulnerable people. 
The principle of the expected circles ethnically, religiously, and socially homoge-
nized the conservative substance of the Reichswehr’s GS. During the Reichswehr era, 
anti-Semitism did not exist in the form of discriminatory laws but as subliminal para-
digms and behavioral patterns. By applying flimsy caveats and implementing arbitrary 
obstacles, the Reichswehr’s leadership followed a policy of social, religious, and ethnic 
exclusion. Yet, nepotism seemed to play only a minor role in officer promotion within the 
GS. 
In the first half of the 20th century, social mobility in Switzerland was limited due 
to the preconditions of education and profession. Social groups that did not have the nec-
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essary economic independence—in one word: wealth—could barely start an academic 
education, which was the precondition for a higher position within the economy and the 
military. Furthermore, since the state did not provide sufficient financial compensation 
for military service—the altruistic duty of the nation—lower classes only had marginal 
chances to serve as officers, particularly within the GS. Those classes faced substantial 
financial limitations, requiring them to work to pay their living allowances. Even so, the 
lower classes had a better chance to enter the military elite via the corps of regular offic-
ers. Although their initial selection was also based on academic preconditions, it was to a 
lesser extent. 
The German GS officer’s self-understanding as ruler of the state was substantially 
determined by the Prussian concept of loyalty and absolute obedience to the sovereign or 
the state, a nationalistic focus, and the conviction to be the only bearer of state power. If 
necessary, the corps would act against the people or a civilian government. Based on the 
officer’s self-understanding, Hitler and the National-Socialist movement must be the of-
ficer’s allies. Like the officer, they acted loyally to the state, if only pretending, and ap-
preciated absolute obedience, advocated for nationalistic standpoints, and conceded a 
privileged status to the officer corps in context of Hitler’s two-pillar-approach. 
The German GS understood and interpreted itself as a societal-political-military 
elite. This approach facilitated the GS susceptibility to a totalitarian regime. At the end of 
the Weimar Republic, the officer corps represented the most homogenous officer caste 
since ancient Prussia: a real warrior elite. Hitler most effectively instrumentalized this 
elite by general conscription, which allowed him to penetrate this insulated caste. The 
following dilution of the officer corps and the GS led to the destruction of its homogenei-
ty, identity, and tradition. For the first time in history, the GS had been downgraded to a 
purely functional military elite. 
The Swiss GS understood its role as part of the Swiss elite, as a group of societal 
dignitaries, but this understanding was not linked to a privileged military caste. Moreo-
ver, most of the Swiss GS officers were conscripts and, therefore, also part of the civilian, 
societal elite. In short, in Switzerland existed one liberal, wealthy, highly educated elite. 
The GS was the militarized part of this elite. Getting selected for the GS training, howev-
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er, depended on preconditions, such as education, while the training itself was signifi-
cantly based on merit and performance. Even candidates from wealthy families with the 
best academic education failed to pass the GS courses. 
B. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL 
The fundamental principle of civil–military relations and a precondition for a 
functional liberal democracy is civilian control of the armed forces. In particular, this re-
quires the military’s subordination to civilian authority, which is defined by two indica-
tors: a civilian CiC, and a politically non-interfering military. The thesis underlines this 
argument by referring not only to the case studies of Germany and Switzerland but also 
to emerging and developing states, in particular, Brazil, Portugal, Ghana, and the South 
African Republic. According to Bruneau and Tollefson, it is critical for civilian officials 
to achieve military expertise in defense and military issues to execute their duties of the 
military’s supervision, control, and loyalty.503 According to Huntington, as cited by Bru-
neau and Tollefson, military professionalization and civilian control are indeed not trade-
offs. Thus, they are heavily intertwined with each other. For Huntington, this is a unique 
feature of modern societies and their bureaucracies.504 
The dilemma of civilian control over a particular state’s military increases accord-
ingly, the more efficient its military becomes. According to Bruneau and Tollefson, this 
effect is the particular result of domestic or international education programs, and foreign 
weapons and services procurement. In short, the more powerful the military becomes, the 
more likely it is to overthrow its civilian government. This is particularly true within 
young and unstable democracies. Professional military education, as mentioned earlier, 
and institution building, including the introduction of the military as a profession, must 
be seen as key task. In order to tackle the civilian-control dilemma within states in transi-
tion to democracy, this key task must be implemented before the increase of military effi-
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ciency takes place.505 Besides, the crafting of an efficient defense bureaucracy, such as a 
ministry of defense, to act as a linking point between the military and civilian administra-
tion must be seen as necessary to formulate a national security and military strategy.506 
Civilian control of the armed forces does not necessarily mean democratic control 
of the armed forces. According to Bruneau and Tollefson, in addition to the liberal demo-
cratic model of civilian control over armed forces (the penetration model with objective 
control), there are two other approaches to ensure the military’s compliance with civilian 
rule. These approaches are the traditional-aristocratic model (social status and military 
rank are comparable, no social mobility, i.e., in early Prussia), and the penetration model 
with subjective control (political factions control the armed forces—and in particular the 
officer corps—through the belief system, i.e., the Communist Party within the Soviet Un-
ion).507 While values education is of very little importance in the traditional-aristocratic 
model, it is essential for the penetration models of civilian control.508 While in authori-
tarian states with civilian leadership, e.g., China, the political control ultimately needs to 
synchronize the officers’ worldview and mindset with those of the ruling entity, the liber-
al democratic model requires the military to integrally accept the legitimacy of the state 
and the supremacy of civilian democratic leadership. Usually, the military’s compliance 
with civilian democratic rule is symbolized with an act of loyalty not to a particular ad-
ministration but to the democratic Constitution.509 In short, moral guidance, and a set of 
democratic norms and values (one of them is democratic civilian control) empowered by 
military expertise and professionalism shield the military from becoming a mortician of 
democracy. As history shows, a single training session in liberal values is not enough. 
Democratic norms, in particular civilian control, need to be a permanent and integral part 
of military education and training throughout an officer’s career. Thus, the liberal demo-
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cratic model of civilian control depends on a set of liberal values and moral-cultural 
norms. Once, those norms are internalized as moral principles in the minds of a particular 
military, especially within the officer corps, objective civilian control has de facto been 
established.510 
Portugal, Brazil, Ghana, and the Republic of South Africa represent striking ex-
amples of effective civilian control after the transition to democracy beyond this study’s 
scope. Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn summarize the classic dilemma of civilian con-
trol with the question: “Who guards the guardians?” A military strong enough to defend 
the country is also strong enough to stage a coup. Portugal and Brazil after democratiza-
tion as successful examples and Germany before 1945 as negative example show that 
formal control is not enough. The essential parameters are functional institutions, effec-
tive oversight, and professional norms. Institutional control mechanisms exercised 
through organic laws and regulations provide direction and guidance for the military, and 
empower the civilian leadership. Oversight helps to keep track of the military’s actions 
and ensure the loyal execution of civilian orders. Transparent professional norms, institu-
tionalized through legal approval, define recruitment, education, training, and promotion 
within the armed forces following the guidance of the democratically elected leader-
ship.511 In order to execute any military mission, a democratically elected civilian leader-
ship needs to provide three components: first, a strategy; second, organizations and pro-
cedures to elaborate and implement plans as well as to enable the cooperation between 
civilian authorities and the military leadership, i.e., a ministry of defense and a GS; and 
third, necessary resources. Lacking one these components might not only endanger the 
military’s mission but also democratic control of the military.512 
Since the mid-1990s, both the South African defense forces and the Ghanaian 
armed forces can be assessed as role models for institutionalized democratic control of 
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armed forces. According to Croissant and Kuehn, in South Africa, the allocation of the 
defense budget is transparently defined based on democratically established rules and 
procedures, overseen by auditing institutions. Parliamentary committees address a variety 
of military issues, conduct field visits, and report to parliament regularly. A powerful 
media sphere and civil society significantly support governmental oversight.513 Despite 
some shortcomings in institutionalization of civilian control, Ghana must be seen as role 
model for sub-Saharan Africa since it succeeded in democratization and demilitariza-
tion.514 Thus, civil society and progressively powerful media increase the people’s inter-
est in civil–military relations and democratic control of the armed forces.515 Despite his-
torical differences, South Africa and Ghana implemented feasible frameworks and mili-
tary reforms to democratize their armed forces. While Ghana has a long history of mili-
tary coups and counter-coups, followed by an era of fragile military rule, South Africa 
has enjoyed greater political stability, but the armed forces played a crucial role in keep-
ing the apartheid regime in power.516 
The contemporary term for the institutionalization of civilian control within a 
state and to prevent the military from becoming a threat to democracy is Security Sector 
Reform (SSR). SSR aims “to reform security institutions to make them better at creating 
a secure environment for individuals and communities, in a way that is consistent with 
democratic norms and principles of good governance,” according to Bruneau and Ma-
tei.517 Most contemporary scholars argue that SSR as a mechanism substantially contrib-
utes to demilitarization and democratization in transforming societies. SSR has the poten-
tial to improve military policies, maintain coherence of effort, and mitigate tensions with-
in a country. Nonetheless, SSR must not be recognized as panacea for unstable societies 
in domestic struggle with an unreliable military at its side. The scope of SSR, its applica-
tion in practice, its defined goals, and the local cultural and historical context of a particu-
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lar society often hinder or impede successful implementation. Further, when foreign ad-
visers and organizations involved in the process do not sufficiently understand the envi-
ronment in which they are working, SSR’s implementation may falter.518 According to 
Booth, as cited by Bruneau and Matei, the major threat to the security of the individual in 
many emerging or developing countries is the state itself through its repressive security 
forces. This statement implies that the reform of dysfunctional or predatory forces, in or-
der to force them to respect human rights and democratic civilian control based on liberal 
values, must be a key strategy to tackle the problem of undemocratic security forces.519 
A crucial advantage of SSR is its comprehensive and normative approach. Ac-
cording to Bruneau and Matei, SSR explicitly acknowledges the relationship between se-
curity forces and governance. In particular, during the Cold War, Westernized improve-
ment programs for emerging states were often based on narrow “train-and-equip” ap-
proaches to achieve specific political or military aims. The outcome was often unsatisfac-
tory, i.e., in South America. Such programs contributed to widespread human rights 
abuses and kept authoritarian regimes in power. In contrast, SSR is inherently guided by 
liberal principles as well as human rights, but also by the aim of democratic control over 
the armed forces.520 The main task of SSR is to address reforms within the security sec-
tor to improve military effectiveness, efficiency, affordability, and professionalization but 
also—and even more important—to reorient the security forces from authoritarian to 
democratic rule as well as to implement appropriate normative standards of good govern-
ance. The standards of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) for SSR are based on four pillars: first, develop a clear and effective institutional 
framework for providing security that includes all relevant actors and focuses on the vul-
nerable; second, enforce the civilian, governmental oversight over the security forces; 
third, craft reliable and qualified security forces that are an integral part of the democratic 
institutional framework (and not a foreign body); and fourth, are accountable for stability 
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and to the rule of law within the particular country.521 The normative synergies of those 
pillars may be non-existent in developing states.522 
The track record of SSR is mixed, however, since a key aspect is often ignored: 
local ownership. According to Bruneau and Matei, the success of SSR heavily relies on 
sensitivity to the local context, particularly with respect to the SSR’s ambition.523 SSRs 
that directly import and impose foreign structures, policies, procedures, among others, are 
doomed to fail. Creative, coherent, discrete, but local approaches, guided (but not deter-
mined) by liberal principles are more suitable. When such approaches are combined with 
domestic incentives and applied over a longer period, they seem to provide the best re-
sults for a democratic transition.524 The real challenge of SSR must be recognized in the 
tension between its strategic-holistic conception and its institutionally-specific operation-
alization in practice.525 
Comparing the case studies of Germany and Switzerland within the studied era 
reveals significant distinctions of civilian control over the armed forces. Neither the 
Weimar Republic nor the Third Reich provided the necessary preconditions for civilian 
control of their armed forces based on a liberal democratic understanding. Putting the to-
talitarian Nazi state after 1933 aside, de facto, the Weimar constitution failed as state 
structure to effectively control, restrict, and limit military power within its constitution 
despite a de jure existing constitutional framework that would have provided the possibil-
ities to do so. The Reichswehr and its GS—as outlined before—welcomed the abolish-
ment of any civilian restrictions and control over military primacy. 
The Swiss GS, as a military incorporation of the Swiss elite, was more than a mil-
itary command instrument. Moreover, it constituted a stabilizing entity of the liberal 
democratic state order and acted as a bulwark against totalitarian aspirations. The civilian 
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control over the SAF can be exemplarily explained by the relationship between the CiC 
and the civilian government: the CiC is unconditionally subordinated to the federal coun-
cil. Particularly in republics, the governmental power shall not consist of military power 
itself, although self-preservation, as the most pivotal state task in wartime, relies substan-
tially on military power. In Switzerland, in cases of mobilization of the armed forces, the 
General, as an elected state official, concentrates all military power in his or her hands. 
This power, however, is substantially and intentionally limited since such a concentration 
of power would contradict essential paradigms of Swiss statehood, such as federalism, 
equality, minority protection, and direct democracy. 
Within the Weimar Republic, constitutional checks and balances never reached 
sufficient effectiveness to restrict the military’s autonomy and to control the armed forc-
es. The constitution of the Weimar Republic comprised legal instruments that would have 
allowed subordinating the military under civilian control and regulating its affairs based 
on liberal democratic standards, i.e., budgetary restrictions. The deficiencies of the Wei-
mar Republic, especially the almost unrestricted right of the president to govern through 
emergency decrees and the refusal of the parliament to apply its authority, led the origi-
nally intended parliamentary control of the Reichswehr ad absurdum. 
In the context of the constitutional structure, the autonomy of the Reichswehr’s 
GS appears extensive, undemocratic, conflict-prone, and dangerous. The fact that the ci-
vilian CiC had less command authority than the formally subordinated military com-
mander exemplified the extent of autonomy which the Reichswehr and its GS enjoyed 
during the Weimar Republic. Despite a political attempt to curtail the military’s autono-
my in 1926, the parliament failed to restrict the Reichswehr’s autonomy adequately. After 
Hitler’s seizure of power, the dictator revoked traditional GS principles and increasingly 
restricted GS autonomy by downgrading or restructuring efforts, or the installation of po-
litical paladins. 
The militia principle is a further measure for civilian control of the SAF since the 
citizens themselves, and not an isolated military caste, constitute the armed forces. De-
spite multiple attempts, a full volunteer force or a permanent CiC never were more than a 
political (or military) dream of isolated groups. The most essential constitutional checks 
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and balances that regulate and limit the armed forces are not only written documents, 
such as the constitution or the military act. Rather, a framework of institutionalized and 
integrated civil–military instruments within the state's structures—such as the conscrip-
tion itself, the militia principle, and the National Defense Committee—ensure that the 
military can never autonomously gain unlimited control over national assets. 
The Reichswehr and its GS, as a full-volunteer elite force, insulated itself from 
the institutional framework and the population, becoming a kind of Praetorian guard, 
which was especially evident in the critical period of 1930-1933 which enabled Hinden-
burg to make Hitler chancellor. Gen. Seeckt’s policy of an apolitical Reichswehr—
substantially influenced by his anti-republican and anti-parliamentary attitude—
sabotaged the republicanization of the military and disconnected the armed forces from 
the democratic institutions of the Weimar Republic. The reactionary course of the mili-
tary leadership provoked hostile isolation of the Reichswehr from the urban working 
class, the liberal-republican middle class, and the intelligentsia. Seeckt’s “Great Wall” 
prevented a successful integration of the Reichswehr into the constitutional framework of 
the Weimar Republic. In contrast, the Nazis almost immediately integrated the military 
into the regime’s framework and instrumentalized the military for their totalitarian and 
racist objectives. 
The German GS, with its self-understanding as a political-social-military elite, 
provided an extremely high military proficiency in favor of authoritarian state rulers and 
is a perfect example of a “state within a state.” The GS became an efficient, fully profes-
sionalized elite with a distinct attitude against republicanism and democracy but with an 
obsession with the ideal state. The highly professional GS officer was a profoundly 
trained military specialist with a limited educational background, isolated from the civil-
ian reality, and possessed of a thought pattern that was strongly influenced by conserva-
tive rhetoric, making him susceptible for seduction. 
The Swiss GS was not a pure functional elite like in other armies. Moreover, the 
amalgamation of regular and conscript officers with their various backgrounds and expe-
riences created a GS that served as an active state-stabilizing entity of the nation and a 
representative of the society. Foreign military structures or procedures of standing ar-
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mies, imported without adaptations and integrating measures, endangered the cohesion 
and destabilized the SAF during the 19th century. Moreover, the German GS concept 
represented the exception, although this concept was more “translated and transformed” 
than imported. In contrast to standing armies’ principles, a conscript army needs an even 
more comprehensible distinction and more specific responsibilities for the permanent ci-
vilian administration, the civil–military bodies, and the military units (which are on duty 
only for a limited period during the year). Despite its steadily increasing complexity, the 
degree of professionalization of the Swiss GS remains limited. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With the Nazi civil-military ideal of the dual pillar state in mind, the French am-
bassador in Berlin, André François-Poncet, wrote in 1934 in a report about the past year: 
Deux institutions, l’armée allemande et le parti national-socialiste, se 
trouvaient ainsi en présence…il s’agissait de savoir qui, dans le nouvel 
état allemand, exercerait l’influence prédominante: le parti ou l’armée.526 
(Two institutions, the German army, and the National-Socialist party are 
now in charge … the question remains, which entity would exercise the 
predominant influence within the new German state: the party or the ar-
my.) 
Unfortunately, the answer to Poncet’s question by the end of the summer of 1934 was the 
National-Socialist party, which exercised the predominant influence within the new Ger-
man state—with disastrous consequences for the entire world. 
In Germany between 1933 and 1945, the GS acted as a mortician of democracy. 
Liberal values and civilian control of the armed forces were negatively related to the role 
of the GS. The German GS sabotaged the Weimar democracy by its actions and omis-
sions in its crucial birth phase but also in the pivotal period of 1930-1933. The GS was a 
refuge of reactionaries, substantially determined by a nationalistic, anti-democratic, anti-
republican attitude, as well as by a traditionally conservative mindset and an authoritarian 
worldview. Respect for democratic norms, the primacy of civilian authority, or the appre-
ciation of ethnic and social diversity was nonexistent. The German GS understood itself 
as a societal-political-military elite, substantially influenced by a conviction of political 
and social superiority extracted from the dynastic and integral nationalist principles 
adapted to mass politics. The Reichswehr’s leadership was successful in providing a pro-
found but narrow form of military training and education to the members of its GS. But, 
it failed to prioritize a comprehensive humanistic education along with Scharnhorst’s and 
Peucker’s enlightened principles. The Weimar Republic failed to provide the necessary 
                                                 
526 Müller, Armee, Politik Und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1933-1945: Studien Zum Verhältnis Von 
Armee Und NS-System [Armed Forces, Politics and Society in Germany 1933-1945: Studies for the 
Comprehension of Armed Forces and National Socialist System], 11. 
156 
preconditions for democratic civilian control of the armed forces. During the whole 
Weimar era, the parliament failed to apply the practically existent and legally binding 
checks and balances of ministerial oversight and policy direction to restrict the 
Reichswehr’s autonomy at home and abroad. In sum, the German GS refused, and the 
republic failed to integrate the military into a pluralistic constitutional framework. The 
Reichswehr and its GS became a state within a state. The German GS awaited the re-
placement of the republic by an authoritarian, although not totalitarian, exalted state and 
acted as a precursor for its restoration which was finally anything but Seeckt's soldier 
state. The GS undermined the civilian government’s authority and became an unreliable 
partner for the state’s republican institutions. It must be underlined, however, that the 
most important attempt to eliminate Hitler and to overthrow the totalitarian Nazi regime 
was planned and executed mostly by German GS officers, with devastating consequences 
for these brave individuals and their families. 
In Switzerland between 1933 and 1945, the GS Staff acted as a protector of de-
mocracy. Liberal values and civilian control of the armed forces were positively related 
to the role of the GS. Surprisingly, the Swiss GS did not constitute itself as protector of 
democracy by its actions, but rather, by its omissions. The GS was a bulwark against to-
talitarian and revolutionary influences because it reacted only on behalf of the liberal 
democratic government (i.e., during the national strike of 1918–1919) and remained (as 
an entity) immune to radical influence from all political sides. Liberal democratic para-
digms, such as direct democracy as an expression of freedom, in combination with neu-
trality, federalism, equality, minority protection, altruistic commitment, and disapproval 
of personified concentration of power were conflated. Eventually, they were converted 
into an institutionalized and integrated civil–military framework that the armed forces 
and the GS completely absorbed. The most important aspects of this framework were 
conscription and the militia principle, a unified social and military elite, and a citizen-
soldier army led by a citizen-officer corps constituted largely of the civilian educated 
bourgeoisie. This framework also encompassed the composition of the officer corps (con-
scripts and regulars) and the influence of the civilian defense administration and advisory 
civil–military bodies. 
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The case study qualitatively underlines this conclusion. Herbert Constam had a 
profound understanding and appreciation of, and respect for, democratic procedural 
norms. His commitment to liberal pluralism, equality before the law, the responsibility of 
the citizen, and the necessity of ethics as moral guideline were beyond question. He rec-
ognized conscription as a stronghold against extremist tendencies within the political and 
military establishment and emphasized multiple times the subordination of the military 
under civilian authorities. Nevertheless, he was not a willful flunky; his profound and 
constructive criticism characterized his responsibility and devotion to the democratic 
state order. In acknowledgment of the complex ethnic character of Switzerland, he 
showed profound comprehension for his subordinates’ needs as well as charismatic lead-
ership qualities, which made him legendary beyond his troops. His tactical expertise and 
his operational understanding substantially influenced Gen. Guisan’s Reduit-concept, 
which had a dissuasive effect on the invasion plans of the German Wehrmacht. Herbert 
Constam can be characterized as a genuine member of the contemporary Swiss elite. 
Constam’s Jewish roots seemed to be no handicap to him. 
In answering the research question how do liberal values and democratic civilian 
control affect the general staff’s role in a democracy in a time of domestic and interna-
tional crisis, the comparison of the German and Swiss GS between 1933 and 1945 em-
phasizes that a set of liberal principles and the conviction of a democratic civilian au-
thority as moral primacy protects a leading military entity from becoming a mortician of 
democracy. Even so, this moral primacy must be implanted within the hearts and minds 
of future GS officers far earlier than any military education starts. 
This comparative study strikingly reinforces Bruneau and Tollefson’s conclusion 
and recommendation expressed in their study Who Guards the Guardian?527 In line with 
Bruneau and Tollefson’s work, it is of critical importance that GS officers internalize so-
cial responsibility as a servant of their people and their democratically elected govern-
ment, even in the case of insufficient civilian governance. GS officers and the military 
organization that they craft need to be bound to a normative and liberal set of values. This 
                                                 
527 Bruneau and Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, 
29. 
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set of values must be a constant educational topic throughout their careers. Furthermore, 
the GS officers must undergo a professional military education, streamlined along a 
broad, humanistic, and values-based approach, and taught by a combined civil–military 
faculty. GS officers need a full understanding of the political sphere and its interdepend-
encies with the polity. Further, GS officers must internalize unconditional loyalty to civil-
ian authority as an expression of modern society and must understand that actually only 
this loyalty strengthens the coherence of the nation and, therefore, also military effective-
ness in the face of a threat, particularly in the long term. In other words, respect for civil-
ian authority is a pre-condition for institution-building, which in turn is a prerequisite for 
nation-building. Last but not least, civilian leaders must learn to respect the military’s 
contribution to the state, which is best achieved through a profound understanding of mil-
itary issues. Technically, the civilian’s expertise in military issues is indispensable to ex-
ecute their supervisory function. 
Since the comprehensive and normative SSR approach provides the most linking 
points to the study’s conclusion, the author argues to adapt the OECD’s SSR concept but 
still in coherence with Bruneau and Tollefson’s interpretation. Moreover, countries in 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy not only need the introduction of a pro-
fessional military education system but also an adaptation of the civilian educational 
framework. Within this adaptation, the internalization of liberal values and democratic 
civilian control as “normal” has to start far earlier than any military education —precisely 
within elementary school. In other words, before you learn to use a weapon, you shall 
learn why and for what reason you have to use it. This adaptation can be encouraged par-
allel to any SSR initiative with civilian means but must remain based on local ownership. 
Such change would facilitate and support the first SSR pillar by promoting the under-
standing of the liberal democratic or objective model of civilian control, the second pillar 
by promoting reciprocal civil-military understanding and expertise, the third pillar by de-
veloping a GS staff bound to these principles (in the long term), and the fourth pillar by 
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